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The main aim of this thesis is to construct a critical concept of performance within a generic 
concept of art through a two-fold operation. Firstly, it reconstructs the development of a generic 
concept of performance–distinct from the performing arts–in the period of post-WWII art in 
North America by focusing on task-dance and the event-score as two emblematic artistic 
strategies of this period. Task-dance and event-score practices, it argues, had a central role in 
the practical transformation from a medium-specific to a generic concept of art. Secondly, it 
examines the key philosophical concepts that are inseparable from a generic concept of art, and 
are necessary for the reconstruction of a generic concept of performance: ‘practice’, ‘labour’, 
‘autonomy’, ‘abstraction’, ‘medium’, ‘mediation’, ‘subject’, ‘object’, ‘structure’ and 
‘abstraction.’  
The central argument of the thesis is that a critical reconstruction of the concept 
of performance within the context of post-WWII art must take into account a generic and a 
autonomous concept of art. The latter refers to a post-medium-specific concept of art, which is 
still autonomous in Theodor Adorno’s understanding of the term: art as derived from, yet 
distinctively and formally separated from empirical reality. Embedded but formally abstracted 
from the social relations from which it comes, the category of ‘performance’, the thesis argues, 
is a practice of relations. It is a practice in the sense in which Karl Marx formulates practice in 
his early writings as social and sensuously empirical. It also refers to practice in the sense in 
which Marx articulates a radically new concept of the subject through this category.  
The thesis also aims to make a contribution to art theory through its critical 
methodology. It forces a reconsideration of performance within the framework of ‘art in 
general’, and more specifically, it emphasises dance’s central role in this history. It employs a 
number of terms and categories central to task-dance and event-score practices that, it argues, 
are internal to the generic category performance as it operates within the context of a generic 
concept of art.  
The central problem from which this thesis sets out concerns the way in which the 
dominating concept of performance–derived from cultural theory–is used within art theory. 
Cutting across disciplines such as Cultural Studies, Performance Studies and Theatre Studies, 
this conception fails to distinguish between art and culture more generally, and between art and 
other modes of reality. In short, the thesis confronts a cultural concept of performance–and the 
related category of performativity–as well as its application to performance practices in art, 
with a critical one that is reconstructed through a different set of philosophical categories and 
methods.  
Chapter 1 argues that the development of a generic concept of art and performance is 
best described as a shift towards practice, primarily through Marx’s account of this. Chapter 2 
confronts art-theoretical conceptions of the event-score and task-dance, based in structuralism 
and pragmatism with Immanuel Kant, and demonstrates how John Dewey’s notion of art relies 
on a conflated notion of Aristotle’s practice/poiesis-distinction. Drawing on Husserl’s 
‘phenomenological reduction’ and Kant’s ‘acts of abstraction’, Chapter 3 argues that the 
negation of a medium-specific conception of the object in event-score and task-dance practices 
constructed a new conception of the art object: the performative structure-object. Chapter 4 
considers the role of negation in task-dance, in relation to Adorno’s concept of autonomous art 
and Marx’s notion of abstract labour. Chapter 5 demonstrates the way in which the 
performative-structure object is transcendental and performative, and argues that it must be 
understood as the practical condition for the generalisation of the category of performance 
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 Introduction  
 
 From a cultural to a critical concept of performance in art  
The central problem from which this thesis sets out concerns the way the dominating 
concept of performance–derived from cultural theory–has been used within art. The 
term cultural theory cuts across several disciplines and modes of thought, including 
cultural-, performance- and theatre studies, which have their respective philosophical 
roots in structuralism, poststructuralism, pragmatism and English language philosophy. 
The concept of performance, used within such discourses, I name as a ‘cultural concept 
of performance’, which I distinguish from performance that is construed within a 
generic concept of art. The former’s primary concern is with meaning production of 
phenomena at a general level.1 As such, it fails to distinguish between art and culture, 
and between art and empirical reality, a distinction that is fundamental for a generic 
concept of art. The main aim of this thesis is to construct a critical concept of 
performance–understood as a general category that is distinct from the performing 
arts2–within a generic concept of art. It does so through a two-fold operation. Firstly, it 
reconstructs the development of a generic concept of performance in the period of post-
WWII art (focusing primarily on North America) by considering a series of emblematic 
artistic strategies, forms and case studies. Secondly, it examines the key philosophical 
concepts necessary for understanding this generic concept of performance, namely: 
‘autonomy’, ‘labour’, ‘medium’, ‘mediation’, ‘object’, ‘subject’ and ‘abstraction’. In 
short, the thesis confronts a cultural concept of performance–and the related category of 
performativity–and its application to performance practices in art, with a critical one 
that is reconstructed through the set of philosophical categories mentioned above. 
Following these aims, the questions asked here are: Firstly, how can performance be 
constructed as a critical–in its highest generality or abstraction–category within the 
context of North-American post-WWII art? To what extent must such an undertaking, 
on the one hand, deal with the category of ‘art in general’, and with the related 
categories of ‘labour’, ‘medium’, ‘mediation’, ‘object’, ‘subject’ and ‘abstraction’? On 
the other hand, to what degree must such a project refer to a concept of performance at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Roland Barthes points out that structuralists, since Ferdinand de Saussure, have been concerned with 
meaning and signification as their main problem. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Anette Lavers 
(New York: The Noon Day Press, 1972), 110.  
2 ‘Performing art’ designates dance, theatre and musical practices seen as distinct disciplines and defined 
as art forms performed in front of a live audience and is often contrasted with the ‘plastic arts’ (painting 
and sculpture).  
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work in cultural theory where terms such as ‘performativity’, ‘structure’ and ‘subject’ 
are central? Secondly, how might such a critical category of performance be understood 
as central to the transformation from “a craft-based ontology of mediums”3 to a post-
medium-based generic concept of art? Furthermore, what made performance practices, 
such as task-dance and the event-score, so central to this change?  
 
The concept of medium is understood in Clement Greenberg’s sense, as he derived it 
from Gotthold Lessing’s 1766 essay on painting and poetry,4 as the self-purification of 
what is “unique and irreducible in each particular art.”5 As Rosalind Krauss has put it, 
Greenberg, like Lessing, tried to “define what is natural to a given artistic enterprise”, 
and through this, Greenberg then tried to understand its “special powers to create 
meaning.”6 Greenberg takes Immanuel Kant’s enlightenment project and critique of 
philosophy (a critique of the limits, or conditions of the possibility of philosophy itself) 
as the model for his understanding of the history of artistic modernism. As with Kant’s 
critical recasting of the borders of philosophy, modernism, Greenberg argued, 
“criticizes from the inside, through the procedures themselves of that which is being 
criticized.”7 For Greenberg, modernism’s self-critique takes the form of a “self-
purification” of specific mediums.8 Within the medium of painting, for instance, self-
purification leads to the problem of flatness, “the only condition painting shared with no 
other art.”9 Artworks, for Greenberg, are judged in terms of the specific qualities of their 
artistic mediums. The consequence of this working towards self-purification, however, 
was the necessary breaking down of the medium-specific borders of the specific arts, 
which results in a production of a generic concept of art. The flatness of painting, for 
example, leads to the questioning of its material support, the canvas, which creates 
problems no longer inherent to the medium of painting. Through the idea of a generic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Peter Osborne, ‘The Fiction of the Contemporary: Speculative Collectivity and Transnationality in the 
Atlas Group’, in Aesthetics and Contemporary Art, eds. Armen Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski 
(Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), 116. 
4 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, ”Laocön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry”, in Classic and 
Romantic German Aesthetics, ed. J.M. Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).   
5 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, 
Volume 4. Modernism with a Vengeance 1957-1969, ed. John O’Brian (University of Chicago Press: 
Chicago and London, 1993), 86. 
6 Rosalind Krauss, Passages in Modern Sculpture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981), 3.  
7 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting”, 85.  
8 Clement Greenberg, “American Type Painting,” in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and 
Criticism, Volume 3 Affirmations and Refusals 1950-1956, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 208.  
9 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting”, 87.  
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concept of art, Thierry de Duve argued that art, since the institutionalisation of 
Duchamp in the 1960s, is no longer reducible to a medium-specific theory of the arts.10  
For De Duve, Duchamp’s gesture of the ready-made implicated a radical break with the 
use of non-artistic mediums and artistic craft-based skills. This also led, as John Roberts 
has shown, to a dialectic of a de- and re- skilling of art labour.11 This de-crafting, the 
untying of artistic practice from a notion of craft, crucially set forth a new ontology of 
the artwork. The shortcomings of De Duve’s account of a generic concept of art is that 
it evades all forms of historical mediations. These shortcomings are illustrated by his 
nominal declaration: ‘this is art’. This thesis recognises De Duve’s shortcomings, and 
follows a concept of art, which considers art as general and autonomous, as formulated 
by Theodor Adorno in his posthumously published Aesthetic Theory [Ästhetische 
Theorie] (1970). This thesis focuses on Adorno’s argument that art is  ontologically 
separated from empirical reality. It also takes as its starting point Adorno’s claim that 
art is distinctively historical. De Duve’s act of nomination takes place in a vacuum, free 
from these historical mediations (social and technical). For Adorno, the concept of art–
and the way art is mediated–is continuously transforming because of social and 
technical innovations.  
 
A primary focus of this thesis is on the period between the late 1950s and mid 1960s in 
New York and California, and in particular, on two novel forms of art making that 
developed during this period and that come from two different traditions and 
disciplines. Task-dance developed out of a context of modern dance, and the event-
score initiated within the framework of musical modernism and composition. Artists, 
dancers and composers such as Anna Halprin, Simone Forti, Yoko Ono, George Brecht, 
Yvonne Rainer and Trisha Brown were central in the invention and development of 
these artistic methods, which is why specific attention will be paid to their works. Task-
dance and event-score practices radically broke with the established norm of medium-
specificity, and by doing so, questioned the convention of specialised art labour, and the 
notion of the art object, as a material and objective site of meaning. One of the main 
arguments of the thesis is that task-dance and the event-score were central in the 
ontological transformation of the concept of art, and were crucial in the move from a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Thierry de Duve, Kant After Duchamp (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996).  
11 John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art After the Readymade (London: 
Verso, 2008). 
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specific to a generic concept of art that began in the late 1940s and became 
institutionalised by the mid-1960s.  
 The period in which a generic concept of art was institutionalised has primarily 
been accounted for by the first generation of October related scholars through terms 
such as “post-war-art”, the “neo-avant-garde” and the “post-medium-condition.”12 More 
recently, a second generation of North American art historians, many of them also 
associated with October, have instead focused on the first part of the post-war art 
period, which has been termed “the social turn”13,  and is a shift from “form to process”14 
as well as a movement “from representationalism to performativity.”15 In contrast to 
Benjamin Buchloch’s, Hal Foster’s and Krauss’ engagement with art practices that 
contributed to a generic concept of art, scholars like Branden W. Joseph, Julia 
Robinson, Judith Rodenbeck and Benjamin Pieckut have rightly focused on the 
centrality that performance practices, as derived from modernist theatre, musical 
composition and dance in the early 1950s, had for the critique of medium-specificity 
and for the establishment of a generic concept of art. The first generation of October 
related scholars considered artists primarily concerned with expanded practices of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Benjamin H.D. Buchloch, “The Primary Colors for the Second Time: A Paradigm Repetition of the 
Neo-Avant-Garde”, October 37 (1986): 41-52 and Hal Foster, “What’s Neo about the Neo-Avant-
Garde”, October, 20 (1994): 5–32. See also Rosalind E. Krauss, A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the 
Age of the Post-Modern Condition (London: Thames Hudson, 2000) and Benjamin H.D. Buchloch, Neo-
Avantgarde and Culture Industry: Essays on European and American Art from 1955 to 1975 (MIT Press, 
Massachusetts, 2003). The latter, following Peter Burger’s periodization–but not diagnosis–of the 
historical and the neo-avant-garde, broadly refers to the neo-avant-garde as post-Second World War art in 
Europe and North America. Crucial characteristics for neo-avant-garde practices are, according to 
Buchloch, their denationalisation (as a result of the hegemony of capitalist exchange relations) and the 
“reemergence of the key paradigms of the historical avant-garde of 1913: grid formation, and 
monochrome painting, the readymade, collage and assemblage.” Buchloch excludes from the neo-avant-
garde The New York School Painting of the 1940s and early 1950s and other artistic practices before 
1955. He also argues that the real detachment from the historical avant-garde, and the establishment of a 
generic concept of art, does not take place until 1968 with the rise of Conceptual art, which is why all of 
the essays in Buchloch’s book are from the late 1960s. Buchloch, Neo-Avantgarde and Culture Industry, 
xxiii. 
13 Branden W. Joseph locates what he calls the “social turn” mainly in the “aesthetics of John Cage” and 
Cage’s influence on artists like La Monte Young and Tony Conrad in the late 1950s and early 1960s at 
the Black Mountain College, the Darmstadt School, Robert Dunn’s choreography workshops and The 
New School for Social Research. He writes for example about Young’s work that “by so specifically 
marking a line out of Cage’s aesthetic” (that is, by providing one possible means by which his generation 
would be able to ask ‘Who is John Cage?’), Compositions 1960 #3, #4, and #6 formed an important, if 
consistently under acknowledged touchstone, for the transformation from a ‘natural’ to a ‘social’ and 
potentially collective point of view, a social turn that would come to characterise the general ethos of 
both minimalism and Fluxus, as well as the more overtly communist projects of George Macuinas, Henry 
Flynt, and others, eventually including Cardew.” Branden W. Joseph, Beyond the Dream Syndicate: Tony 
Conrad and the Arts after Cage (Zone Books: New York, 2008), 100-101.  
14 Judith Rodenbeck, Radical Prototypes: Allan Kaprow and the Invention of Happenings (Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2011), 117.  
15 Benjamin Piekut, Experimentalism Otherwise: The New York Avant-Garde and Its Limits (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2011), 7. 
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sculpture and painting in the mid 1960s.  In contrast, the second generation argues that a 
generic concept of art, from which a concept of conceptual art derived, must be traced 
all the way back to the late 1950s’ and early 1960s’ performance practices.  This thesis 
agrees with Robinson who writes “that the conceptual turn of the 1960s actually started 
in 1959, with Brecht’s first text-based score, and not, as most accounts would have it, 
almost a decade later.”16 Peter Osborne made the same claim half a decade earlier when 
he wrote that “[t]he range of works which can retrospectively – but, nonetheless 
legitimately – be classified as ‘conceptual’ predates the movement that bears its name 
by several years and includes, crucially, work by Yoko Ono and others who would 
become associated with Fluxus.”17 In distinction to Robinson and the abovementioned 
scholars who exclude the central impact that task-dance had in this transformation, this 
thesis will argue that task-dance is as equally important as, for example, Robinson’s 
noting of the significance of the event-score.  
 
Marx’s critical epistemology  
The method used in this thesis is critical in the sense in which Karl Marx conceptualises 
the construction of economic categories within a broader claim of epistemology in his 
introduction to the Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (a 
series of seven notebooks written roughly around 1857-58 but not published until 
1941.)18  In contrast to formal logic, in which pure forms of thought are opposed to 
objective reality, Marx, partly following Kant’s transcendental critique, argues that 
within a critical scientific method one must depart from the most general and abstract 
categories to then work one’s way through to the more simple ones, and thus to finally 
arrive at the most concrete categories. Marx’s epistemology is about the limitedness of 
empirical observation: It is through the abstract categories that concrete (reality) 
“appears in the process of thinking.”19 I use Marx’s epistemological historicising claims 
about scientific method as my overall approach and method. I employ a number of 
terms and categories central to task-dance and event-score practices, which I argue are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Julia Robinson, “From Abstraction to Model: George Brecht’s Events and the Conceptual Turn in Art 
of the 1960s”, October 127 (2009), 77.  
17 Peter Osborne, Conceptual Art (New York and London: Phaidon, 2002), 18. 
18 Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde (especially Chapter 2), in which he conceptualizes the 
autonomy of art in relation to Marx’s methodology outlined in the introduction to the Grundrisse, guided 
me in this methodological connection. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minnesota: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1984).  
19  Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. Martin 
Nicolaus (London and New York: Penguin Books 1973), 101. 
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internal to the more generic category performance as it operates within the context of 
advanced art. The categories in question are ‘practice’, ‘experience’, ‘object’, ‘abstract 
labour’ and ‘structure’. Each of the five chapters departs from at least one of these, and 
also relates the concepts discussed to terms and categories such as ‘mediation’, ‘task’, 
‘event’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘reduction’. Instead of a chronological ordering, the chapters 
proceed through different categories that are inseparable from the more general category 
of performance. In this way, each chapter accounts for one aspect within the general 
category of performance. Together they give an account of how, why and in what ways 
such a general category developed as well as the way it can be placed within a generic 
concept of art.  
In the same section of the Grundrisse, Marx also makes the point that the 
most abstract categories become valid or thinkable–as abstract categories–only when 
the historical, that is, real practical relations of which they are expressions of relations, 
are fully unfolded. The main example given by Marx is the category “labour”, which he 
writes, is “immeasurably old.” But “when it is economically conceived in this 
simplicity, ‘labour’ is as modern a category as are the relations which create this simple 
abstraction.”20 The implication is that ‘labour in general’ “presupposes a very developed 
totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is any longer predominant.”21 It 
also means that it is only in the most developed form of capitalist societies that “the 
abstraction of the category ‘labour’, ‘labour’ as such, ‘labour pure and simple’, becomes 
true in practice.”22 Of the generality of labour Marx writes:  
 
Indifference towards any real kinds of labour presupposes a very 
developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single one is 
any longer predominant. As a rule, the most general abstractions arise 
only in the midst of the richest possible concrete development, where 
one thing appears as common to many, to all.23  
 
Labour as a general category only became thinkable when labour was 
treated practically, in other words as generalisable under the capitalist mode of 
production. That is, when labour was no longer tied to particular and specialised craft 
based forms of labour, but became non-specialised wage labour. Marx’s argument about 
the category of labour compares on at least two levels with what this thesis argues. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Marx, Grundrisse, 103. 
21 Marx, Grundrisse, 104.  
22 Marx, Grundrisse, 105. 
23 Marx, Grundrisse, 104. 
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Firstly, the break with medium-specificity that developed in art in the post-war era, and 
was institutionalised by the mid 1960s, was also the development of an indifference 
towards the specificity of craft-based art labour. American art critic Leo Steinberg put it 
succinctly in his 1972 essay “Other Criteria” in which he wrote: 
 
American art since World War II is unthinkable without this liberating 
impulse towards something other than art. […] Not art but industry. 
[…] Not art but technological research. […] The process of courting 
non-art is continuous. Not art but happenings: not art but social 
action; not art but transaction – or situation, experiment, behavioural 
stimulus.24  
 
Steinberg suggests that art after the Second World War became integral to labour in 
general (to industry, technology, social action, scientific experiments etcetera), and to 
“non-art”.  Secondly, and in relation to Marx’s claim that labour in general became 
thinkable when labour was treated practically as generalisable, a general category of 
performance was only institutionalised in the mid 1960s when artists began to make 
performances which were no longer tied to specialised labour in performance and their 
specific institutional settings, such as theatre and ballet.25  
I have approached the categories from which each chapter departs through 
primary and secondary readings. The texts have been chosen because of the way in 
which they deal with the categories, and although in different ways, for the way in 
which they put light on Marx’s critical claim about the relation between thinking and 
reality as well as on the critical scientific method more broadly. The dialectic between 
the concrete and the abstract at the centre of Marx’s argument also reflects the 
categories dealt with in the thesis. Furthermore, I have approached specific artworks 
and art practices through art critics as well as artists’ writings. When possible I have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 62-63. (My emphasis.) 
25 Rose-Lee Goldberg’s book Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present demonstrates the way in 
which the performance practices of the historical avant-garde preceded a generic concept of performance. 
The Italian Futurists’ “Variety Theatre Manifesto” (1913), Emily Hemming’s and Hugo Ball’s Cabaret 
Voltaire (1916) and Satie’s ballet Parade (1916-17), composed for Ballets Russes and with costumes and 
scenography by Pablo Picasso, stretched the forms of the variety, cabaret and ballet outside of their 
conventional meanings and functions. The importance of Goldberg’s book, first published in 1979, was 
that it presented a part of art history up to that point overlooked in conventional accounts of 20th century 
art. Whilst making visible a crucial part of art history, her account of performance became based on the 
thought that it is a separate and medium-specific discipline. From the standpoint of a general concept of 
performance, as well as from the standpoint of the art practices that preceded such a concept, as the ones 
accounted for by Goldberg, this is problematic. Rather than separate disciplines, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, they all came out of a transgression of mediums and disciplines. Rose-Lee Goldberg, 
Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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tried to get a hold of films and photo documentation of the works. Additionally, an 
interview with Yvonne Rainer was made in a later phase of the research. However, 
rather than the excavation of original archive material, the contribution of the thesis lies 
in its critical methodology since it forces a reconsideration of performance within a 
framework of art in general, and more specifically, of dance’s central role in this 
history. 
 
Performance, performativity and the disciples  
What does a cultural concept of performance within cultural theory look like? How has 
it been included into accounts of post-war performance practices, and what is the crucial 
problem with this? There are, at least, three versions of this concept of performance, 
which although different in nuances, have certain key characteristics in common. An 
outline of these versions demonstrates an overall account of the concept of performance 
as it is used within the broader field of cultural theory.  
Firstly, a category of performance can be found within the well 
established discipline, Performance Studies, which derived from a meeting between 
Theatre Studies and the Social Sciences in the 1950s. The connection between 
Performance Studies, and its concept of performance, was established at the opening of 
the First Annual Performance Studies Conference: The Future of the Field, held in New 
York in 1995. There ethnographer Dwight Conquergood argued that performance 
studies is located “on the borders and margins” and that this is what “most clearly 
distinguishes it from traditional disciplines and fields of study, concerned with 
establishing a cent[re] for their activity.”26 Performance Studies’ self-understanding as a 
discipline, based on a notion of performance seen as a border or transition, is indebted 
to anthropologist Victor Turner’s term ‘social drama.’ Introduced in Schism and 
Continuity in African Society: A Study of Ndemba Village Life (1957), and expanded on 
in From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (1982), the term is 
understood by Turner as a transition from one situation to another and includes the 
psychological phases of separation, transition and incorporation. The notion of 
performance, referred to by Conquergood, is equally indebted to the discipline of 
sociology. Like sociologists before him (Kenneth Burke for example), Ervin Goffman 
used terms and metaphors derived from theatre and drama to describe and discuss 
phenomena such as role playing and performing in social situations. In his essay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Marvin Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 16.  
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“Facework” (1955), Goffman introduced the concept of “interpersonal ritual 
behaviour,” which is similar to Turner’s ‘social drama’. Both “describe an event 
structure in which the orderly flow of normal interaction, social or cultural, is disrupted 
by an incident, some breach of social or cultural norms.” 27 In The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life (1956), Goffman gives an account of performance as “all the activity 
of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before 
a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers.”28 This has 
strong similarities with Richard Schechner’s account of performance made in a 1973 
article. Published in a special issue of the journal Theatre Drama Review and guest 
edited by Schechner, it focused on the divergence between the social sciences and 
theatre studies. Arguing for the relevance of the connection between the two fields, 
Schechner wrote:  
 
This issue of TDR is a far from perfect and less than a panoramic start 
of an effort to establish in a systematic way a continuum between the 
social sciences and performance. It has been obvious at least since the 
work of Ervin Goffman and Claude Lévi-Strauss – let’s say 1950s – 
that such a continuity exists. In other words that performance is a kind 
of communicative behaviour that is part of, or continuous with, more 
formal ritual ceremonies, public gatherings and various means of 
exchanging information, goods and customs.29  
 
This is followed by seven key areas where the social sciences and theatre coincide and 
with which performance theory should engage: performance in everyday life, the 
structure of sports and rituals, semiotics, the relation between human versus animal 
behaviour, aspects of psycho-therapy, ethnography and theories of behaviour. This is in 
contrast to Schechner’s more recent accounts of performance, left out from his 1973 
account, were performance art practices.  In Performance Studies: An Introduction (first 
time published in 2002), he characterises four objects of study within performance 
studies and also includes art. They are: behaviour in all its forms, artistic practices 
(especially avant-garde and community based), field-work as participant-observations 
and social practices. “The underlying notion” of these four, Schechner contends, “is that 
any action that is framed, enacted, presented, highlighted or displayed is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction, 34.  
28 Goffman quoted in Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction, 35.  
29 Richard Schechner, “Performance and the Social Sciences: Introduction”, The Drama Review: TDR 17 
No. 3 (1973), 3.  
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performance.”30 Art here is understood in the same manner as other objects of study, 
such as behaviour, and is ontologically considered the same type of social phenomena.  
 
The other central concept of performance at work within cultural theory emerged, 
broadly speaking, as a result of a critical encounter between analytic language 
philosophy and poststructuralist theory. It has primarily been popularised through Judith 
Butler’s account of gender as performative, but it also goes back to John Langshaw 
Austin’s use of the term and Jacques Derrida’s critique of the same. In an attempt to 
question a traditional view of language derived from formal logic, found in Gottlieb 
Frege, Austin coined the term performativity in his 1955 lectures where he argued that 
“performative” in contrast to “descriptive” or  “constative” utterances do not describe or 
state anything to be true or false. Instead, they perform or do what they say. “[T]he 
uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action.”31 Although this initial 
definition of a performative statement sounds broad enough to encompass a number of 
statements, the examples given by Austin demonstrate the opposite. A performative can 
only take place under strict contextual norms defined by certain conventions 
(conventionality, completeness, intentionality and conduct), and when broken, the 
utterance becomes unsuccessful or “unhappy.” One of Austin’s most cited examples is 
“I do”, uttered when getting married, where the saying changes someone from being 
unmarried to becoming a wife or a husband. This means that the person who makes the 
utterance must have an intention and be serious (have conduct). Whilst Austin’s critique 
of conventional and analytically oriented views on language can be debated, it has had 
an unprecedented impact on poststructuralist theories, and by extension, also art theory.  
Derrida was the first to discuss Austin’s performative within 
poststructuralist theory in his lecture “Signature, Event, Context”, delivered in 1971 and 
published in Margins of Philosophy [Marges de la Philosophie] (1972). Although 
Austin, in most secondary literature and accounts of the term performativity, is named 
as the main reference to the term, Derrida’s critique of, and to a certain extent, 
expansion of, Austin’s performative utterance, is key for understanding how the term is 
used within cultural theory.32 Derrida’s essay focuses on a critique of a conventional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 
2.  
31 John Langshaw Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 5.  
32 See for example Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, eds., Performativity and Performance 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996); James Loxley, Performativity (London and New York: 
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notion of communication within Western philosophy and its foundation on a 
metaphysical idea of presence. He develops a contrasting concept of writing understood 
as a break with, rather than a continuation of presence, by arguing for its “iterability” 
(repeatability) and “graphematic” (linguistic) structure in general. Derrida recognises 
Austin’s performative utterances as an attempt to criticise a classical understanding of 
communication, but argues that, although “it could appear that Austin has exploded the 
concept of communication as a purely semiotic, linguistic, or symbolic concept”,33 it 
fails to take into account the fundamental structure of all forms of locution and of 
communication in general: “graphematic in general.” What Austin calls “parasites” and 
excludes from the “performative,” such as jokes or utterances made in a play on stage, 
are from Derrida’s point of view, “its internal and positive condition of possibility.”34 
The performative utterance suffers, Derrida argues, in the same way as classical notions 
of communication do, from “metaphysical origins: an ethical and teleological discourse 
of consciousness.”35 Derrida’s understanding of how communication and meaning is 
produced demonstrates that specific performative situations could never occur. The 
performative moment, rather, is how experience is structured, whose “marks” are 
named “signatures.” If the performative moment could exist for Derrida, it would take 
place all the time: “The effects of signatures are the most ordinary thing in the world.”36 
Derrida does not need the term performativity to develop his critique of the metaphysics 
of communication, writing or meaning and does not develop the term further in his 
work. It is more useful to consider Derrida’s intervention in relation to how the term 
performativity was developed after him. 37 
 Butler’s conceptualisation of gender as performative, and the transformation of 
the normative ideas of gender through gender performances, has since the early 1990s, 
become the key reference in cultural theory for the terms ‘performance’ and 
‘performativity.’ Although Butler refers more explicitly to Michel Foucault and Louis 
Althusser as her main influences, she came across the term performativity for the first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Routledge, 2007); Peggy Phelan, “The Ontology of Performance: Representation Without Reproduction,” 
in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London, New York: Routledge, 1996), 146-166. 
33 Jacques Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1982), 322. (My emphasis.)  
34 Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” 325.  
35 Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” 327.  
36 Derrida, “Signature, Event, Context,” 328.  
37 As John R Searle also has argued, against the claims that Derrida’s article merely would be an 
argument against analytical philosophy, it would be a mistake to solely “regard Derrida’s discussion of 
Austin as the confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions.” John R Searle, “Re-iterating 
the Differences: A Reply To Derrida”, Glyph 1 (1977), 198.  
	  	  15 
time via Derrida.38 Both terms appear in an article from 1988 in which Butler criticises 
an essentialist distinction between sex and gender, and in which sex is assumed as pre-
discursive and as a natural metaphysical substance, and gender as the cultural 
interpretation of sex. In the article, she draws on a concept of performance in theatre 
studies and sociology and on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s and Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas 
of the body as a “historical situation.”39 Her main argument in the article is that gender 
should be thought of as a cultural production that both conditions and is conditioned by 
societal norms and conventions that are produced by performances (repetitive acts) over 
time through the body. “Consider gender, for instance, as a corporeal style, an ‘act’, as 
it were, which is both intentional and performative, where ‘performative’ itself carries 
the double-meaning of ‘dramatic’ and non-referential.’”40 Developed in Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990), gender, Butler suggests, is the 
cultural, reiterative and re-productional process through which sex is constructed. It is 
“the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established,”41 
making sex into another gendered category.  
Butler’s conception of gender as performative relies on Foucault’s notion of 
power, and of the subject as both subordinating and productive, in which the process of 
becoming a subject is always a twofold and simultaneous paradoxical process: that of 
being subordinated and that of becoming a subject.42 This double movement, according 
to Butler, is conditioned by a set of normative social conventions (heteronormativity 
and kinship for example) and gender plays a central role in the subjectivisation process. 
This temporal embodied process, is best explained, Butler argues, as “performative.” 
Performativity becomes the term through which she describes the temporal and 
reiterative process of gender construction.  
 
[G]ender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity 
it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though 
not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed. [...] 
there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “I think in Gender Trouble I actually took it from Derrida’s essay on Kafka, ‘Before the Law’ which 
had Austin as its background but which I didn’t bother to pursue.” Vikki Bell, “On Speech, Race and 
Melancholia: An Interview With Judith Butler,” Theory, Culture and Society 16 No. 2, 164.  
39 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory, Theatre Journal 40, No. 4 (1988): 520.  
40 Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” 522.  
41 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), 10.  
42 This is developed in Judith Butler, “Chapter 3: Subjection, Resistance, Resignification: Between Freud 
and Foucault,” in The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press). 
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identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that 
are said to be its results.43  
 
Whilst the term ‘performativity’ is used by Butler to account for the 
temporal process through which gender is inscribed within the body, the term 
‘performance’ is mainly developed in conjunction with her account of resistance to 
stereotypical gender roles. The main claim made is that if gender is constituted by a set 
of repetitive acts at the level of the body, it should be possible to change or transform 
these acts in a way that they de-stabilise the hegemonic modes of gender that they are 
trying to constitute. The main example Butler gives is the performance of drag, cross-
dressing or “sexual stylization of butch/femme identities.” These identities, and 
especially drag, displace the relationship between the anatomy and the gender identity 
of the performance and “suggests a dissonance not only between sex and performance, 
but sex and gender, and gender and performance.”44 Subversive gender performances 
reveal the fiction, or illusion of gender and sex, because “disorganization and 
disaggregation” disrupt regulatory fiction of coherence resulting in that the “expressive 
model loses its descriptive force.”45 The political task, Butler claims, is to find out why 
certain gender performances disrupt the illusion of a stable sex and others do not.  
  Although Butler does not reflect much on her use of performativity in Gender 
Trouble, we might, with Gill Jagger, argue that Butler’s concept of gender as 
performative is “based on a combination of speech act theory and a poststructuralist 
understanding of subjectivity.”46 The term “performativity” turns into an empty 
placeholder filled with the concept of gender, or into a generic category, as suggested by 
Lynne Segal and Peter Osborne, when they rhetorically asked Butler if “performativity 
[is] the generic category of which regulatory norms are historically specific instances, 
or what?”47  
 
A third and more recent version of the term performance has emerged within the field 
of cultural theory, and more specifically, within an expanded account of performance 
theory concerned with management studies and versions of post-Marxist theory. Here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Butler, Gender Trouble, 34.  
44 Butler, Gender Trouble, 187.  
45 Butler, Gender Trouble, 185.  
46 Gill Jagger, Judith Butler: Sexual Politics, Social Change and the Power of the Performative (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008), 9.   
47 Lynne Segal and Peter Osborne, “Gender as Performance: An Interview with Judith Butler”, Radical 
Philosophy: 67 (1994), 33.  
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the term performance is employed to account for the change in the organisation of 
labour since the Second World War, and for how the production of subjectivity (in the 
Foucauldian sense referred to above) became a key part of such a restructuring and the 
subsequent debates. Such debates, however, conflate the turn to performative, or the 
affective forms of labour as a renewal of new forms of value production in the crisis 
that capital faced in the 1970s. This conflation has its origin in Antonio Negri’s lectures 
in 1978 of Marx’s “Machine Fragments” in the Grundrisse, but was popularised via 
Maurizio Lazzarato’s conceptualisation of “Immaterial labour” and Negri and Michael 
Hardt’s Empire (2001).48 New forms of labour (in programming, telemarketing etcetera) 
that emerged in the 1960s as a result of the deindustrialisation in the West, these 
thinkers argue, make the production of the commodity inseparable from the worker’s 
subjectivity. Drawing on the abovementioned thinkers, performance scholar Bojana 
Kunst argues that the production of subjectivity takes centre stage in capitalist 
production, and that contemporary artists (specifically those within the performing arts) 
through the structure of their work, play a fundamental role in this production.49 
Performance theorist Jon McKenzie builds on Foucault’s concept of power and the 
subject to argue that the changes at the workplace in the West in the 1960s, in which 
performance becomes the measurement of value, make performance “to the twentieth 
and twenty-first century what discipline was to the eighteenth and nineteenth, that is, an 
onto-historical formation of power and knowledge.”50  
 
These three versions of the category performance at work in cultural theory are not 
exhaustive, but give an account of some of the main tendencies in the vast literature on 
the concept. As will be shown in Chapter 5, where the concept of structure and the 
structuralist object in structuralism and poststructuralism is discussed–and from which 
many of these categories of performance derive–no structuralist object can be 
ontologically differentiated from any other object. All are concerned with meaning in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (London: Pluto Press, 1992); Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001); Maurizio Lazzarato, 
“Immaterial Labour”, http://www.generation-online.org/c/fcimmateriallabour3.htm, accessed Nov 10, 
2016. Lazzarato’s article was first published in Italian in 1992. Maurizio Lazzarato, “Lavaro immateriale 
e soggettività”, Deriveapprodi, No.0, 1992.   
49 Bojana Kunst, Artist at Work: Proximity of Art and Capitalism, Zero Books: Lareford Hunt (2015). See 
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Sarma Docs, http://sarma.be/pages/Publications, accessed Nov 10, 2016. 
50 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (London and New York: Routledge, 
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horizontal way. Art, as a consequence, is considered another type of object, rather than 
an ontologically different one as de Duve or Adorno put it. Although art practices that 
are distinct from a critical concept of art (such as experimental theatre, happenings, 
body art and socially engaged or participatory art) are discussed in the literature on 
performance, a critical concept of art, is excluded from the same literature. The result is 
that different concepts or takes on performance migrate into art theory and other fields 
and turn performance into a category simply added to a list of historical and 
contemporary art practices. One such example is the work of American art historian 
Amelia Jones whose main argument is that the introduction of artists’ use of the body in 
post-war art is primarily an introduction of a poststructuralist decentred subjectivity and 
that this challenges the conventions of modernism and aestheticism, conceived as a 
disinterested (in the Kantian sense) white male subject. 51 Jones also shows that the 
concept of ‘meaning’ in cultural theory underlies her arguments when she writes that 
performance related practices in the 1950s and 60s, such as those of Jackson Pollock 
and Hannah Wilke, demonstrate that “meaning is a process of engagement and never 
dwells in any one place.”52 Jones reduces performance practices to the representation of 
a poststructuralist concept of the subject and a critique of, what she loosely refers to as, 
“Kantianism.” Another example is art historian and curator, Dorothea von Hantelmann, 
who explicitly ties the term performativity to the process of meaning production in 
relation to a modern concept of art. The term, she argues, provides her with a 
framework through which art can be problematised in its distinct modern and generic 
form, and which, as emphasised by Hantelmann, is inseparable from the critique of the 
exhibition format as it was introduced in the mid 19th century. Hantelmann uses 
performativity in an Austinian and a Butlerian sense to argue that artists from the mid 
1960s onwards (Daniel Buren, James Coleman and Tino Sehgal) have continued to 
perform such a critique. She also illustrates what forms such a critique has taken. In her 
writings, performativity is used as an index, or a measurement, to wage the societal 
impact of art. Put differently, she sees performativity as able to measure the meaning-
production of art, and what she calls, their “reality-producing” dimension. “To ask 
about the performative in relation to art is not about defining a new class of artworks. 
Rather, it involves outlining a specific level of meaning production, which basically 	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exists in every artwork, although it is not always consciously shaped or dealt with–
namely, its reality-producing dimension.”53 In short, Hantelmann uses the term 
performativity to describe the meaning-production through which art works gain 
societal impact without critically engaging with what such a concept of performativity 
has to say about a critical and autonomous concept of art.  
 
Chapter Outline  
The first and the second chapters introduce the reader to the broad context of artistic 
practices that this thesis is concerned with as well as some key concepts that are central 
to understanding these practices. The three final chapters are shorter in length and focus 
on more specific problems that are demonstrated through particular case studies. 
Chapter one argues that the development of a generic concept of art is best described as 
a shift towards practice, primarily in Marx’s account of this term. It begins with a 
critical reconstruction of two key artistic strategies of the post-war art period in North 
America. Firstly, the expansion of painting through the inclusion of the process of 
painting into the meaning of the artwork. Secondly, the transformation of the musical 
score from a mimetic/identical to a non-mimetic/non-identical understanding of it. 
Jackson Pollock and John Cage are used as emblematic examples followed with the 
Gutai Group, Yves Klein and Niki de Saint Phalle, Robert Rauschenberg, Merce 
Cunningham, George Brecht and Simone Forti. This critical re-construction 
demonstrates the way in which artistic practices, in both of these two tendencies and 
through a critique of medium-specificity, altered the conceptions of ‘medium’, 
‘materiality’ and the ‘subject-object’ relationship in art. The most substantial part of the 
chapter is dedicated to Marx’s concept of practice [Praxis], as it can be found in his 
early writings, and through which he radicalised categories such as subject, object, 
materiality and mediation. The chapter also problematises the transformation of these 
concepts in relation to Aristotle’s distinction between practice and poiesis, and 
specifically in relation to what might be understood as a ‘metaphysics of practice.’  
The second chapter considers the two main artistic methods that came out 
of Cage’s radicalisation of the musical score: the event-score and task-dance. It sets out 
from the problem that these methods have been wrongly understood as a critique of a 
dualistic perspective in Western philosophy as represented by Descartes and Kant. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Dorothea von Hantelmann, How To Do Things With Art: The Meaning of Art’s Performativity (Zurich: 
JRP Ringier and Les Presses du Réel, 2010), 18.   
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contrast, this chapter argues that these practices must be seen as epistemological 
problems, which direct attention to the fact that they are simultaneously radically 
heterogeneous and autonomous works of art. The chapter begins with an overview of 
the main literature on these two forms of making and considers them as empirico-
positivist approaches to performance. This is followed by an account of American 
Pragmatist John Dewey’s understanding of experience and art, which is taken as an 
emblematic example of the main philosophical influence of these different approaches. 
This part demonstrates the way in which Dewey’s notion of experience encapsulates 
distinctive aspects of task-dance and event-score practices, yet fails to account for them 
as ‘art’ in a generic and autonomous sense. It counter-poses Dewey’s critique of Kant 
with Kant’s critique of metaphysics. Tying in to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 ends by arguing 
that Dewey’s notion of experience and art relies on a conflated notion of Aristotle’s 
practice/poiesis-distinction.  
Chapter 3 begins with a discussion of the established discourses around 
the critique of the art object that are related to minimalism and conceptual art, 
respectively the ‘specific object’ and the ‘dematerialised object’, and argues that such a 
critique was explicit already in task-dance and event-score practices of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. Through artistic strategies of reduction and abstraction it is argued that 
they directed attention to art as the site of objectification tout court. By negating a 
medium-specific conception of the object, event-score and task-dance practices 
construct a new conception of the art object. These arguments are problematised by 
drawing on Edmund Husserl’s understanding of the phenomenological reduction and 
his understanding of objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] as well as what in Kant might be 
termed, ‘acts of abstraction,’ inseparable from the construction of the transcendental 
subject and object of knowledge.  
Chapter 4 further develops the role of abstraction in relation to task-dance 
practices. It considers Rainer’s No-Manifesto (1966) in juxtaposition to the role of 
negation in Adorno’s concept of autonomous art and to the notion of abstract labour in 
Marx’s mature work. The central argument made in this chapter is that task-dance 
practices, such as Rainer’s, are abstract in their social form. The chapter confronts 
arguments in art theory and art criticism, exemplified by Catherine Wood who reduces 
task-dance’s relation to labour to the level of mimetic representation. The final chapter 
comes back to key terms, problems and references made in this introduction, such as 
‘art in general’, ‘performativity’ and ‘performance in general’, as well as to the critical 
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method proposed by Marx in the Grundrisse. Chapter 5 also returns to the critique of 
the medium-specific art object. It argues that task-dance and event-score practices, 
through the negation of the medium-specific art object, proposed a new concept of the 
object: ‘the performative structure-object’. The claim is that this new conception of the 
art object functioned as the practical condition for a general concept of performance to 
establish itself. Taking Trisha Brown’s Accumulation Series from the early 1970s as a 
case study, this chapter problematises this argument by looking at the concept of 
structure as it has been accounted for in structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) and 
poststructuralism (Gilles Deleuze and Étienne Balibar). It demonstrates how this 
concept of structure implied an understanding of the subject that is seen as both 
transcendental and performative as well as how both subjects were crucial for the 
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 1. Practice: performance, a practice of relations  
 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that the transformation of the ontology of art 
towards a generic understanding of it is best described as a shift towards practice that is 
understood in Marx’s elaboration of the term. Moreover, I argue that the post-WWII art 
practices that have retrospectively been labeled performance, particularly those that 
took place within dance and music contexts, were central to this change. Internal to this 
latter argument, I distinguish between two tendencies in performance practices during 
the post-war period, and make the case for a certain tendency or lineage within these 
performance practices that broke with medium-specificity in a more fundamental way. I 
designate this through the distinction of ‘performance’ in general and ‘performance art.’
  
 The generality of the concept of practice in Western European philosophy is well 
suited to grasp the way that art was made in the post-war period, especially in its 
rejection of basing notions of art in terms of craft-based skills and its opting for more 
general categories that resembled everyday human activity and that mediated the 
artwork through categories such as the event, action and task.  Following Allan Kaprow, 
John Rajchman describes this shift in art that took place in the mid 20th century:  
 
At this time, in this site, a new idea of art would arise, freeing itself 
from the stories and preoccupations of European modernism; in 
contrast to it, it would become “contemporary art”. No longer 
necessarily produced in a studio or exhibited in a “white cube” space, 
no longer even relying on the traditional skills of painting and 
sculpture – themselves in the process of “expanding their fields” […] 
Thus one became an “artist” (a Conceptual, Earth, Pop, Performance 
or Process artist) first, sometimes passing from one medium to another 
[…] “Sound Art” rather than music, “Language Art” rather than 
poetry, “An-architecture” rather than building, “Performance art” 
rather than theatre.54 
 
By becoming artists, instead of painters, poets, musicians and theatre makers, Rajchman 
demonstrates the explicit generalisation of the art object–for instance, ‘Sound Art’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 John Rajchman, “The Contemporary: A New Idea?,” in Aesthetics and Contemporary Art, eds., Armen 
Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), 133–34. See also Kaprow, “The 
Legacy of Pollock,” in which Kaprow writes: “Young artists of today need no longer say, ‘I am a painter’ 
or ‘a poet’ or a ‘dancer. They are simply ‘artists.’ All of life will be open to them.” Allan Kaprow, “The 
Legacy of Pollock,” in Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press), 9.  
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rather than ‘Music’–and also, implicitly, the generalisation of art labour. This process of 
generalising artistic skills into a non-specialised activity resonates with the 
philosophical meaning of the term practice, as it has generally connoted in its different 
formulations running from Aristotle to modern epistemology, some form of general 
human action or doing.55 It is, nonetheless, Marx’s radicalisation of the term that 
provides the conceptual tools needed to articulate more historically what this 
generalisation towards practice meant. More than any other thinker, Marx’s 
conceptualisation of practice redefined the concepts ‘materiality’, ‘subject’, ‘object’ and 
‘mediation’ in a novel way. In Marx’s early work, practice [Praxis] stands for a new 
materialism that is neither mechanically materialist, nor idealist, but which instead, is 
posed as a dialectical, sensuous activity between subject and object, nature and man, 
and materiality and ideality. Marx’s notion of practice proves specifically useful to 
articulate many of the changes that took place in art in the mid 20th century, where 
categories such as materiality, medium, subject and object were under scrutiny through 
the blurring of the lines between the art object, the artist and the performer, between 
human bodies and objects of art and between viewers and makers. It also allows for a 
deepened articulation of the ontological shift of art in this period as one moving from 
‘discipline’ to ‘practice’ or from ‘medium’ to ‘mediation’.  
 The chapter opens with a brief discussion of how the post-war period in art can be 
accounted for through two main tendencies or lineages. Thereafter, I move into an 
exposition and discussion of the term practice in modern European languages to then 
explore, in more detail, Aristotle’s account of the term. Here I focus on a distinction 
within Aristotle’s category of practice–between a ‘metaphysics of practice’ and a more 
generalised idea of practice–and discuss these two categories in relation to the two 
tendencies of performance practices. The third part of this chapter goes into a detailed 
exposition of the two contexts. My aim here, in particular, is to discuss the role of the 
performer, the viewer and the art object through some emblematic examples in order to 
pave the way for my reading of them in relation to the coming section on Marx’s 
construction of practice. The section on Marx is one of the lengthier parts of the 
chapter. Here I make a close reading of his 1844 Manuscripts and his theses ‘On 
Feuerbach’ (1845). The aim is to demonstrate the way in which Marx’s notion of 
practice implies a transformation of the categories ‘materialism’, ‘mediation’, ‘subject’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Nicholaus Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1968).  
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and ‘object’ through an appropriation as well as a critique of philosophy (Kant and 
Hegel) and political economy (Smith). The section on Marx’s concept of practice plays 
a central part for the subsequent chapters. It functions as a backdrop to many of the 
categories discussed there, particularly, ‘abstract labour’, ‘materiality’, ‘subject’, 
‘object’ and ‘objectivity’.  I conclude with a discussion of practice in relation to the case 
studies that I detail below.  
 
Firstly, this period can be looked at from the perspective of the expansion of painting 
that is mostly connected to the introduction of action painting by the first generation of 
Abstract Expressionist Painters in the 1940s (the so called New York School) and 
American artist Jackson Pollock in particular. 56 Developed in the 1950s with artistic 
forms such as the assemblage, large scale environments and Happenings,57 it continued 
throughout the 1960s with different forms of action art, and ended up somewhere in the 
1970s with body art, a certain proximity to feminist art, and what retrospectively has 
been termed, performance art.58 One of the key categories within this context is ‘action’, 
as the artist often performed actions in staged, theatrical and spectacular ways with the 
aim to shock or surprise. These actions emphasised the inner and existential states of 
what it means to be human by focusing on the artist’s body and psyche. This tendency 
can be traced back to Pablo Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (1907) and Henri 
Matisse’s Dance (1909). In both of these paintings the canvas is expanded into wall-
sized dimensions, which produced embodied and sublime feelings in the viewer. As 
argued by Jay Bernstein, they included motifs of the human body, “not as a 
representational object”, but rather as “a condition for pictorial space.” 59 This context 
can also be traced to Surrealist art practices where automatic actions (writing for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 There was a dispute amongst critics and artists around what to call this movement. Greenberg points 
this out in his essay “‘American-Type’ Painting”, where he for the first time publicly dismisses Harold 
Rosenberg’s term “action-painting” as well as French critic Michel Tapié’s “l’art informel” and “art 
autre” and instead suggests “American-type” painting. Clement Greenberg, “American Type Painting,” 
Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, 209.  
57 Most famously articulated by Allan Kaprow in “The Legacy of Jackson Pollock.”  
58 For example does Amelia Jones use the terms body-art and performance art when she describes 
practices such as Pollock’s, Kaprow’s and feminist art performance practices such as Hanna Wilke’s. 
Amelia Jones, Body Art: Performing the Subject and The Artist’s Body. According to Rose-Lee Goldberg 
performance art was established as a term in the early 1970s.  
59 Jay M. Bernstein, “’The Demand for Ugliness’: Picasso’s Bodies” in Art and Aesthetics After Adorno, 
eds. Bernstein (Berkley: University of California Press, 2010), 211. For the connection between Matisse’s 
and Picasso’s paintings and modern expressionist dance, such as Wigman’s and Graham’s see: Christine 
Macel and Emma Lavigne, eds., Danser Sa Vie: Art et danse de 1900 à nos jours (Paris: Éditions du 
Centre Pompidou, 2011).  
	  	  25 
example) was used to reach unconscious states of the human psyche.60 It can also be 
tracked down to Expressionist theatre and dance with choreographers, dancers and 
writers such as Mary Wigman, Martha Graham and Antoin Artaud.61 
 The break with medium-specificity, and the emergence of a general concept of 
art, must also be regarded from the standpoint of another category of performance and 
another generation of artists who had their background in modern dance and music. 
Their foremost achievement was the expansion of the musical score. This trajectory of 
artistic practices can be traced back to forms and artistic methods such as the montage, 
the ready-made and the monochrome in art practices within Dada and Constructivism.62 
It is equally indebted to the forerunners of what Adorno, in an essay from 1960, termed 
“New Music” (Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen and John Cage), and in which he 
also included Arnold Schoenberg and Anton Webern with their interventions of 
atonality and the twelve-tone technique.63 Although, as pointed out by Adorno, the re-
conceptualisation of the musical score had already begun with composers such as 
Schoenberg, Cage’s work transformed it by bringing it into the context of art, allowing 
it to resonate in dance, sculpture and painting, which resulted in new forms of mediation 
for art such as the event-score and task-dance. 
The artist played a different role in the artistic practices that are situated within a 
context of musical modernism by using strategies of withdrawal and objectivisation of 
themselves and others. Often the artist did not need to be there, as was the case in 
George Brecht’s event-scores. Choreographic and conceptual strategies were used in 
order to represent the artist and/or performer like any other part or tangible object in the 
piece, as was the case in much dance practices of Simone Forti and Yvonne Rainer in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See for example Shinichiro Osaki’s discussion of Pollock, the Gutai Group and Asgar Jorn’s use of 
automatism in relation to Surrealism. Shinichiro Osaki, “Body and Place: Action in Post-War Art in 
Japan,” in Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object, 146-147.  
61 For a discussion and genealogy of the history of performance within the history of drama or theatre see 
for example Marvin Carlson, Theories of the Theatre: A Historical and Critical Survey, from the Greeks 
to the Present (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984) in which explicit links are made in-
between for example happenings, The Living Theatre and Antoin Artaud. See also Chapter One: The 
Natural and the Neutral…” in Meredith Morse, Soft is Fast: Simone Forti in the 1960s and After, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2016). Morse gives an account of how Graham and Wigman among others put 
primacy on the expressivity of human nature and inner subjectivity in their dance. The latter resonates 
strongly with the work of early performance within this tendency such as Niki de Saint Phalle.  
62 For a genealogy that goes from Duchamp to Cage and to choreographers like Trisha Brown see Carlos 
Basualdo and Erica F. Battle, eds., Dancing Around the Bride: Cage, Cunningham, Johns, Rauschenberg 
and Duchamp (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). For Duchamp’s influence on conceptual art 
more broadly see Martha Buskirk and Mignon Nixon eds., The Duchamp Effect: Essays, Interviews, 
Round Table (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996).   
63 Theodor Adorno, “Music and New Music: In memory of Peter Suhrkamp” (1960) in Quasi una 
Fantasia. Essays on Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London and New York: Verso), 251.  
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the early 1960s. Another contrast can be seen through the artistic practices that explored 
the expansion of painting by using work objects that were seen as singular and 
expressive (such as guns, animal cadavers and painting buckets). Here the objects used 
within dance and music were everyday, functional objects such as pens, sofas, bottles 
and clocks. These objects were presented in the same way as the bodies within the 
work, reducing all possible expression from the human body to that of objects.  
 
1.1. Practice and a metaphysics of practice in Aristotle 
The shift towards an understanding of artistic making as a general practice resonates 
with the broad meaning that the term practice has in modern European languages. As a 
verb it means to “rehearse”, “train”, “carry out”, “repeat an exercise” or “to work” on 
something. Considered as a noun, it is defined as “an action or execution as opposed to 
theory.” And to be practical is to be “concerned with practice or use rather than theory.” 
Overall, although specifically in the noun and the adjectival form of the word, 
“practice” in everyday use carries with it a sense of doing something in “real life” as 
opposed to thinking, reflecting or theorising in “non-real” life, in the mind.64 The title of 
Kant’s politically oriented 1793 essay “The common saying: This may be true in theory 
but it does not apply in practice” confirms this, still today, often made distinction 
between theory and practice.65 The aspect of practice that refers to rehearsing, training 
and carring out an action resonates with most of the art practices considered here. In 
contrast, the part of practice that implies its opposition to theory seems ill suited to 
those same practices, since what might be understood as theory in an everyday sense, 
such as the production of discourse through writings, was central to these art practices. 
Practice, in an everyday sense, is also often used in relation to certain 
professions and skills and refers to a notion of technique or craft [techne]. Professions 
such as doctors, dentists and lawyers are said to have practices, as do physical 
practitioners of body practices such as yoga, mediation and Aikido. These professions 
have in common a relation to specialised skills that require a substantial amount of 
training. Both also resonate and contrast with the rejection of skills and the medium-
specificity of this period. Whilst specialised techniques and skills were negated, other, 
much more general skills and techniques were used, such as the throwing and dripping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Joyce M. Hawkins and Robert Allen, eds., The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press,1991), 1136.  
65 Immanuel Kant, “The common saying: This may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice,” in 
Kant: Political Writings, ed. H.S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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of paint or the use of found movements, such as walking.  In everyday language, and in 
the use of the term within an art context, practice refers to something general and also 
to something more specific that has to do with skill. In both, practice is seen as opposed 
to something mental and theoretical. These two aspects of practice are present in how 
the term was conceptualised in Ancient philosophy. But in contrast to connotations in 
modern European languages, ‘practice’ there referred to something more complex than 
a practical activity. Whilst it referred to human action in a general sense for Aristotle, it 
also had a more metaphysical aspect to it. Furthermore, Marx’s understanding of 
practice, departs and owes much to the Aristotelian distinction.66  
 
The actual term practice was not used in Greek philosophy until Aristotle, but the 
meaning of it was hinted at already in early Greek poetry where it related to three 
different walks or ways of life: political life, the life of contemplation and the life of 
enjoyment. Aristotle considered only the contemplative and the political way of life to 
be worthy alternatives for a free man and narrowed down the three walks to two. By 
doing so, he was the first to “explicitly contrast ‘theory’ and ‘practice’.”67 Richard J. 
Bernstein writes that the “political walk of life” with Aristotle took “on a distinctive and 
quasi-technical meaning”68 as it referred to the political activities performed by the free 
men in the Polis (the Greek city state) and was fundamental for democracy. Practice 
distinguished human man from animals and made him into a “political animal.”69 
Excluded from practice in Aristotle’s account were activities that merely kept human 
beings alive, such as human reproduction (childbirth), building of infrastructure and 
agriculture. They were thought of as pre-human activities and were performed by 
slaves, women and migrant workers, who consequently, were not considered strictly 
human in Aristotle’s thinking. 
In addition to the distinction between political and contemplative activities, 
more complex distinctions can be made within Aristotle’s concept of practice. Étienne 
Balibar, Barbara Cassin and Sandra Laugier, argue, that we, on the one hand, find in 
Aristotle a general notion of practice, which includes “everything that has to do with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Another reason for expanding on the Aristotelian take on this notion is the central role that it has had in 
much of the literature on the performance practices of this period, and especially the conflation it 
introduces between art and culture, which will be explored more in depth in Chapter 2.  
67 Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx, 4.  
68 Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), ix.  
69 Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, 28.  
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action and operation.”70 Here emphasis is on repetition, durability and ability of 
improvement as well as its opposition to theory and knowledge. On the other hand, they 
argue, there is a category of practice in Aristotle that is understood as a specific domain 
of approved behaviours that includes ethical or qualitative judgements as well as values 
of individuals’ behaviour. These latter two–the ethical and the political–merge for 
Aristotle “in the idea of ‘making oneself’ through acting for the common good in accord 
with the virtue of phronêsis”71: a type of practical intelligence.  
Within the first of these two distinctions (a general notion of practice to do with 
action and operation), Balibar, Cassin and Laugier, in addition, make a distinction 
between two categories of practice defined negatively by their oppositions: 1)‘practice’ 
versus ‘poiesis’ and 2)’practice’ versus ‘theory’. These, in turn, are made more complex 
in Aristotle due to the distinction made between practice and the category of energy 
(energeia). The latter, for Aristotle, in contrast to the everyday activity of practice, 
refers to “being in actuality.” For Aristotle, this activity is in itself practical and 
described as the supreme mode of being. It is not dissimilar to contemplative divine 
activity.  
Depending on how close or far away Aristotle situates energy from practice, 
poiesis and theory, different categories of practice, internal to Aristotle’s concept of 
practice, are produced. Balibar, Cassin and Laugier demonstrate this by arguing for two 
triadic relationships, each with two distinct categories of practice that are internal to the 
broader understanding of practice as a general doing. The first of the two triadic 
structures situates practice, poiesis and epistême (or theory or contemplation) in relation 
to one another. Here practice is referred to as the faculty of acting and poiesis as the 
faculty of making. These two are separated from theory in so far as they belong to the 
domain of genesis and becoming, and theory or knowledge instead belongs to the 
domain of divinity and to the limits of the human being. Whereas practice and poiesis in 
this triangle are seen as everyday ways of making and acting, theory’s close relationship 
to the divine, or the domain of contemplation, situates it in close proximity to 
Aristotle’s account of energy and therefore to being in actuality.  
The second triad of categorical distinctions is also between practice, poiesis and 
epistême. But here, practice and epistême are opposed to poiesis because the first two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Étienne Balibar, Barbara Cassin and Sandra Laugier, “Praxis,” in Dictionary of Untranslatables: A 
Philosophical Lexicon, ed., Barbara Cassin (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press), 820.  
71 Balibar, Cassandra and Laugier, “Praxis”, 824.  
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are activities that exist without end-products: They are in themselves their own 
products, whereas poiesis produces end products outside of its own activity. In contrast 
to the previous triadic relationship, here practice is the category situated closer to 
energy in that it actualises itself, tends towards nothing other than its own improvement 
and appears as a “metaphysics of practice.” In the first triadic relationship, where 
practice and poiesis is contrasted with epistême, practice and poiesis are considered 
activities of making and action, separated from divinity and energy. In the second of the 
two triadic relationships, where practice and epistême are opposed to poiesis, the first 
two are considered activities without end products, and are therefore just as closely 
related to energy. Since the latter for Aristotle is in close proximity to the divine, and a 
going beyond practice, practice can be described as a “metaphysics of praxis.”72  
 
1.2. From action painting to performance art 
Within the context of painting, the practice-isation of the artwork happened via a 
temporalisation and environmentalisation of the painting. This was primarily the result 
of a general shift away from an understanding of the canvas as a space in which to 
depict, represent and express an object or a feeling, towards a use of it as a record or an 
index of an action. Instead of being seen as a space constitutive of a picture or a form of 
representation that contains or expresses meaning, the canvas began to be conceived as 
the space for registering the process of making the painting. “At a certain moment” 
American art critic Harold Rosenberg wrote in 1952: 
 
the canvas began to appear to one American painter after another as 
an arena in which to act – rather than as a space in which to 
reproduce, re-design, analyse or ‘express’ an object, actual or 
imagined. What was to go on the canvas was not a picture but an 
event.73   
 
By “extinguishing the object” and the image, the painter enabled a situation in which 
“nothing would get in the way of the act of painting.”74 Rosenberg argued that, in 
contrast to formalist or other abstract types of painting where the exclusion of the 
pictorial object only made way for a perfect representation of colours and form, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Balibar, Cassandra and Laugier, “Praxis”, 821. 
73 Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” in The Tradition of the New (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1962), 25. (My emphasis) Rosenberg most likely received the term ‘action’ from Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s L'existentialisme est un humanism, published in 1946 and translated into English in 1948.  
74 Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” 26.  
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action painting, the representation of colours and forms were also subordinated to 
action. Greenberg rejected Rosenberg’s term action-painting, and two years earlier in 
his essay “Modernist Painting” (1962), claimed that although “Modernist painting in its 
latest phase” has abandoned “the representation of the kind of space that recognisable 
objects can inhabit” it “has not abandoned the representation of objects in principle.”75 
Also in distinction to Greenberg, Rosenberg emphasised the proximity between the 
artist performing the action and the meaning of the work. The action in action painting, 
he wrote, is “inseparable from the biography of the artist.”76 The artist becomes “an 
actor” who comes to exist through its action, and as a result, the “act-painting is of the 
same metaphysical substance as the artist’s existence.”77 The inner psychological and 
existential state of the artist is, in Rosenberg’s account, translated directly onto the 
painting through the action. “The work, the act […], translates the psychologically 
given into the intentional, into a ‘world’ – and thus transcends it.” Described as an actor 
whose existence comes into being through its actions, the action-painter, for Rosenberg, 
represented a liberated acting subject who ”accepts as real only that which he is in the 
process of creating.”78 Furthermore, this acting, liberated artist-subject is recognised by 
Rosenberg as a secularised or pseudo-version of a religious movement based on what he 
calls, “the creation of private myths.” Through its action, the artist attempts to break 
free from its “past self-recognition” and create a new myth of a future self-recognition. 
The artist becomes in charge of its future through its actions. 
 The main method used by artists to expand painting was by turning the process 
of painting into an explicit action such as throwing, shooting or dripping paint on the 
canvas.79  The actions were often performed dramatically and spectacularly in front of 
an audience, and perhaps more importantly, in front of a camera. Emphasis was on the 
live event. The photo-documentation of these actions was crucial as it further mediated 
the performance in ways that made it more spectacular and that enabled a wide and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 87.  
76 Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters”, 27.  
77 Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” 28. (My emphasis) 
78 Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” 32.  
79 Various exhibitions have highlighted this shift in painting in the post-war era and its relationship to 
performance practices. See for example Paul Schimmel, ed., Out of Actions: Between Performance and 
the Object 1949-79 (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1998), Magnus af Petersens, ed., Explosion! Måleri 
som handling [Explosion: Painting as Action] (London: Koenig Books, 2012), Catherine Wood, ed. A 
Bigger Splash: Painting after Performance (London: Tate Publishing, 2012) and Alexandra Munroe and 
Ming Tiampo eds., Gutai: Splendid Playground (New York: Guggenheim Publishing, 2013).  
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international distribution.80  The audiences, viewers or participators in these 
performances were often intended to be shocked, surprised and were at times forced 
into doing things.  
 In the short period between 1947-51 during which he developed his drip and 
action paintings, Pollock stands out as the first and main example within this historical 
trajectory. By focusing on the act of painting–dripping, squeezing and slashing paint on 
the canvas–Pollock emphasised the making of art as a temporal, environmental and 
experiential process. Pollock never performed the making of his paintings in front of a 
live audience. But Hans Namuth’s photographs, published in the international 
photography magazine Life in 1950, are a fundamental part of the work. In these 
photographs Pollock is seen almost dance-painting around the canvas. The creative 
process is represented through what looks like spontaneous, uncontrollable and 
unrepeatable original acts. Drawing on the general image of Pollock, Julia Robinson 
contrasts Pollock’s actions, which represented originality and unrepeatability, to Cage’s, 
who emphasised the repeatability of his works and the withdrawal of the artist. But as 
Greenberg already noticed in 1955, the fact that the works represented immediacy and 
spontaneity was not true in practice. Greenberg wrote about the action painters that in 
their practice “An ungoverned spontaneity seems to be at play”, but that action painting 
in fact “owes its realization to a severer discipline than can be found elsewhere in 
contemporary painting.”81  
 
Existential dimensions of action painting  
Action painting was taken further in the coming two decades by a generation of artists 
in Japan, USA and Europe.82 One of the earliest and most experimental explorations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Photographic documentation has always been central to performance practices. In the case of early 
avant-garde performance practices, as for example those undertaken in the Dadaist’s Cabaret Voltaire, 
costumes and photographs are often all that is left of their performances. In the mid 1960s, but more 
crucially in the 1970s, photography and video were made inseparable from the work, as for example in 
Bruce Nauman’s video performances. With regards to the two tendencies discussed here, the 
documentation of the performance was an explicit part in the practices related to action painting since the 
presence of the live event was seen as fundamental to the work. For an account of the central aspect that 
performance had in these practices see Simon Baker and Fiontán Moran, eds., Performing for the Camera 
(London: Tate Publishing, 2016.)  The documentation of performance was less used in performance 
practices that came out of musical modernism and modern dance. This was partly because these practices 
did not emphasis or fetishise the live event as such. In contrast, since they used scores, they were 
repeated. This thesis focuses on the second of these two tendencies, which is why little attention is given 
to the relation between photography and performance.  
81 Greenberg, “’American-type’ Painting,” 218.  
82 Whilst Pollock is often situated as one of the key figures in the development of post-war art in the U.S. 
and Western Europe, I would like to emphasise that his influence was not linear but simply that similar 
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action related painting was initiated by the Gutai Art Association [Gutai Bijutsu Kyokai] 
founded in 1954 by the Japanese artist Yoshihara Jirō. The latter wrote in the Gutai 
Manifesto (1956) that “they highly regard the work of Pollock and Mathieu”,83 which 
gives testimony to the international aspect of the art of this time. Gutai means 
“concrete” or “concreteness […] as opposed to abstract or figurative” that “reflects its 
engagement with materials and problems of representation.”84 Most members of Gutai 
came out of a first generation of abstract painters in Japan.85 The process of painting 
(throwing, shooting, crawling) were made into spectacular one-off events documented 
extensively by the media “to a degree unparalleled in the world.”86 Namuth’s 
photographs of Pollock captured an unrepeatable live event. Furthermore, they represent 
an existential dimension to painting (the artist subject in action) that has to do with the 
explicit focus on the originality and the unrepeatability of the artist’s action. Something 
similar is at work in the artists associated with Gutai. Consider, for example, the two 
emblematic actions of the Gutai group that were presented in their outdoor exhibition 
The First Gutai Exhibition (October, 1955 in Tokyo): Kazuo Shiraga’s Challenging 
Mud in which a pool of mud stood in for the canvas and the artist’s body crawling in the 
mud created an imprint, and Saburo Murakami’s At One Moment Opening Six Holes in 
which the artist jumped through six sheets of paper that he had mounted onto wooden 
frames. In both works, the artists use their own bodies in, if not violent, at least visceral, 
actions. Other paintings by the artists in the group were made by filling cannons or jars 
of paint shot or thrown on the canvas or by using their bodies as brushes as in Kazuo 
Shiraga’s The Artist Painting with His Feet (1956). Shinichiro Osaki emphasises the 
importance of the body in the Gutai Group’s works and comments on Murakami’s and 
Shiraga’s actions. “After finishing his action […] Murakami was groggy from a 
concussion, and Shiraga’s struggle with mud half-naked left his body bruised and cut.”87 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
tendencies could be seen in other parts of the world after Pollock had made his paintings. 
83 Yoshihara Jirō, “The Gutai Manifesto” [Gutai bijutsu sengen],” in Geijutsu Shinchō 7 (December 
1956): 202-04.  “Gutai art manifesto”, last modified October 17, 2016. 
http://web.guggenheim.org/exhibitions/gutai/data/manifesto.html.  
84 Miang Tiampo, “Gutai since 1954,” in Explosion: Painting as Action, 205.  
85 Although it is possible that Gutai knew about Pollock, their work must first be considered in relation to 
the cultural movement that took place in the Kansai region in the early 1950s and to the defeat of Japan in 
the Second World War. A number of art movements and associations, such as the Genbi Contemporary 
Art Council [Gendai Bijutsu Kondankai] founded in 1952, were joined by artists coming from different 
artistic mediums. In this and in other movements and associations there was a strong urge to search for “a 
new mode of expression, crossing over different mediums.” Osaki, “Body and Place: Action in Post-War 
Art in Japan,” 121-122.  
86 Osaki, “Body and Place: Action in Post-War Art in Japan”, 149.  
87 Osaki, “Body and Place: Action in Post-War Art in Japan”, 146.  
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This Dionysian, existential and destructive/creative perspective from which the 
Gutai group arose was made explicit in their manifesto. Their aim, they wrote, is to “go 
beyond abstraction” and instead let the “pure creativity” of the artist enable “the human 
spirit and matter shake hands with each other while keeping their distance. […] Gutai 
Art does not alter matter. Gutai Art imparts life to matter. Gutai Art does not distort 
matter.”88 Like Pollock, the Gutai group took strategic use of the growing international 
press at the time making sure that their performances were well documented and 
distributed. They also published photographs of their work and their own writings in 
their international journal Gutai. This publication was sent around the world to artists 
and critics, and is why “the extent of this journal’s influence should not be 
discounted.”89  Copies of it, for example, were found in Pollock’s home after his death.90 
In the Gutai Group’s work, and in their writings, artistic practice is described as a 
liberating, creative, spiritual activity–or rather energy–able to transcend out of the world 
in which it is presented.  
Similar strategies of subordinating the representative aspect of painting to the 
performance of a spectacular Dionysian action were used amongst artists working 
around the same time in Europe, but mainly after, the Gutai group and Pollock. In 
France the turn to action painting was termed ‘l’art informel’ or ‘tachism’. In 1954, 
George Mathieu staged himself painting La Bataille de Bouvines [The Battle of 
Bouvines] dressed up in a cloth helmet in an attempt to represent the battle both on the 
canvas and live in front of the audience. 91 In 1960, Yves Klein staged an event in which 
he used women’s bodies as “living brushes” resulting in Anthropométries de l’époque 
bleue [Anthropometry from the Blue Period]. The latter was performed at Galerie 
Internationale d’Art Contemporain in Paris. Klein was dressed like a conductor and 
directed two women who were naked to wipe their bodies in blue paint and then make 
imprints on the white paper stuck onto the wall. For Klein, as for the Gutai group, the 
photographic documentation of this live-event mediated the work as much as the 
paintings did. In the blue paintings, and in works, such as A Leap into the Void (1960), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Jirō, “The Gutai Manifesto.” (My emphasis.)  
89 Osaki, “Body and Place: Action in Post-War Art in Japan,” 123.  
90 Osaki “Body and Place: Action in Post-War Art in Japan,” 122-123.  
91 Together with art critic Michel Tapei, Mathieu visited the Gutai group in 1957. Tapei was the leader of 
the French art movement art Informel and was the key figure in making Gutai internationally known, 
partly through his organising of international exhibitions such as International Art of a New Era: Informel 
and Gutai at the Martha Jackson Gallery in New York in 1958. Osaki “Body and Place: Action in Post-
War Art in Japan,” 131-133. 
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in which the artist photo-montaged himself to make it look as if he threw himself out 
from a building, the human body is presented through actions that emphasise its 
existential and specifically human aspects. In the blue paintings, the human body 
becomes an imprint on the canvas and in Leap into the Void the human being is 
represented through an action (flying or throwing oneself out of the window). Klein had 
visited Hiroshima already in 1952 before the Gutai group was initiated. Although he 
later came to know about the group through international press and exhibitions, he 
always referred back to his experiences in Hiroshima as the source of influence for his 
body based performance work. It was in particular, as argued by Paul Schimmel, 
Klein’s existential experience of seeing “the preserved silhouette of a man burned into a 
rock by the atomic flash [which] “foreshadowed the anthropometries (body 
paintings).”92  
Another emblematic example of a French artist whose action paintings 
represented the human being and its body in existential and also in psychoanalytical 
dimensions, was Niki de Saint Phalle “whose aggressive pseudonym”93, as Valie Export 
argues, points at the feminist critique implicit in her work. Between 1960 and 1963, 
Saint Phalle made her Tirs [Shooting Paintings]: complex assemblages with concealed 
paint containers shot at with a pistol, rifle or cannon fire. In her attempt to inscribe Saint 
Phalle into a genealogy of feminist action art, Export also makes explicit the link to 
psychoanalytical motifs in Saint Phalle’s work. Export argues that “[t]he sexual 
aggressivity of this early voluntaristic identification with male symbols (the gun as 
phallus, the spurting co[u]lors as ejaculation, the chase, the kill, the bags as scalps, etc.) 
revealed hatred as the actual motivation.”94  
 
 
Environments and event-based works: Kaprow 
Robinson argues that the legacy of Pollock and of the generation of artists that came out 
of Abstract Painting resulted in a “performativisation of action”95 that moved towards 
body-specific and performance related works. In addition, a turn towards environmental 
and event-based works followed. Rather than solely focusing on the act of painting, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Paul Schimmel, “The Void: Performance and the Object,” in Out of Actions: Between Performance and 
the object 1949-1979, 31.  
93 Valie Export, “Aspects of Feminist Actionism,” New German Critique 147 (1989), 78.  
94 Export, “Aspects of Feminist Actionism,” 78.  
95 Julia Robinson, “Pollock’s Concreteness: Painterly Performance or Performative Painting,” in 
Explosion: Painting as Action, ed. Magnus af Petersens (London: Koenig Books, 2012), 157.  
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artists began to make large-scale environments that bordered on assemblages, paintings 
and sculptures in which performances in the form of rituals, happenings or theatre plays 
took place. This indicated a significant opening up of the previously discreet object of 
panting towards the viewers’ and performers’ experiences of the rituals, play and games 
inside of these environments. In his essay “The Legacy of Jackson Pollock” published 
in 1958, two years after Pollock’s death, Kaprow celebrates the way in which Pollock’s 
paintings expand beyond themselves temporally and spatially. His paintings give  “the 
impression of going on forever–a true insight that suggests how Pollock ignored the 
confines of the rectangular field in favour of a continuum going in all directions that is 
simultaneously beyond the literal dimension of any work.”96 The sheer size of them 
created a new relationship to and concept of the viewer. His “mural-scale paintings 
ceased to become paintings and became environments”97 which turned the viewer or 
observer into a participant. In 1959 Kaprow showed 18 Happenings in 6 Parts at the 
Reuben Gallery in New York, and in 1961, he made A Spring Happening, which in both 
this new conception of the viewer as a participant was present. In 18 Happenings, 
Kaprow divided the space into three rooms whilst six performers performed 
disconnected actions. The audience was forced to move twice during the one-hour 
performance. In a Spring Happening, the audience, placed inside the Reuben Gallery, 
was violated more than in 18 Happenings. Here someone operated a power lawn mower 
and chased the audience out of the gallery space. Kaprow attended Cage’s composition 
classes and derived from there, for example, strategies of simultaneity as used in 18 
Happenings. But as has been pointed out by Branden W. Joseph, whilst Kaprow saw 
intuition and improvisation as central to the artistic process, artists who followed Cage’s 
ideas more systematically rejected this. “Although Kaprow, for instance, derived much 
of his introduction to Cage, he largely rejected the strictness with which Cage 
implemented chance operations in favour of intuition.”98  
In the mid 1960s, Actionism developed as a form of making art, primarily within 
a German context. For politically historical reasons, these art practices radicalised the 
performativisation of the artist’s bodily actions, and its surrounding environments, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Kaprow, “The Legacy of Jackson Pollock,” 5.  
97 Kaprow, “The Legacy of Pollock,” 6.  
98 Branden W. Joseph, “Chance, Indeterminacy, Multiplicity,” in The Anarchy of Silence: John Cage and 
Experimental Art, ed. Julia Robinson (Barcelona: Museu d’Art Contemporani de Barcelona, 2009), 211.  
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differently than in the U.S context.99 They are emblematic examples of artists who 
expanded the understanding of painting through staged actions. They also fall into the 
lineage of artists, who, by so doing, became occupied with the existential and 
psychological dimensions of the human being and its body. The actionists demonstrate 
that artists on both sides of the Atlantic questioned painting by performing the process 
of making paintings. Through spectacular, violent, ritualistic, libidinal and transgressing 
actions, the Wiener Aktionismus [Vienna Actionists]100 (1964-), maybe more than any 
other post-WWII artist movement, explored “the systematic destruction of subjectivity 
in the Second World War.”101 The four main members’ (Günter Brus, Otto Muehl, 
Rudolf Scharzkogler and Hermann Nitsch) stated aim was to make “direct action”, and 
within this, they used “their own and collaborator’s bodies as ‘material,’ along with 
excrement (their own) and other bodily fluids, animal blood and body parts, paint and 
sharp objects.”102 In similarity with Pollock and the Gutai, the Vienna Actionists also 
considered the documentation of their live events central to the mediation of their 
works. And like the former, the action could only take place once and was considered 
irreversible.  
 
1.3. From musical modernism to performance in general  
Schoenberg and Webern made radical changes in composition with the introduction of 
the twelve-tone-technique and the persistent use of atonality. But within their work, the 
musical score still had a representational function, which followed traditional ideas of 
interpretation and technique. With composers primarily connected to the Darmstadt 
Circle (Germany), such as Cage, Stockhausen and Boulez, the score underwent a 
transformation. From having been understood as a written representation of 
composition as well as a self-contained entity prioritised above all other aspects of the 
performance, the score began to be considered as one of many parts of the work. In his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Buchloch problematizes the internationalism of much of post-War art in relation to national contexts 
and histories, and in relation to German post-war art. He rhetorically poses a question that underlines the 
impossibility of escaping national contexts: “How could the definition of an almost complete repression 
of the memory of having inflicted the holocaust and the devastation of war on a geopolitical and cultural 
formation previously considered the ‘bourgeois humanist civilization’ of the European continent not 
affect the definition and the practices of post-war cultural production in that country?” Buchloh, Neo-
Avantgarde and Culture Industry, x.  
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collaboration between Valie Export and Peter Weibel. Mechtild Widrich, “The Informative Study of 
Performance: Vienese Actionism 1965-1970,” The Drama Review 57:1 (2013), 138. 
101 Buchloch, introduction, xx.  
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unfinished book project Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction, written at the 
beginning of his career in the mid 1920s, Adorno asks: “What is the relationship 
between music and language?” The musical text, he claims, should not be seen “as a set 
of performance instructions”103, but instead be regarded as “the ideal of the sound, not 
its meaning” and as having the absolute primacy “over its imitation,”104 that is, the 
performance. Writing towards the end of his career in 1960 about the “New Music” and 
“its latest manifestations in Darmstadt”105, the relation between the written composition 
and the performance is of such nature that it gets rid of all “professional expertise 
[Metier]” and turns the notion of technique into the “radical sense of realization.”106 
Adorno’s writings demonstrate the shift in how the score went from being understood to 
have a mimetic to more of a constructive relation to the performance.  
Cage began to experiment with the musical score in the 1930s, but his first 
explicit conceptualisation of an expanded notion of it in relation to the visual arts, and 
to performance more broadly, was with 4.33 in 1952. 107 In it, the performer remains 
silent during three sections of chance-determined durations. Rather than written with 
conventional musical notation, the score, as Liz Kotz has shown, it was made up of “a 
condensed set of typewritten numbers and words.” In this way it “effectively 
inaugurated the model of the score as an independent/graphic textual object, inseparable 
words to be read and actions to be performed.”108  By intentionally not filling the piece 
with anything other than the surrounding sounds, it manifested a break with the idea 
that the materiality of the work is an objective site of meaning. It demonstrated that 
meaning is produced in the social relations of the work, and that these meanings change 
for each and every transformation of those relations. 4.33 also emphatically positioned 
the listener on the same level as the artist in terms of its fulfilment and performance and 
introduced the idea that a composed work can be made up of heterogeneous and non-
specialised skilled sounds.  
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Hoban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 3. 
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 The transformation of the score to a form of structure in which artistic material 
(sound, visual elements, sensations, surroundings), as well as the roles of the composer, 
the audience and the performer were considered equally important parts, was employed 
in other works dating from the early 1950s. Most of them were related to Cage in one 
way or another. Robert Rauschenberg, Robinson argues, “bypassed expressive painting” 
from the start by introducing mechanical models of painting: “printmaking, 
photography, the impression of gravel ground on wet paint, the manual incision of a 
painted surface, the deployment of language or number in the field of composition.” In 
Automobile Tire (1952), the painting was made as Cage drove his car over a rolled out 
sheet of paper whilst Rasuchenberg inked the tires. The work moved beyond Pollock’s 
expressive intentionality and showed painting as a form of “desubjectivized, non-
expressive index.”109  
Cage also had an explicit influence on the dancer and choreographer Merce 
Cunningham’s work. The two met in the late 1930s, and their first official collaboration 
took place in 1944 when they presented a joint solo concert of six dances at the 
Humphrey-Weidman Studio in New York.110  The titles of the dances were taken from 
James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) and explored the independence of music and 
dance. Writing about how Cage’s and Cunningham’s collaboration changed 
conventions of the use of music in dance, David Vaughan writes: “The kind of 
relationship between music and dance proposed in this solo was a departure from a 
previously common practice in modern dance whereby the composer would be given 
the counts of a dance after it had been choreographed, and would then write the music 
to fit them.”111 The experiment between dance and music explored by the two artists in 
this concert had already been articulated by Cage in an article in 1939: “The form of the 
music-dance composition should be a necessary working together of all materials used. 
The music will then be more than an accompaniment; it will be an integral part of the 
dance.”112 Cage’s influence on Cunningham cannot be overstated. In the coming years, 
Cunningham would transform the premises of modern dance from that which Doris 	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(New York: Aperture, 2005), 17.  
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Humphrey and Martha Graham (in whose company Cunningham had been the solo 
dancer) had developed it. The body was in this tradition represented as a source of truth 
of inner human subjectivity and dance was seen as the direct mediation of this truth.113 
Body and movements were inseparable from the meaning and expressivity of the 
choreography, and the movements were put together in a way so that each element 
supported one another and created an organic or compositional whole in similarity with 
Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk in which “all elements united into a seamless 
whole by a single directorial auteur.”114  
Cunningham’s main achievement or contribution to the history of dance and art 
is similar to Cage’s influence in music and art. In Cunningham’s work, meaning and 
expression were detached from single movements and the choreography in its entirety 
indicated a shift “from the old to the new modern dance,”115 as dance critic Jill Johnston 
put it in an article in 1965. One early example in which Cunningham explored the 
detachment of expression from movement and from the human body was in 16 Dances 
for Soloist and Company of Three (1951) in which 16 short dances had been put 
together by tossing a coin. One part of the piece also “included a small section in which 
the sequences of the movement itself was determined by chance.”116 The work 
investigated the relation between elements within the work as well as elements 
inside/within these sections at the level of the movement itself. The chance-procedures 
equalised each movement, resulting in choreography with no climaxes or resolutions.117  
The movements were often a mix of found movements, such as walking and running 
and highly virtuosic abstract ballet-like movements. Cunningham began to experiment 
with ideas, such as those of non-expressivity, almost from the beginning of his career as 
a choreographer, at first on his own, and later on, in the Merce Cunningham Dance 
Company founded in 1952, in which Cage and Rauschenberg were close collaborators. 
From the earliest productions in the company, sound, visual elements and motion were 
considered separate entities “related only by their shared location and duration.”118  
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The legacy of the transformation of the score in the early 1950s can be found in the 
artistic form that developed in the early 1960s which Kotz has described as “instruction-
like texts proposing one or more actions.”119 They have been termed Instructions, Word 
Pieces, Word Events or Performance Instructions, but should perhaps simply be 
described as event-scores. They were developed by artists, primarily connected to 
Fluxus, such as Yoko Ono, who developed her Instruction Paintings in 1961, and La 
Monte Young who made several instruction-like pieces such as Compositions in 1960. 
George Brecht, who was the founder of the event-score,“initially wrote them as 
performance instructions and began mailing them to friends and receptive 
acquaintances: on a couple of occasions, he also displayed handwritten scores in gallery 
settings.”120 Many of these were developed within the framework of Cage’s classes in 
Experimental Composition at the New School for Social Research in New York, 
between 1956 and 1960. To his classes came artists who were primarily focused on 
music, such as Young and Ono as well as artists coming from painting. This 
demonstrates how the two contexts, or lineages, outlined merged in and out of one 
another. Brecht was early on interested in Pollock and the way he (at least seemingly) 
represented ‘a letting go’ of authorial control and introduced the artist subject, and its 
process, into the representation of the work. Between 1956-57, Brecht explored chance 
procedures in a series of paintings in which he used dye on bed sheets. But as Robinson 
points out, there was a crucial difference between Pollock’s and Brecht’s practices. 
Pollock’s actions could only be performed once by Pollock and represented artistic 
practice as an act of originality, whereas Brecht sought something else. Brecht knew 
that: 
Pollock’s performance was inimitable. What he wanted to make 
repeatable was not the single, original expression, it was everything 
else that made Pollock radical. To move beyond him, Brecht 
recognized that he needed to translate the one-off performance – to 
move from singular abstraction to repeatable model.121  
 
Cage’s and Cunningham’s experiments with the score had important legacies for 
what came to be known as post-modern dance, but which is better suited to be called 
new dance or task-dance.122 This way of making was also often based on the ideas of 	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scores, tasks and instructions. Similar to how Cage’s ideas were distributed through his 
teachings, Cunningham’s views on dance were filtered through Robert Dunn’s 
composition workshops in 1960 in which many of Cunningham’s dancers and others 
attended who would later form the Judson Church Theatre (1962-64). Another 
important context was Ann Halprin’s summer workshops on the West Coast.123 Here, 
within the context of dance–although it is important to notice that many artists such as 
Rainer, Morris, Rauschenberg, Young and Forti moved in-between the world of art and 
dance–ideas about movement, the body and choreography in modern dance were 
rejected in favour of the types of scores where movements were produced and put 
together in new ways. The scores took the form of “‘rules’ or game-like structures” 
devices or “constructions”124 that structure the movements or actions. Although Dunn 
introduced Cage’s ideas of scoring, as it had been used in Cunningham’s work, this new 
dance context rejected the latter’s emphasis on technique and virtuosity. Forti, who 
signed up for Dunn’s class because she felt discouraged after having had attended 
Graham’s and Cunningham’s technique-based classes, gives testimony to this.125 
Similarly to how, for example Ono’s Instruction Paintings had an infinite possibility of 
variations, Rainer’s dances, made from instructions or sometimes charts divided into 
time-units, celebrated each individual dancer’s interpretation of them. Similarly, to how 
Ono’s “paintings” broke with the idea of material objectivity as a site of identity of the 
work, the aim for Rainer was to disconnect the body, specific movements and 
combinations of movements from meaning. The aim with her piece, Parts of Some 
Sextets (1965), in which mattresses and a chart were used to structure the actions, was 
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Two concepts of practice in performance: Practice and metaphysics of practice 
These two contexts contributed to the transformation of art in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. They broke with the idea that art should be mediated via specific mediums, and 
instead, generalised the artistic process through new forms of mediation, such as action-
painting, happening, event-score and task-dance. Although contemporaneous, and 
despite the fact that both broke with earlier modes of production, the methods and 
strategies used, the understanding of the art object, the artist- and spectator-role, as well 
as ideas about materiality and meaning, differed. This meant that these two tendencies 
and contexts in art came to have different legacies with regards to the categories of art 
in general, performance in general and performance art.  
 Amongst the artistic practices in the first lineage, the action or practice of making 
the work was intentional and inseparable from the artist who performed the action. The 
actions were performed once and fetishised the present moment through the 
spectacularisation of the live event. They had existential, and sometimes transgressive 
and metaphysical, dimensions. The latter was emphasised through a putting together of 
actions with clear climaxes within traditional dramaturgical manners. The works 
represented concrete actions, such as shooting paint and jumping through canvases. But 
these actions also represented less concrete and more existential dimensions associated 
with distinctively human psychological drives, such as libido, aggression and creativity. 
Put differently, the artist used the literality of these actions in order to move beyond the 
same literality. They represented artistic practice as a general and physical practice, but 
with the aim to move beyond such a concrete physical and visceral practice. The 
existential and human aspect was also emphasised by the fact that the actions were 
considered original to each specific artist. The action could be reduced to a mechanical 
repetition of action, whereas the artist who performed the action was distinguished by 
its originality and distinctive humanness.  
 The art practices in the second context did not represent art labour or activity as a 
means to move beyond reality, or as the expression of something inside the human body 
or psyche. Here artistic practice was looked upon as an activity immanent to reality and 
everyday life. Cage’s in-depth studies of Zen Buddhism and Henri Bergson’s writings 
on nature contributed to this. 127 The action did not need to be made by the artist her- or 
himself, for the artist was rarely was present in the performance. The scores made it 	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possible to repeat the works an indeterminate amount of times. Meaning was detached 
from the performing body and from the artist whose work–through the score–was 
repeatable. Although Cage’s and Brecht’s scores are clearly authorised, whilst 
performed, the maker of the works, are equally withdrawn or equally present as the 
potential viewer and/or performer of the work. Since works, at least conceptually, could 
be performed an infinite amount of times by anyone, artists within this context did not 
see the performance as an irreversible and original event.128 Here artistic practice is 
represented as akin to everyday activity.  
 
These two versions or categories of performance and artistic practice correspond with 
the two versions of practice internal to Aristotle’s overall concept of practice. In the 
first of the two triadic relationships, practice and poiesis are opposed to theory and 
make practice into a general human activity of making and doing that involves activities 
such as repetition, exercise and action. The epistême is contrasted with practice because 
the former, in contrast to everyday practice, is situated closer to energy, that is, to 
actuality, being and the divine. In the second of the two triadic relationships, practice 
and theory are contrasted with poiesis because the former are activities, which contain 
their own end products, whilst the latter have its end products outside of itself. “But 
there seem to be a certain difference among ends: some are activities, while others are 
products of some kind, over and above the activities themselves.” (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a1). In this second triadic relationship, practice is instead 
defined as an activity without end products, and therefore, is seen as as closely related 
to energy, actuality and supreme modes of being.  
The first of these two versions of practice in Aristotle, in its reference to a 
general everyday activity, is similar to the activities–and the concept of practice–that is 
found amongst artistic practices connected to the second of the two contexts referred to 
above. Cage’s transformation of the score framed everyday practice in such a way that 
everything became immanent to it. Artists such as Rainer and Brecht, who structured 	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everyday movements through textual and choreographic procedures, continued to frame 
or point to everyday phenomena such as movements, sounds and sensations. Artistic 
practice is in these works represented as what is there. The second triadic relationship 
proposes a concept of practice that lies closer to how artistic practice in works by 
Pollock, the Gutai Group and Saint Phalle might be understood. Amongst these artists’ 
work, the practice or action is represented as an act of transcendence and connotes 
forms of liberation, vitality, creativity: energy. The action is concrete, and yet at the 
same time, points beyond itself and the body of the performer: a metaphysics of 
practice.  
 
1.4. Marx’s relational practice: Smith, Hegel, Feuerbach  
Despite the conceptual centrality of practice in Marx’s writings, the actual term is rarely 
used. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (published posthumously 
in 1932) practice is commonly referred to as “conscious life-activity”, “practical 
activity”, “free activity”, “act of production” and “spontaneous activity.”129  In the 
theses ‘On Feuerbach’ (written in 1845, also published in 1932), the concepts 
“practical-critical, activity” and “sensuous, human activity, practice”130 are used, while 
in the German Ideology (1845) the main term employed is production. Balibar 
highlights this movement in terminology, and argues that Marx’s writings before 1845 
are based on an “ontology of praxis [practice]”, whereas “work”, in the German 
Ideology, “is entirely organized around the notion of production, taken here in a general 
sense to refer to any human activity of formation and transformation of nature.”131 
When Marx, in the writings referred to above, refers to human activity mediated via 
private property, he uses the terms “labour”, “alienated labour” and “worker’s activity.” 
Marx’s account of practice follows Aristotle’s to the extent that it refers to a specific 
aspect of humankind that enables it to transcend the animal realm and defines it as 
human. But where practice in Aristotle is exclusive to the domains of politics and 
contemplation, Marx’s account of it, partly in line with early Christian thinking, 
expands into the sphere of needs and actions.132 More specifically, Marx’s notion of 	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‘practice’ emerged out of an appropriation, critique and transformation of German 
Idealism and English political economy.  
 
The positivism of Smith’s account of labour 
Although Marx’s doctoral dissertation contains some important seeds for his notion of 
practice, it is not until the Manuscripts that Marx, for the first time, “attributes 
fundamental ontological significance to productive activity”133, and uses the term Praxis 
to refer to it. A major part of the Manuscripts is devoted to an exposition and critique of 
Adam Smith’s and other political economists’ writings on private property, rent and 
labour. Marx, before writing the Manuscripts, had begun to study political economy in 
detail,134 partly inspired by Engels’ studies of the worker in the production process as 
described in his article “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy.”135 The main idea 
that Marx takes from the political economy at the time is the insight that labour is at the 
centre of capitalist production, and that “everything is bought with labour and that 
capital is nothing but accumulated labour.”136 The Manuscripts constitute a detailed 
critique of the grounds on which this claim is made. The main critique of political 
economy–of Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) especially–is that it analyses the rise 
of capitalist society one-dimensionally, and in this way, hides and inverts the real 
relations that constitute it. It fails, especially, according to Marx, to manifest the relation 
between human labour and private property. Rather than attempting to comprehend the 
social form of private property, it assumes it and takes it as law. Political economy is 
unsuccessful in revealing the real source of wealth in capitalist societies, which can 
found in the division between labour and capital. This inability to grasp the social form 
of private property causes the inversion of categories in political economy, and 
therefore, of real social relations. Political economy’s inability to “disclose the source of 
the division between labour and capital” makes it define “the relationship of wages to 
profit” from the point of view of the capitalist only, and thereby, “takes for granted 	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what it is supposed to explain.”137 In a section on rent, Marx criticises Smith for turning 
“the fertility of the land into an attribute of the landlord” when the real truth is that it is 
“established as a result of the struggle between tenant and landlord.”138   
 The central link between Marx’s critique of political economy and his account 
of practice is that political economy, unsuccessful in rendering visible the real relations 
that make up the social form of private property, is unable to conceive of the human 
subject. Through its one-sided analysis of private property, political economy, only 
recognises human beings in relation to capital when “the existence of capital is his 
existence, his life”139, and elevates labour to human being’s “sole principle.”140 Private 
property “enables him [the human subject] to exist first, as a worker, and second as a 
physical subject.”141 Marx’s critique of Smith demonstrates how his notion of practice is 
inseparable from a critique of the subject and of the construction of a new conception of 
the subject. Marx develops this critique of political economy in length in the section on 
Alienated Labour. The crucial point here, with regards to the concept of practice, is the 
contrast set up between the productive activity of the human subject and between this 
activity when it operates inside the relations of private property, which is referred to as 
alienated labour. Alienated labour, Marx states, separates the human subject from its 
products, its own production, its species-being and its fellows. So “when one speaks of 
private property, one thinks of dealing with something external to man. When one 
speaks of labour, one is directly dealing with man himself.”142 Where political economy 
fails to grasp the human subject in its entirety and only sees it one-sidedly, Hegel 
provides Marx with an understanding of the subject as the result of a dialectical process 
with regards to the object.  
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Objectification in Hegel 
In the preface to the Manuscripts, Marx writes that the settling of accounts with the 
Hegelian dialectic and with Hegelian philosophy as a whole “[is] absolutely necessary” 
and “a task not yet performed.”143 The impact of Hegel on Marx’s account of practice is 
present throughout all parts of the Manuscripts to the extent that Hegel’s principle of 
objectification constitutes the fundamental basis of Marx’s rethinking of the term. It is, 
however, not until the last section entitled “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and 
Philosophy as a Whole” that Marx explicitly comments on his relation to Hegel. 144 In 
comparison to his contemporaries, the Young Left Hegelians who take “a completely 
uncritical attitude to the method of criticizing” their master, the most pressing question 
for Marx is: “[H]ow do we now stand as regards the Hegelian dialectic?”145  
In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Spirit [Geist] is presented as a social 
form of which human consciousness is an individual manifestation. Spirit demonstrates 
how the latter relates to objects external to it, and therefore, might be seen as a 
manifestation “of how knowledge makes its appearance.”146 Describing consciousness’s 
relation to knowledge, Marx writes about Hegel’s Spirit that “something comes to be 
for consciousness in so far as the latter knows this something.”147 This process is 
described by Hegel as a movement in which consciousness first externalises itself as an 
object, then negates itself, and by so doing, incorporates this externalised self into itself 
in order to sublate or abolish it. Spirit is dialectical when “[o]ne ‘moment’ of a 
dialectical process, […] is fully developed or understood [it] gives rise to its own 
negation”, rather than being “mechanically confronted by an antithesis.”148 Spirit’s 
being is in this sense constituted through a constant struggle with itself. But this 
struggle is progressive in that consciousness reaches a higher state of knowing for each 
phase it goes through. The structure of the Phenomenology manifests the different 
stages through which Spirit comes to realise itself, and by the end, of the 
Phenomenology, it reaches the stage of Absolute Knowing. This self-realisation or self-
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fulfilment of Spirit happens only when “everything that has appeared ‘other’ than itself 
is fully appropriated and thereby subjectivized.”149 
 Hegel’s philosophical achievement, according to Marx, is his conception of “the 
dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle” since it understands the 
human being as a product of her own productive activity.  
 
“It conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives 
objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence 
of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and 
comprehends objective man – true, because real man – as the outcome 
of man’s own labour.”150  
 
The dialectical movement of Hegel’s Spirit provides Marx with the principle of human 
objectification: the idea that “[a]n unobjective being is a nullity – an unbeing.”151 But 
where Hegel understands this activity to take place at different levels of consciousness, 
Marx conceives it as a mediating activity that takes place between the human subject 
and real concrete nature. From his critique of political economy, Marx came to 
understand practice152 as the “essence of man” which is in contrast to Hegel who 
understood it as thought. What Marx takes from Hegel is the principle of objectification 
as well as the dialectical movement which constitutes this objectification. But this 
principle must, as is clear from Marx’s critique of Hegel, be transformed in order for 
Marx to go beyond Hegel’s idealism.  
Marx’s main critique of Hegel is that the dialectic of Spirit’s actualisation is an 
ideal, abstract and speculative process that only takes place in the mind. The 
Phenomenology is only a process of human consciousness, and not of real human man. 
Objects are for Hegel “spiritual entities; for only mind is the true essence of man and 
the true form of mind is thinking mind, the logical, speculative mind.”153 The subject in 
Hegel similarly, Marx claims, does not refer to a real human being of flesh and blood, 
but is “posited consciousness” or “self-consciousness.” The consequence is that Spirit’s 
realisation of itself is an overcoming at the “level of speculative thought, leaving reality 
itself unchanged.”154 Hegel, Marx claims, turns “[r]eal man and real nature” into “mere 	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predicates–symbols of this esoteric, real unreal man and of this unreal nature.”155  
Political economy inverts concepts and presents them in mystified form. Similarly, the 
dialectical movement of Spirit “models the real objectification of man” in a “mystical 
form.”156 So although Hegel “grasps labour as the essence of man”, he–similarly to 
political economy–“sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour.” 
Furthermore, and although Hegel has understood the self-creation of man as process, 
“the only labour which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labour.”157   
It is here in Marx’s re-formulation of practice, as an activity of objectification on 
the part of an active subject through its concrete action on real nature, that a concept of 
practice as sensuous material activity begins to emerge. It is also here that we begin to 
see how this notion of practice corresponds with some of the art practices we have 
looked at above. As we will see, Marx’s notion of practice is material in the sense that it 
is constituted through the relations between subjects and objects, and accounts a 
concept of the subject based on an ontology of relations. Marx argued for a human 
subject who is endowed with material power and who works upon real concrete objects 
outside of him, and through this “confirms his objective activity, […] as the activity of 
an objective, natural being.”158  
 
Feuerbach’s influence on Marx  
Marx’s emphasis on nature as sensuous and his transformation of Hegel’s Spirit into a 
dialectic of species-being were consequences of Ludwig Feuerbach’s influence on 
Marx. The former enabled Marx, at a certain point in his thinking, to proceed in his 
critique of Hegel as manifested in the Manuscripts.159 The main influence of 
Feuerbach’s thinking, as it is manifested in the Manuscripts, is his understanding of the 
relation between the human subject and nature, as expressed in the Essence of 
Christianity (1843). The human subject, according to Feuerbach, had to be conceived of 
as an activity that is in immediate relation to concrete sensuous reality, and not, as in 	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159 Feuerbach’s influence on Marx should not be overstated since Marx, in the theses ‘On Feuerbach’, 
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Hegel, as mediated consciousness. Hegel’s mediated consciousness (thought’s relation 
to the object) introduced, Feuerbach argued, an unnecessary distance between the 
subject and the object. Marx’s attraction to Feuerbach, at this particular moment in his 
work, was that the latter came to stand for a philosophy of the concrete and the real, 
which is against a philosophy of the ideal and the speculative. Feuerbach emphasised a 
radical naturalism or humanism of the senses as a weapon against Hegel’s speculative 
idealism. Similarly to how Feuerbach had criticised religion for projecting human 
essence into the image of God and by so doing estranged man from himself, 
Feuerbach’s sensuous materialism enabled Marx to criticise Hegel for manifesting how 
philosophy “is nothing else but religion rendered into thought and expounded by 
thought, hence equally to be condemned as another form and manner of existence of the 
estrangement of the essence of man.”160 Marx also borrowed from Feuerbach a set of 
terms of which the most central one is “species-being” [Gattungswesen]: “‘a being to 
whom his own species, his own nature, is an object of thought...’”161  
In contrast to the Manuscripts, Marx’s theses ‘On Feuerbach’ do not explore 
practice in its alienated state, or what Arthur has distinguished as a second order of 
mediations.162 Instead, they articulate Marx’s conception of the human subject as a 
social relation more explicitly than in the Manuscripts. Human essence, Marx writes in 
his theses, “is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations.”163 Drawing on Balibar, Peter Osborne argues that: 
 
Marx used the French term ‘ensemble’ here, in all likelihood in order 
to distance himself from the implications of a hierarchical 
completeness associated, philosophically, with the German terms for 
totality (Totalität) and whole (Ganze). An ensemble is more of a fluid 
network of relations.164  
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Marx’s account of practice as an ensemble of social relations emphasises the 
necessary reciprocity between human man and the totality of human man expressed as a 
species-being. For Balibar, Marx’s concept of human essence allows us to think of his 
social ontology as “an ontology of relations […] in which the bond of individuals to the 
community is formed and dissolved, and which, in its turn, constitutes them.”165 By 
defining humankind as constituted through social relations between subjects and 
objects, Marx’s account of practice created a new philosophical definition of the 
Subject which broke with the prevailing Cartesian understanding of the Subject defined 
as a subject of knowledge and of representation.166 Marx’s account of practice also 
rejected the dominating idea of human essence that was previously understood as a set 
of abstract attributes inherent within individuals with the same genus. Marx’s concept 
of practice suggested the opposite: that the human essence is relationally spread among 
all individuals, which through its relations makes up the human subject.167 Marx’s 
subject defines itself through its practice and through its constant changes, which is 
why “[i]ts unity is not given but must be produced.”168   The theses ‘On Feuerbach’, 
more than any other text by Marx, make explicit an ontology of the human subject as 
inherently social.  
It is also in ‘On Feuerbach’ where Marx, for the first time, “comprehensively, 
and consciously, breaks with Feuerbach.”169 Feuerbach only considers humankind “in 
the form of the object or of contemplation”170 and still holds to the Kantian idea that 
sensibility and intuition is passive. So although Feuerbach emphasises reality as 
sensuous, he never conceives of the human subject “as sensuous human activity, 
practice”, and therefore, “not subjectively.”171 In doing so, Marx also, and importantly, 
formulated an entirely new type of materialism. The core of this new materialism is to 
be found in the first of the theses where Marx accuses both materialism and idealism for 
failing to grasp the activity of the subject and its relation to the object. “The chief defect 
of all hitherto existing materialism” Marx writes, “is that the thing, reality, 
sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.” Marx’s opposition against all 	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materialism is that, although it understands the object as sensuous, it does not grasp the 
activity of the subject as active and sensuous. The theses continue: “Hence, in 
contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – 
which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.” Here Marx opposes 
idealism (as inherited by Kant) because, although the latter placed the activity on the 
side of subject, as we saw above in Marx’s account of Hegel, it did not move beyond 
conscious activity. Iinstead, idealism saw the subject as detached from the object. 
Feuerbach is an idealist as much as Hegel. As is overwhelmingly clear in the last of the 
theses, Marx considered that both of them for too long had interpreted the world in 
various ways, but that the point was to change it.172  Rather than conceiving the activity 
of the thinking subject as passive and as separated from the sensuous world, Marx 
claimed that this activity is subjective, and in itself, sensible. In this way, Marx’s “new” 
materialism was equally separated from dialectical materialism (DIMAT) as well as 
from a traditional and metaphysical doctrine of matter. Whereas, we in the latter find 
the idea that there is only one substance in the world and that “everything else (thought 
for example) is a modification or an attribute to it”, the former is a combination of a 
traditional metaphysics of matter within Hegel’s dialectic. Marx’s notion of practice, 
proposes a new concept of materialism that is understood as a sensuous relational 
activity, and which had profound consequences for the idea of the subject. As Osborne 
writes, “the first fragment ‘On Feuerbach’ cuts through prevailing understandings of the 
conceptual pair, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, on which theories of knowledge had been based 
since Descartes. It dissociates the subject from representation, from its restriction of 
being a subject only of knowledge, and redefines it as ‘sensible’ activity or ‘social 
practice.’”173  
 
1.5. Performance, a practice of relations 
The broadest meaning of practice for Aristotle is to act or to make. The history of post-
war American and Western European performance practices, which is what I mainly 
have focused on here aside from the Japanese examples, was broadly a shift in art where 
the making or doing of the work–the practice–became increasingly important as the 
main mediation of the work. Both of the trajectories outlined above relate to such a 	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general concept of practice. But what separates Marx’s concept of practice from 
previous ones, and what makes it particularly well suited to articulate the post-WWII 
performance practices that I have focused on here?  
Practice is a transhistorical category in Marx’s work. It refers to the specific 
ontological condition of the human subject, which is mediated differently in different 
historical conditions. Within the historical condition of capitalist production–exchange– 
practice is recognisable as labour in general. The process of equating different forms of 
labour with one another, done through the logic of exchange, eliminates all specific 
aspects of labour within capitalist production. The performance practices I have dealt 
with in this chapter belong to a modern category of art which is inseparable from 
capitalistic modernity. Any analysis of these artistic practices need to set off from a 
concept of practice which problematises such a category of art. The performance 
practices discussed here emerged through processes of general artistic labour. Despite 
the general character of the Aristotelian concept of practice, and the fact that it resonates 
with the movement towards a generalisation of artistic skills present in performance 
practices after the Second World War, this concept fails to articulate the way in which 
these practices are mediated in the specific historical condition of modernity.  
Through his construction of practice, Marx redefined the categories of subject, 
object, mediation and materiality within a trajectory that both rejected and included a 
modern Cartesian and Kantian concept of the subject. Best defined as a relational 
ontology, practice, in Marx’s work, produces a concept of the subject that is understood 
as the mediation of the relation between subject and object. In performance practices 
that developed from a critique and expansion of painting, the production and the process 
were made into the work’s main principle. Such a strategy expanded the artwork to 
include the surrounding environment, the artist’s making of it and the viewers’ implicit 
or explicit participation. Artists performed explicit actions on objects and the 
performance was the mediation of such actions. But whereas practice in Marx’s early 
writings is distinctively relational and does not think of matter as passive, the artwork 
within this context might be described as a form of collage that includes heterogeneous 
elements, where the elements still reference specific materials such as the body and 
representative actions (a form of theatre), and therefore, reference medium-specificity. 
Pictorial representative meaning was removed from the canvas to the body/bodies 
performing those actions. The materiality of these works lies in the body and its 
environment, which was seen as acting in and against itself, and become as, argued by 
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Export, a form of “drama of meaning.”174 The body became the new medium, and 
medium-specificity was as such, not broken with, but only substituted, with a new 
medium: the body. Quoting Peter Weibel’s article “Kritik der Kunst/Kunst der Kritik” 
from 1973, Export writes: “Centred in the body and in this world, the body is the artistic 
medium. The human body itself is the work of art, the material.” Export continues on 
Weibel’s point: the “equation material = body, […] anticipated Body Art and certain 
forms of Performance art.”175 By retaining links to specific mediums, the materiality of 
the works (paintings) operated in these links as objective sites for expression of 
meaning. Therefore, the way in which artistic practices within this context were 
mediated were still attached to the idea of medium-specificity and materiality. Both of 
which were seen as the main objective site of meaning, rather than in strategies that 
broke completely with such an idea of mediation.  
Amongst the performance practices that came out of the transformation of the score, 
the movement towards an understanding of the meaning of the artwork as distributed 
through its social relations–practice–broke with medium-specificity more explicitly. 
This was a consequence of the fact that artists within this tendency structured and 
conceived their work in terms of scores, structures and systems, and in this way, 
separated more distinctively from the idea of craft/skills and materiality of mediums as 
objective sites of meaning. The artwork is, within this context, conceived as structurally 
constituted by separate elements or parts, whose productive meaning was constituted 
independently from their material expression as well as from the composition of these 
materials or expressions. In contrast, each part in the work is juxtaposed separately and 
independently from each other, destroying any sense of completeness or wholeness. 
Materiality is represented in these works as relational. Robinson, as discussed above, 
referred to the concept of the subject in these practices as de-subjectivised. Marx’s 
concept of the subject resists such an account of the subject. Rather than de-
subjectivised, the subject in his account, is produced through an ensemble of sensuous 
relations between subjects and objects.  
In contrast to the first lineage, the body is seen within these works as one 
element or object among others, rather than taking any primacy. In Cunningham’s 16 
Dances, movements and performers, were turned into objects, through choreographic 
strategies such as minimalising movements and the use of chance. The meaning of art 	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works, such as Rauschenberg’s White Paintings (1951) or Brecht’s event-score Exit 
(1961), are to be found in the relations between the work, the making and the viewer 
and/or performer of the work. In Rauschenberg’s words: “Any material has its content 
and its independence from meaning. Meanings belong to people.”176 The art object, the 
artist and the viewer and/or performer are expanded into a spatially and temporally 
infinite sphere constitutive of the mediation of the work. These works are not mediated 
through specific materials. Instead, they are mediated through the indifference to the 
materials used as well as through the social relations in which they are constituted. 
From within this context, another category of performance emerges– a generic category 
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2. Experience: art as experience or art to experience 
 
 
The event-score was coined by Brecht in Cage’s composition classes, and Rainer, in an 
interview in the journal Avalanche from 1972, which described her work as “task-like 
dance.”177 Cage’s 4.33 stands as the direct precursor to both the event-score and to task-
dance in that it “is an inscription that activates a performance.”178 As a non-
representational score, it proposes “an indeterminate relationship between score and 
performance in which the musical notation ceases to be a system of representation and 
instead becomes a proposal for action.”179 It had a direct impact on the development of 
the event-score as it was invented by Brecht, and shortly afterwards, came to dance via 
Young’s work with Halprin in 1959.180 Through the request of Cage, it was also 
developed in Robert Dunn’s composition workshops for dancers in New York in the 
beginning of 1960.181 
Task-dance and the event-score were forms or structures for making work which 
consisted of, on the one hand, a set of instructions or tasks, and on the other hand, the 
actualisation or the possibility of realising these. This doubleness, I will argue in this 
chapter, makes them into epistemological ‘problems’: such practices are based in a set, 
ideal score, instruction or task, on the one hand, and in an infinite realisation, 
embodiment and materialisation, on the other.182 At the core of the event-score and task-
dance lies a tension between an ideal, form, structure, construction or system 
(materialised and expressed in the score, task, text, aural or imagined instruction) and a 
realised or materialised expression (materialised in the dance, performance, 
participation, reading or thinking). On an overarching level, this tension is constructed 
through the opposition between task and dance, or between score and event. It also 
plays out a number of other oppositions, including most importantly, subject/object, 	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ideal/material, theory/practice, science/art, knowledge/experience and mind/body.183 Put 
differently, the score or task functions as the limit, or the transcendental speculative 
horizon, against which the dance or performance practice infinitely actualises itself.  
This problem, constituting the core of these artistic practices, I will contend, enables 
them to be experienced by the viewer, performer and/or listener as works of art.  
These forms or strategies of making–as important as the ready-made and 
the monochrome were for art at the beginning of the 20th century–were central in the 
reconfiguration of some of the key categories within art such as mediation, medium, 
skill, subject and object. Although the event-score mainly developed out of a musical 
and visual arts context, and task-dance developed from dance and choreography, their 
interdependences cannot be stressed enough. There were crucial collaborations between 
the two ‘scenes’ or contexts in the making, performing and authorising of the works. 
Part of my argument here is that the boundaries between the two contexts, most of the 
time, were merely conventional and institutional rather than conceptual. One reason to 
investigate these two forms next to each other is to reject the institutional separation that 
is often made between dance and visual art in histories on post-war art. By exploring 
them side-by-side, I hope to demonstrate that, although there were differences between 
forms of producing and distributing these works, conceptually, they explore similar 
things and employ the same artistic strategies.  
 The literature on the event-score and task-dance is extensive, encompassing 
many areas since they have been considered within larger narratives such as the history 
of Fluxus, Judson Church, minimal music and 1960s performance practices.184 More 
recently, artists and artworks related to the event-score and task-dance have also been 
explicitly recuperated and inscribed into a broader history of art practices that are 
considered important for the development of a generic notion of art, such as those of 
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cataloguing, serialising, recording and systematising tasks as for example in Judson Church dancers 
Lucinda Child’s and Brown’s dances or Young’s score-events. Another formal strategy which manifests 
the tension between ideal form and material expression, or between construction and expression, is the 
use of time as a systemic device to “clock” tasks and movement instructions as well as to involve objects 
as in Forti’s construction dances and in many of Brecht’s scores. Both of these two aspects will be 
explored in the coming chapters.  
184 The renewed interest in Fluxus is seen in exhibitions such as: Fluxus and the Essential Questions of 
Life at the Hood Museum of Art, Darthmouth College, USA, April-Aug 2011 curated by Jacqueline Baas; 
and in George Brecht. Events. A Heterospective at MACBA Barcelona, Spain and Museum Ludwig, 
Cologne, Germany, September 2005-January 2006.   
	  	  58 
Duchamp, Cage and Rauschenberg.185 Whilst there has been some literature focusing 
specifically on the event-score, there is no literature that has investigated task or 
instruction-dance as a specific form of mediation or genre.186 One of the arguments of 
this chapter is that the theoretical frameworks that have dominated the reading of these 
performance practices have been grounded in, what I call, an empirico-positivist 
approach to performance, and of which three theoretical types can be distinguished. 
Firstly, a sociological or anthropological approach where focus lies on discussing 
performance practices through categories taken from these disciplines, including, 
‘behaviour’, ‘ritual’ and ‘habit.’ Secondly, a structuralist and poststructuralist approach 
to event-score and task-dance practices. Finally, a pragmatist–of which American 
thinker John Dewey is emblematic–perspective on these early performance practices. 
Despite some divergent sources, each of these empirico-positivist approaches to task-
dance and the event-score share an emphasis to unify the inherently contradictory or 
paradoxical status referred to above as the epistemological problem with these art 
practices. Through metaphysically and phenomenologically charged terms, such as 
‘being’, ‘behaviour’, ‘experience’, ‘presence’ and ‘embodiment’, this literature posits 
performance as a unitive, total and holistic activity that brings together body and mind, 
art and life and artist and viewer into one unmediated experience. Rather than 
addressing the paradoxical or problematic character that lies at the core of these 
practices, art and dance’s theoretical writing has, in contrast, frequently viewed 
performance as an activity that is either smoothing over or unifying the relationship 
between task and dance, score and event, or the ideal and material. They are empirico-
positivist because they fail to account for these artistic strategies as the epistemological 
problems that they are.  
 As American Pragmatist philosopher and public intellectual, Dewey’s work 
around experience and art has had a central role in these approaches for the readings of 
event-score and task-dance practices. Experience, which develops into the metaphysics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 See for example Carlos Basualdo and Erica F. Battle eds., Dancing Around the Bride: Cage, 
Cunningham, Johns Rauschenberg, and Duchamp (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). Published 
on the occasion of the exhibition Dancing Around the Bride: Cage, Cunningham, Johns, Rauschenberg, 
and Duchamp, Philadelphia Museum of Art, October 30, 2012-January 21, 2013, Barbican Art Gallery, 
London, February 14-June 9, 2013.  
186 Kotz, Words to Be Looked At and Robinson, “From Abstraction to Model: In the Event of George 
Brecht and the Conceptual Turn in Art of the 1960s.”At the end of writing this thesis Morse’s book Soft is 
Fast was published which focuses on Forti’s task-dance practice. Although it gives a good account of 
what influenced Forti’s work it does not, more than tangentially, approach task-dance as a conceptual and 
philosophical problem.  
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of experience, functions as a unifying category in his work. It aims to reconcile 
Cartesian dualistic oppositions, or more strictly Kantian divisions, between that of 
subject/object, culture/nature, art/life, science/philosophy and body/mind. This is done 
though an appropriation of a modern or scientific concept of nature, coming primarily 
from evolutionary Darwinism present within the American intellectual climate at the 
time.187 The concept of experience is constructed in Dewey’s work through an 
Aristotelian understanding of praxis in which categories such as ‘being’ are central. 
Important within the context of this chapter is Dewey’s understanding of experience as 
a deeply unifying activity of which art can be seen as the emblematic example of such 
an activity. This has given this concept a clear function in theoretical discourses on 
performance, where it is used as unification, not merely of the score/task and its 
heterogeneous outside, but also of the reader’s and/or performer’s body and mind as 
well as of the object-like character of the score/task and the subject interpreting these. 
Following this conceptual problem, some of the questions asked in this chapter are: To 
what extent is Dewey’s notion of experience important for a critical and deepened 
understanding of task-dance and the event-score? And what are the critical limits of 
Dewey’s concept of experience? What do these limits say about the level on which this 
notion operate and about the consequences it has for Dewey’s understanding of art?  
The aim of this chapter is firstly to provide a deepened account of task-
dance and the event-score, including specific artworks using these forms, by placing 
them conceptually in relation to Dewey’s category of experience. Also included are 
considerations on categories and terms in his work such as ‘body-mind-creature’, 
‘equilibrium’, ‘radical empiricism’ and ‘event.’ By exploring Dewey’s writings on 
experience, and its relation to art in close relation to the event-score and task-dance, I 
intend to provide a thorough account of the underlying, and often under-theorised, 
philosophical content on which the major part of the empirico-positivist literature on the 
event-score and task-dance rests upon. Secondly, I aim to demonstrate the critical limits 
of Dewey’s concept of experience. I point out Dewey’s conflation between aesthetics 
and art, and between the Aristotelian notions of ‘practice’ and ‘poiesis’. The latter 
makes Dewey’s notion of experience ill suited to grasp the ontological condition of art 
that was established in the mid 1960s and that began with practices using the event-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 For an account of the American intellectual context in which Dewey’s thought developed see Louis 
Menand, The Metaphysical Club: A History of Ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 
2002) and in particular the role the Civil War, race and pluralism had for the development of philosophy 
as a discipline and for pragmatism in particular.  
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score and task-dance. The main argument of this chapter is that Dewey’s empirical 
concept of experience is crucial for a conceptually and historically contextual-
intellectual understanding of task-dance and the event-score. Internal to this argument is 
also the notion that Dewey’s reliance on Aristotelian notions of art and culture makes 
him conflate aesthetics and art in such a way that it erases the latter in its distinctively 
modern sense. In short, my argument is that whilst Dewey’s work provides a thorough 
conceptual, intellectual and contextual understanding of task-dance and the event-score 
(in that it shows their intrinsic entwinement with a modern concept of nature, science 
and empirical reality in general), this same concept fails in showing how these ways of 
making function as ‘art.’  
The chapter opens with a deepening of the historical and institutional 
context of task-dance and the event-score and discusses their ‘problematic’ character. It 
then moves into an exposition of some of the empirico-positivist approaches to these 
genres in the literature. This leads to a close reading of Dewey, and in particular, his 
understanding of experience as well as the relation between art, aesthetics and 
experience. I then make a reading of two series of works by using Dewey’s 
understanding of art and experience. This leads to a final part where I discuss the 
critical limits of Dewey’s concept of experience and art.  
 
2.1. Event-score and task-dance: Fluxus and the Judson Church  
The event-score, as initially developed, were short enigmatic texts where the words 
functioned as cues or instructions to the reader who simultaneously also operated as the 
performer. They were performed either formally on stage, or imagined by the 
reader/performer. When staged, they were rarely rehearsed and did not require 
specialised skills. Some of the first staged performances of event-scores and versions of 
them took place at Ono’s loft in New York, where she hosted Young’s series of 
performance programs. Later on, more organised performances took place through 
international events, including, the First Fluxus Festival of Avant-Garde Composition at 
the Museum Wiesbaden in Wiesbaden in Germany. Publishing was a fundamental 
aspect of Fluxus, and the scores were often distributed and turned into autonomous 
objects via artists’ books such as Fluxus: An Anthology (1961) and through the Fluxus 
‘event-boxes.’188 Retrospectively over the last twenty years or so–through their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Oven Smith gives an account of early publishing in Fluxus in Ken Friedman ed., The Fluxus Reader 
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institutionalisation–the works have also been exhibited independently in galleries.189 
Brecht is considered the artist who “most systematically”190 developed the form, and 
some of his event-scores were exhibited in his solo exhibition Towards Events: An 
Arrangement (1959) at the Reuben Gallery.191 Most of Brecht’s event-scores were also 
published in the Fluxus publication Water Yam (1963) and in Fluxus: An Anthology 
(1961). Other important artists for the initial developments of the event-score were 
Young, in particular his Composition #7 and #11 (1960)192, and Ono’s Instruction 
Paintings193 (1961). 
 Task-dance was not seen as a set or defined term at the time of these practises, 
nor can it be traced to a specific artist or critic, unlike the event-score. When used here, 
it refers to art practices situated in the USA (New York and California mainly) in the 
mid 1950s to mid 1960s in a dance context referred to as “post-modern dance.”194 These 
dance practices have often been understood to constitute a firm break with the modern 
dance exemplified by choreographers such as Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham and 
Mary Wigman. More importantly, task-dance, as I understand this term, must be 
considered as the name of a general strategy or genre of making works used by dancers 
and choreographers in the early 1960s within the production and performing of dance.  
This general strategy necessarily took on a form that is less defined than Brecht’s event-
scores and developed them further in various ways. The basic operation, however, was 
similar to that of the event-score: an instruction or task was to be executed or 
performed. Two of the main differences between task-dance and event-score are found 
in how the score was written/documented (or non-written/non-documented) and 
distributed (or non-distributed) as well as the focus on improvisation, rehearsal and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, Academy Editions, 1998), 12-20. Baas’ gives a detailed 
exposition on flux-kits and event-boxes in Jacqueline Baas, ed., Fluxus and the Essential Questions of 
Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).   
189 This was for example the case with the exhibition Yoko Ono: To the Light at the Serpentine Gallery in 
London 19 June - 9 September 2012 in which some of Ono’s instruction paintings from Grapefruit were 
displayed as wall pieces. 
190 Kotz, Words to Be Looked At, 61.  
191 Robinson, “From Abstraction to Model: George Brecht’s Events and the Conceptual Turn in Art of the 
1960s”, 77. 
192 Branden W. Joseph, Beyond the Dream Syndicate: Tony Conrad and the Arts after Cage (A “Minor” 
History) (New York: Zone Books, 2011). 
193 Ono’s Instruction Paintings were made in 1961 but published in Yoko Ono, Grapefruit (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1964).  
194 This was the first description of this type of dance made by dance historian Sally Banes in Terpsichore 
in Sneakers: Post-Modern Dance, first published in 1977, but which has been debated and criticised 
much since. For the debate see the Introduction to the New Wesleyan edition. Terpsichore in Sneakers: 
Post-Modern Dance (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), xiii-xxxvii.  
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performance within dance. The task or instructions were not formally written down, as 
in the case of the event-score, and were rarely considered part of the work and thus 
rarely distributed. When written down, they ranged from personal notes to highly 
elaborate systematic diagrams as well as to descriptive instructions.195 Retrospectively, 
task dance scores have been exhibited and brought in to focus in a more distinct way in 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Compare for example Forti’s straightforwardly written instructions for Slant-Board (1961) to Rainer’s 
elaborated chart for her piece Parts of Some Sextets (1966).  
196 Yvonne Rainer: Dance Works at Raven Row in London, UK, 11th of July – 10th of August 2014 where 
works such as Talking Solo (Part of Terrain) (1963) and Trio A (1966) were performed live on set time 
intervals alongside her scores and notebooks that were exhibited on the walls and shown in vitrines.  
Yvonne Rainer, Score for Parts of Some Sextets (first half), 1965. Collection Robert Rauschenberg. 
Photo taken from Lambert-Beatty, Carrie. Being Watched: Yvonne Rainer in the 1960s. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008.  
 





The introduction of written scores into dance was important since it jettisoned the way 
in which dance had been connected to writing since the end of the 16th century. The 
word choreography goes a long way back to its Latin transliteration of the Greek terms 
for dance (khoreia) and writing (graphein). But choreography, in the sense of “the 
writing of dance”, was not coined until 1589 when the French mathematician, dance 
master and Jesuit priest Thoinot Arbeau used it as the title for his manual for social 
dancing. Orchesographie was produced after a request from a law student who wanted 
to learn the art of dance and its social rules. The result was a book with detailed step-by-
step instructions and illustrations of the vast variety of social dances practiced in the 
renaissance.197 Ever since the publishing of Orchesographie, the notion of 
choreography, in Western dance, has rested on the idea that the written choreography 
functions as a predetermined ideal, and that when interpreted by the dancer, always will 
appear as an inferior copy. (This was reflected in ballet as well as in modern dance, 
where the choreographer “invented” the movements, which were then taught through a 
répétiteur to the dancers, who through this process were compared with the “original.”) 
Task-dance practices, such as those of Forti and Rainer, and through the introduction of 
the scoring of movement, broke with this idea of the connection between writing and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 André Lepecki, Exhausting Dance: Performance and the Politics of Movement (New York: Routledge 
2006), 26.  
Simone Forti, Score for Slant-Board (1961), from Forti, Simone. Handbook in Motion. 
Halifax, Canada: The Press of Novia Scotia College of Art and Design, 1974.  
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dance as no ideal of them existed. The tasks were in these practices often based on 
“found” or “ready-made” (in the case of Dunn’s workshops) movements such as 
walking, sitting and running or on natural movements such as turning one’s spine (in 
the case of Halprin’s workshops). Tasks and instructions were then formalised and put 
together into a structural composition through choreographic scoring methods that use 
repetition, accumulation and reduction.198  
 One of the first to use tasks and instructions in dance was Halprin in her 
workshops in which Rainer, Forti, Shirley Ririe, Brown, June Ekman, and others 
participated.199 These were formalised, most systematically, by Forti in her work Five 
Dance Construction and Some Other Things (1961). Other early pieces structured 
around simple tasks were Trisha Brown’s Trillium (1962) in which “the rules were that 
‘I could stand, sit or lie, and ended up levitating’”200 and Rainer’s Ordinary Dance 
(1962) in which Rainer “repeated simple movements”201 while reciting an 
autobiographical poem. Forti was the “first to rely on tasks and objects to structure 
movement”, and her “focus on a single action rather than on a sequences of actions 
connected her work conceptually to the Events of pre-Fluxus artists...”202 Forti’s 
importance also has to do with the mediating function she had between Halprin’s 
summer school and Dunn’s workshop in New York, both of which she attended and had 
a central role. 
   
2.2. Empirico-positivist approaches to the event-score and task-dance  
Since the publication of Sally Banes’ work on 1960s dance, Terpsichore in Sneakers: 
Post-Modern Dance (originally published in 1977), sociology and anthropology have 
formed the guiding disciplines in the writing on dance of the period. The ordinary, 
found and everyday movements that we see in works by Judson Church and related 
choreographers are here primarily articulated in relation to terms such as ‘behaviour’, 
‘habit’, ‘environment’, ‘social drama’, ‘myth’ and ‘ritual’ through a drawing of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 The best overview and detailed accounts of early task-dance is to be found in Banes’ Terpsichore in 
Sneakers and Democracy’s Body: Judson Dance Theater 1962-1964. The detailed accounts of the 
movements used in these work,s and their emphasis on simple actions or movements such as walking, 
running and lifting, reveal perhaps the second most important philosophical source–alongside Dewey and 
Pragmatism–for this type of dance, namely analytic philosopher Arthur Danto’s concept of basic action. 
Arthur Danto, “Basic Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly Vol 2. No. 2 (1965): 141-148. 
199 Ross, “Atomizing Cause and Effect: Ann Halprin’s Summer Dance Workshops”, 62.  
200 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 78.  
201 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 42.  
202 Barbara Haskell, introduction to Blam! The Explosion of Pop, Minimalism and Performance: 1958-
1964 (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1984), 62.  
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theories found by sociologists, anthropologists and performance studies scholars such as 
Goffman, Turner and Schechner.203 Commenting on the dance pieces from the Judson 
Church’s related dancer and choreographer, David Gordon, Banes writes that they “look 
more like behaviour, than choreography–the sorts of movements people make routinely, 
unconsciously and therefore often decisively.”204 Catherine Wood also places herself 
within a sociological discourse when she describes Rainer’s use of repetition by 
referring to Schechner’s concept of performance as “being behaviour that is ‘restored’ 
or ‘twice-behaved.’”205 Wood sees this repetitive aspect of Rainer’s work, in relation to 
Butler’s account of gender and the way in which it can be performatively resisted 
through subversive repetition.206 Similarly, Janice Ross’s discussion of Halprin’s work 
is framed around the experiential, ritual and participatory aspects of her choreography 
and workshops.207  
The literature on the event-score is, as a whole, more conceptually and 
theoretically framed than that of task-dance. A lot of work has been done on the relation 
between the event-score and the structuralist and poststructuralist theories of language 
as well as between the event-score and the discussions of linguistics in analytic 
philosophy. Linking the event-score’s open character to Ferdinand Saussure’s S/S-
structure, Julia Robinson argues that Brecht “[t]hrough the score [...] asserts the 
conceptual nature of the denotative function of languag–precisely the relationship 
between signifier and signified–using it as the matrix for engaging a subject.”208 Liz 
Kotz reads the event-score in relation to Saussure, commenting on the structure of 
language itself and on the fact that “words are both here – concretely and physically 
present on the page, or in the moment of utterance – and yet also elsewhere too, evoking 
or metaphorically conveying up sets of ideas, objects or experiences that are somewhere 
else.”209 Kotz’s and Robinson’s account of Saussure are, however, questionable. Whilst 
Robinson reduces Saussure’s Signifier/Signified-structure to the analogy of text (the 
score) and meaning (the reading or performance of the score), Kotz’s reading of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 See Carlson’s Performance: A Critical Introduction which shows a lineage that goes from 
anthropological and ethnographical writings on performance as ritual and social dance, to linguistic and 
cultural ideas of performance in the development of Performance Studies as a discipline in its own right.  
204 Banes, Terpishore in Sneakers, 105.  
205 Catherine Wood, Yvonne Rainer: The Mind is a Muscle (London: Afterall, 2007), 55.  
206 I discussed this in the introduction. See also in Butler, Gender Trouble, 142-163. 
207 See Ross, “Atomizing Cause and Effect: Ann Halprin’s Summer Dance Workshops” and Anna 
Halprin: Experience as Dance.  
208 Robinson, “From Abstraction to Model,” 95-96.   
209 Kotz, Words to Be Looked At, 3.  
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Saussure sounds more like Frege.210 Both–following Krauss–also argue that the event-
score’s open character can be read in relation to Roman Jakobson’s “shifter-function”: 
“that category of linguistic sign which is ‘filled with signification’ only because it is 
‘empty.’”211 Also relating to the textual aspects of the event-score in Kristin Stiles’ 
writings on Fluxus, she asserts that the event-scores “are to behaviour what the ordinary 
language philosophy of Wittgenstein was to language: they investigate the connection 
of abstract contemplation to concrete activity.”212  In Stiles’ account, event-scores link 
thought with action, perception, and experience “in the formation of meaning-producing 
signs which is critical if the self is to be considered an instrument for reform in the 
world.”213  
 The literature on the event-score–particularly in relation to Fluxus–has also been 
centred around a critique of epistemology and Cartesian dualism that is primarily found 
in thinkers connected to pragmatism. It has also been centred around Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and phenomenology more broadly. Higgins argues that event-scores, through the 
multi-sensorial and embodied aspects they impose on the performer and viewer, create 
experiences that escape boundaries between body and mind, sight and sound and 
subject and object. This makes the event-score implicitly critical of Western 
epistemology, which Higgins argues, privileges mind over body. This argument is 
constructed with reference to Dewey’s concept of experience, and to Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the phenomenological body.214 Similarly, Stiles claims that most 
Fluxus events challenge Western epistemology by connecting ‘doing’ to ‘being’ and 
‘becoming, and by collapsing ‘poiesis’ with ‘praxis’. In a more historically contextual 
manner, Ken Friedman understands ‘experimentation’ and ‘research’ in Fluxus as 
related to American pragmatism as well as to religious and spiritual movements, 
including Unitarianism, American and European transcendentalism and the Shakers 
through their emphasis on the ‘ordinary.’215 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Barthes argues for a more complex understanding of Saussure’s S/S-model: “We must here be on our 
guard for despite common parlance which simply says that the signifier expresses the signified, we are 
dealing, in any semiological system, not with two, but with three different terms.” Barthes, Mythologies, 
111.  
211 Robinson, “From Abstraction to Model: George Brecht’s Events and the Conceptual Turn in Art of the 
1960s”, 20.  
212 Kristine Stiles, “Metaphysics of Act: Between Water and Stone,” in The Spirit of Fluxus (Minneapolis: 
Walker Art Centre, 1993), 67.  
213 Stiles,  “Metaphysics of Act: Between Water and Stone,” 67.  
214 Higgins, Fluxus Experience, 38. See also Maurice-Merleau Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
trans. Colin Smith (London and New York: London Routledge, 2002).  
215 Ken Friedman, ”Fluxus: A Laboratory of Ideas,” in Fluxus and the Essential Questions of Life.  
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 Pragmatism and language philosophy have also informed the literature on task-
dance. One such example is the focus on the democratic aspect of works in the Judson 
Dance Theatre. Banes sees the collaborative form of making and presenting work 
within the Judson Church as reflective of democratic procedures. She also frames this in 
relation to the Judson Church members’ interest and close engagement with the Civil 
Rights Movement at the time.216 Mostly, Banes thinks of the works made within the 
Judson Church as democratic at the level of the representation of movements. She 
paved the way for this reading with her book Democracy’s Body: Judson Dance 
Theater, 1962-1964 in which she argues that the democratic aspect of the Judson 
Church lies in the focus on people’s everyday actions.217 More recent writings on 
choreographers linked to the Judson Dance Theatre have also emphasised the 
relationship with democracy, as for example, Wood’s essay on Rainer’s work The Mind 
is a Muscle and dance scholar’s Ramsay Burt’s book on the Judson Church Theatre.218 
Banes’s, Wood’s and Burt’s work on the Judson Dance Theatre also refer to 
pragmatism in a more contextual way. In her discussion of the role of authenticity in 
Rainer’s work, Wood states: “Rainer’s work appears to propose a simpler, pragmatic 
materialist notion of authentic experience.”219 The influence of pragmatist thinking on 
Judson Dance Theatre works, Burt writes, is manifested in their concern with “external 
behaviour and actions in the world rather than inner psychological states”220 as well as 
in their rejection of the dualism between body and mind central to their work. In 
discussing the use of ‘everyday’ movements, Banes speaks referentially about the link 
between Rainer’s work and Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce. Underlying this thought 
that Rainer’s and Judson Church dancers’ work represenst a modern version of 
democracy is Dewey’s understanding of this term modelled on his understanding of 
experience as an integrated interaction between a living organism and its environment 
characterised by a harmonious relationship between need and satisfaction. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Sally Banes, Greenwhich Village: Avant-Garde Performance and the Effervescent Body (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press 1993) and above mentioned Democracy’s Body: Judson Dance Theater, 
1962-1964. Interestingly, Dewey’s conception of democracy goes in the opposite direction of what Cage 
stood for in his classes and in his work, which criticised representation as a form of democracy. Joseph 
connects the non-representational aspects of Cage’s scores – e.g. in that the performer is not supposed to 
represent the composer’s “aim” or will – with Cage’s critique of representational politics and his leaning 
towards anarchism. Joseph, “Chance, Indeterminacy, Multiplicity,” 228.  
217 Banes, Democracy’s Body: Judson Dance Theater 1962-1964.  
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219 Wood, Yvonne Rainer: The Mind is a Muscle, 56.  
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The central role of Dewey and pragmatism more broadly in the literature on task-dance 
and event-score is underpinned by a resonance between his concept of experience and 
the experiential dimension in these works as a central concern. Pragmatism emerged in 
the U.S as a radical critique of the “spirit of Cartesianism,”221 which was meant as a 
rejection of the dualism between subject and object and mind and body. Beyond 
philosophical resonances, the proximity between Dewey’s pragmatism and task-dance 
and the event-score can also be traced historically through questions of disciplinarity, 
nationality and the influence of science. The term ‘pragmatism’ was introduced in 
William James’s lecture “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” (1898), 
which “delivered an address before the Philosophical Union of the University of 
California in Berkeley.”222 Based on Peirce’s 1878 paper “How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear” it states that the “pragmatic maxim” [c]onsider[s] what effects, which might 
conceivable have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”223 
Later Peirce would reject the term because of its misuse, and instead, began to use the 
term ‘pragmaticism.’224 Central to pragmatism is the focus on the human being’s 
relation to nature. It opposes mechanical scientism, reductive naturalism and 
mechanical determinism, and instead, emphasises know-how, social practices and 
human agency. Furthermore, pragmatism was a self-consciously American movement 
that developed at a time in which philosophy did not yet exist as a discipline at the 
American university.225 The distinctively American aspect of Pragmatism and Dewey’s 
work was also related to the major topics he was concerned with such as democracy, 
education and art. This made him one of the most influential public philosophers of his 
time. The influence of Dewey and his ideas in America in the 1960s cannot be 
underestimated. Dewey was also one of the founders of The New School for Social 
Research in New York (1919)–where Cage taught–which was considered progressively 
American in terms of its approaches to art, pedagogy and politics. Noticeably, there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Richard J. Bernstein quotes Peirce in The Pragmatic Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), x. 
Pragmatism must be seen as one ‘answer’ at the time to the question of practice, action and language. 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein were fairly contemporary with the pragmatists but approached the problem 
from different philosophical and national contexts. 
222 Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn, 2.  
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224 Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn, 4.  
225 See Chapter 11 in Menand, The Metaphysical Club (where he gives an account of the role of science 
and the beginning of philosophy as an academic discipline in American universities), 255-286.   
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also a thematic similarity between Dewey’s understanding of experience and the Zen 
Buddhism that influenced Cage and his students.226 Writing on Fluxus, Higgins draws 
an explicit link between the two: “Both American pragmatism and Zen Buddhism are 
radically empiricist, based in the principle of direct sensory perception of everyday life 
and the sense of connectedness to the world that results, and in a commitment to 
attaining that sense of connectedness by using what is at hands.”227 Critically examining 
Dewey’s concept of experience indirectly shed light on other philosophical backgrounds 
such as the Zen Buddhist influences to the event-score and task-dance.  
 
2.3. Dewey’s concept of experience: Unmediated interaction  
In the article “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1905), Dewey sets out from 
what he considers to be the main problem with philosophy until now: the conception of 
experience, and what he thereafter often refers to as “modern philosophy” in general, in 
which he includes “sensationalistic empiricism”–with Hume and Locke on the one 
hand–and “transcendentalism”228–with Descartes and Kant–on the other. Both of these 
philosophical positions’ understanding of experience “fall back on something which is 
defined in non-directly-experienced terms in order to justify that which is directly 
experienced.”229 The method Dewey proposes–immediate empiricism or the denotative 
method–in contrast, departs from a different understanding of experience. It is only by 
grasping how experience is conceived within this way of thinking, that is it possible to 
understand its most basic arguments and the method it employs. This is because “the 
postulate of empiricism” is the same thing as “a general consideration of the concept of 
experience.”230  
 The postulate of this new method is “that things-anything, everything, in the 
ordinary or non-technical use of the term ‘thing’ – are what they are experienced as.” 
For Dewey nothing exists outside of experience. This is why it is only through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 For example Cage derived his use of chance from methods used in the I Ching, the ancient “Chinese 
Book of Changes”, which he had been given a copy of in 1950 or early 1951. From it he took the method 
of divining hexagrams by tossing three coins six times and used this method, among others, in the making 
of his composition Music of Changes (1951).  As Joseph notes, the majority of the literature on Cage 
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experience that a thing can be sensed, known or felt. As such, experience is always the 
experience of something, and to describe something correctly is therefore, “to tell what 
it is experienced as being.” In Aristotelian categories Dewey exemplifies this by 
arguing that to understand fully what kind of a being or a thing a horse is, it needs to be 
approached from the experience of the “horse-trader, or the jockey, or the timid family-
man who wants a ‘safe driver’, or the zoologist or the palentologist.”231 All these 
experiences of the horse are equally real and correct experiences–and therefore 
descriptions–of what a horse is. An experience is always an experience of ‘thats’ and all 
experiences stand “on the same level.”232 Knowledge does not take a specific or 
ontologically different position from any other type of experience. It is “one mode of 
experiencing” and “the primary philosophic demand (from the standpoint of 
immediatism) is to find out what sort of an experience knowing is–or concretely, how 
things are experienced when they are experienced as known things.”233 Dewey 
exemplifies with Zöllner’s famous illusion of lines. Zöllner’s lines appear as 
convergent, but are completely parallel. The experience of them as convergent is for 
Dewey one way of experiencing them. The experience of knowing that they are parallel 
is another experience of the lines. Both, he claims, are equally real and correct and 
belong to Zöllner’s lines as a thing.  
 
The basic claims made on immediate empiricism in the article in Experience and 
Nature (1925) are taken as a foundation and should be further developed. The first of 
these is that things are what they are experienced as being, meaning all experiences 
exist on the same “plane field” and are equally real in that the only differences between 
things experienced are in variables such as context, quality, intensity and quantity. It 
further implies that from “the postulate of immediate empiricism” […] “nothing can be 
deduced, not a single philosophical proposition.”234 Secondly, this conception of 
experience is the method identical to modern science and the only one that can grasp 
reality and things as they are.  
The proximity to modern science is seen in Dewey’s notion of experience and in 
event-score and task-dance practices. In the essay “Chance-Imagery” (1966) Brecht 
writes that the use of chance-techniques in Cage’s, Pollock’s and his own work must be 	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233 Dewey, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” 394. (My emphasis.)  
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seen in relation to the developments in science, mathematics and physics. From the 
1850s onwards, a conception of nature began to emerge, which rather than seeing nature 
in strict terms of causality, comprehends it as something in constant change and 
therefore with high degrees of probability. “Of course, we don’t mean to imply that 
chance-imagery is the direct result of the artists’ knowledge of these trends. We only 
mean that the works of great artists are products of the same complex, interacting welter 
of cause and effect out of which came the results of mathematical physics.”235 Fluxus 
artist Ken Friedman similarly argues that the emphasis on experimentation in the ways 
of making and presenting in Fluxus were partly borrowed from the realm of the natural 
sciences, indicating that one of the reasons artists in the 1960s borrowed a general 
approach and methods from the natural sciences was that it provided them with tools to 
plunge into the ‘everyday.’ 236 As Dewey puts it in the 1905 article, experience is both 
the method and the point of departure for immediate empiricism. Brecht’s essay and 
event-scores show that what he took from science was an approach and a method.  
 In Experience and Nature, the method used is referred to as “denotative”, and 
Dewey describes it as being both the method and the object of investigation: the 
metaphysics of experience. The main effects of this method on the history of Western 
philosophy is, firstly, that it does away with “the complete separation of subject and 
object (of what is experienced from how it is experienced)” by merging them into a 
unified and all-inclusive whole. Secondly, it gets rid of the “exaggeration of the features 
of known objects at the expense of the qualities of objects of enjoyment and trouble”, as 
known objects do not have a specific status but are considered equal to all other types of 
objects. Lastly, it criticises the “exclusive isolation of the results of various types of 
selective simplification which are undertaken for diverse unavowed purposes.”237 In 
short, Dewey argues that the method of empirical immediacy will unify the main 
dualistic positions throughout the history of Western philosophy, including, between 
subject and object, between the experienced and the transcendental and between 
understanding and intuition.  
Summarised into three postulates, Dewey argues that the denotative 
method is concerned with graspable things around humankind and always refers to 
concrete, primary and everyday experience. Firstly, the common man or woman’s 	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ordinary and everyday experience of the world is the prime object of the scientific 
investigation. This object is on its own “capable of developing from within itself 
methods which will sense direction for itself and will create inherent standards of 
judgment and value.”238 Secondly, for the denotative method, all objects of knowledge, 
after they have been investigated and explored, must return to where they came from 
and be tested in experience in order to be verified. Once brought back, they are turned 
into means to solve further problems. In the natural sciences, objects of reflection, 
Dewey writes, “never end by rendering the subject-matter from which they are derived 
a problem.”239 Lastly, the denotative method results in the fact that the investigation 
must be able to be used by the ‘everyday man’, rather than becoming elitist objects for 
scientific men or philosophers that end up in a “metaphysical museum.”240  
Similar to how Dewey argues for situatining philosophical problems 
within the sphere of everyday life, George Macuinas’ Fluxus Manifesto (1963) shows 
an approach to art which departs from scientific procedures and which insists that art 
must be integrated into everyday life. Fluxus art, Macuinas writes, is in a constant 
change and flux. The task of Fluxus is to “purge the world of bourgeois sickness, 
‘intellectual’, professional and commercialized culture” […] and to “promote non art 
reality to be grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes and professionals.”241 
Although Macuinas primary reference here is the historical-avant-gardes’ rejection of 
the separation between life and art, he, like Dewey, considers the art object as 
inseparable from everyday life and reality. A similar urge to use methods from everyday 
life can be found in task-dance’s rejection of modern dance’s emphasis on specialised 
skill and technique. In an attempt to define her strategies and methods, Rainer, in her 
No-Manifesto (1966), rejects virtuosity, spectacle, make-belief, eccentricity, and 
involvement of performer or viewer in the possibility of being moved by the 
performance.242 Posing task-dance against a conventional tradition of theatre, these 
aspects of making dance resonate with an urge to bring art back to everyday empirical 
life in much the same way that Dewey wanted to take philosophy down from its 
transcendental pedestals.  
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Although the 1905 article argues that a new method is needed to critique the Western 
(Kantian) epistemological paradigm by invoking the need to look at things ‘as they are’ 
and therefore in the same way a physicist or biologist would do, it is not until 
Experience and Nature that Dewey expands on what constitutes an experience as well 
as what a model for understanding the world in general might be. If Dewey in earlier 
writings only argued that there are different levels of experience, here he expands on 
what these different levels or planes are.243  
The premise that experience–understood as an integrated interaction 
between a living organism and its environment–only takes place at a specific level in 
nature requires a further explication of Dewey’s overall view on nature. For Dewey, 
reality, existence, experience and nature (the terms are used interchangeably) must be 
seen from the perspective of modern science and as a “diversified whole.”244 Existence 
or experience is impossible to grasp if it is approached rationally and mechanically. The 
“world of empirical things includes the uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable and 
hazardous.”245 This dual character of rest and movement marks each existence and every 
object with why all investigations and understandings of experience must begin from 
the basic fact that all existing things have “an eventful character”. Nothing is 
completely separated from anything else, but all connected structurally, meaning that if 
something changes in an event, the entire structure of events changes too. It is a 
teleological separation between means and ends, subjects and objects and causes and 
effects, which conditions Dewey’s ontological position in so far as “there is no isolated 
occurrence in nature.”246 Nothing in existence is final, instead, everything in it is 
divisible into temporal, functional and teleological means and operations: “ends-in-
view”. The latter term is taken from the field of modern science, where, Dewey writes 
that ends are always taken as “ends-in-view”, meaning “they are projections of possible 
consequences.”247 They are neither objects of contemplation nor unreachable. Criticising 
Aristotelian metaphysics, in which, for example, contemplation, is considered a higher 
end than physical activity, Dewey writes that to “think of objects as more or less ends is 	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nonsense […] They either have immediate and terminal quality; or they do not. Quality 
as such is absolutely comparative.”248  
Within this overall understanding of nature–a flux of events inseparable 
from each other–Dewey distinguishes between three levels or planes on which events 
can interact through a set of terms borrowed from physics and biology. Interactions on 
the first level–the physical–are between different types of physical matter: “its 
distinctive properties are those of the mathematical-mechanical system discovered by 
physics and which define matter as a general character.”249 Interactions on the second 
level–the psycho-physical–are qualitative differences between plants and animals. The 
third level–of mind or human experience–is that which interaction takes place via 
communication, language and participation and is the most complex one: “The 
distinction between physical, psycho-physical, and mental is one of levels of increasing 
complexity and intimacy of interaction among natural events.”250 Dewey’s 
understanding of the central categories in his philosophy, such as experience, art, event 
and action, are based on this model of interaction.  
 
Experience as interaction between organism and environment: a model in Dewey and in 
dance  
Dewey drafted a miniature model of the process of interaction between organism and 
environment already in 1896 in the article “The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychology”251, 
which outlines the basic premises of interaction at the level of human behaviour.  The 
article also demonstrates the way in which Dewey’s understanding of experience as an 
integrated action between a living organism and its environment, first and foremost, 
must be understood as a model which can be applied to all processes in life. This model 
encompasses numerous examples, from amoebas interacting with water, to how humans 
behave in relation to their social environments, to the way in which democratic 
processes work as well as the relation between an artwork and its reception. The 
approach of taking models of behaviour and interaction from the fields of psychology 
and behaviourism was also present in the work of Halprin’s mentor and dance educator, 	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important, as “it became one of the classics in the development of functional psychology.” Richard J. 
Bernstein, John Dewey: Metaphysics of Experience (Washington: Washington University Press, 
1966),15.   
	  	  75 
Margaret H’Doubler.252 In the mid 1910s, H’Doubler developed an alternative form of 
dance pedagogy that explicitly rejected the modernist expressionist dance of Martha 
Graham and Mary Wigman. Instead of seeing movement as an expression of the inner 
self, H’Doubler, who came from sports, approached moving and dancing from 
anatomical, biological perspectives.253 In almost identical terms to how Dewey 
describes the activity between an organism and its environment, H’Doubler, writing in 
her dance manual Dance: A Creative Art Experience (1925), states that natural 
movement means “the perfect state.”  
“The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychology” sets out as a critique of the 
“reflex-arc-concept” which “was used by [then] contemporary psychologists to describe 
and explain human behaviour”254, and according to which “”psychic behaviour can be 
analyzed as a mechanical sequence of three moments: sensation or peripheral stimulus, 
followed by the idea or central process, followed by motor response.”255 Dewey 
illustrates the implication of this understanding of human behaviour with the “familiar 
child-candle instance”256 in which a child reaches for the fire and then burns itself. 
Within the theory of the reflex-arc-concept, “the interpretation would say the sensation 
of light is a stimulus to the grasping as a response, the burn resulting [...] a stimulus to 
withdrawing the hand as a response and so on.”257 The problem here, for Dewey, is that 
stimuli and response or sensation and movement are thought of as permanent existences 
and as separate causal units. In empirical experience, or metaphysical experience as 
Dewey often puts it, these things are fully integrated. This is similar to how nature for 
Dewey cannot be separated into means and ends–other than temporally–causes and 
effects, subjects and objects or stimuli and response cannot be seen as distinct 
phenomena.  
 
[W]hat is wanted is that sensory stimulus, central connections and 
motor responses, shall be viewed, not as separate and complete 
entities in themselves, but as divisions of labo[u]r, functioning factors, 
within the single concrete whole now designated the reflex-arc.258  	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Understood as operative functions, stimuli and response take place within an “organic 
coordinate whole” in which they can only be distinguished from each other through 
their teleological function: “it is only the assumed common reference to an inclusive 
end which marks each member off as a stimulus and response.”259 Both H’Doubler and 
Halprin aimed to achieve such a unification of thinking and dancing in their dance 
workshops. H’Doubler used the term ‘kinaesthetic sense’ as a way to describe how the 
senses of the body worked “in tandem with the other senses of the body.” It has been 
speculated whether H’Doubler gained this concept from evolution theory and 
“particularly the adaptability of organisms to their environments.”260 Rather than 
consisting of separate functions, human behaviour, Dewey argues, should be understood 
as “a whole act, a sensori-motor-coordination.” The stimulus is in fact born from this 
coordination and “it represents as it were, an escape from it.”261  
 
The coordinated process between sensory and stimulus, as outlined in the 1896 article, 
is applied and expanded to the process of life in general in Experience and Nature, in 
which it is specified through the three levels of interaction. Experience only occurs on 
the second and the third (the psycho-physical) levels, and this is why Dewey’s interest 
is primarily in these. The main difference between a living and a non-living thing– 
between the chemical and the psychophysical levels–is that the latter is “characterized 
by needs, by efforts which are active demands to satisfy needs, and by satisfactions.”262 
Each need is a demand something as it “denotes a concrete state of events: a condition 
of tension in the distribution of energies.”263 When action is taken upon the 
environment, the need comes to a state of satisfaction. The activity created through this 
interaction and change occurs when a need is being satisfied, a state of equilibrium has 
occurred, and the environment and the organism, as a consequence, have changed. This 
circular and interactive process between need, demand and satisfaction is for Dewey an 
activity that ties itself together into a whole with discrete parts. “Hence its selective bias 
in interactions with environing things is exercised so as to maintain itself, while also 
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maintaining the whole of which it is a member.”264 Furthermore, this need-demand-
satisfaction circle of activity models the most general ideas of activity to more distinct 
‘activities’: the way democracy works as well as education and art. In her movement 
workshops, H’Doubler might have termed this activity “movement as an integrated 
flow.”265 Dewey and H’Doubler worked around the same time-period in the United 
States and were influenced by modern science and progressive ideas around education 
and pedagogy. Whereas Dewey’s thoughts on this manifested itself in writings and 
initiatives in education, philosophy and social research, H’Doubler explored similar 
questions through bodily practices and through her role as the founder of the first degree 
in Dance at the University of Wisconsin in 1926, where Halprin studied. Causal 
connections cannot be made between Dewey’s philosophy, H’Doubler’s, Anna 
Halprin’s, Simone Forti’s and Yvonne Rainer’s art practices. Forti’s and Rainer’s 
practices developed within a post-war art context in New York. Yet Halprin’s practice 
(and H’Doubler’s influence on Halprin) cannot be underestimated as it provides a 
context for understanding the way in which Forti approached the making of movements.  
 
The body-mind-creature, the role of language and the object as event 
What implications upon epistemological categories such as subject and object does 
Dewey’s empiricist concept of experience have, and what role does language play for 
these categories? Although subject and object-positions in Dewey are merely “names 
for changing functional distinctions within experience”266, these positions have some 
basic features. The closest to a concept of the subject we find in Dewey’s thinking is 
found in his category of the ‘body-mind-creature’, whose interaction with the 
environment is more complex and varied than other animals. They respond to events 
and qualities of events in complex, organised and objectified ways that produce feelings 
on a different level than animals of lower forms. One of the most distinct capacities of 
the body-mind-creature is its use and developed form of language which distinguishes it 
from other animals. Language objectifies and makes it possible to reflect upon feelings 
and qualities. When qualities of interaction are taken into a discourse or a system of 
signs they begin to make sense. “[W]hen for example a certain quality of the active 
relationship of organism and environment is named hunger, it is seen as an organic 	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demand for an extra-organic object.”267 It is this objectification or reflection upon events 
that enables body-mind-creatures to “have” rather than just to “feel” feelings.  
Written and spoken language plays a central role in objectifying the 
dancer’s movements as well as the dancer her- or himself, as seen in works by many of 
the Judson Church dancers. In Rainer’s Ordinary Dance, premiered at the first Concert 
at the Judson Memorial Church Theatre on 6th of July 1962 and organised by Robert and 
Judith Dunn, Rainer speaks and moves at the same time. Simple everyday movements, 
and more illustrative ones taken from a fairy tale, are repeated whilst she recites an 
autobiographical poem listing all the addresses she had lived on until she moved to New 
York.  By reading the text out loud, the movements are turned into objects of reflection, 
refraining them from appearing spectacular or virtuosic. But in contrast to Dewey’s 
work where the function of language is to integrate movement and action, the text in 
Rainer’s work was written after the movements had been set, and did not correspond to 
the rhythms or the connotations of movement.268 Dewey and H’Doubler sought absolute 
interaction between movements and language. Rainer, who in addition to her classes 
with Halprin, also did Dunn’s Cage-influenced composition techniques, aimed for a 
dissonance or juxtaposition between language and movements.  
In Brecht’s event-scores, the function of language takes on a closer role to 
Dewey’s. The reading of his scores is what enables the viewer to have an experience of 
the work that turns the scores into ‘art.’ Reduced to written words, the event-scores 
frame and produce everyday experience. The same can be argued with relation to some 
scores within task-dance. The chart for Rainer’s Parts of Some Sextets (1965), made by 
two large pieces of graph paper taped together, produced and framed movements into 
choreography. Along the vertical axes of the score were written down thirty-one choices 
of movement material such as “bird-run”, “sitting figure” and “standing figure.”269 
Along the horizontal axis were the eighty-four units, which corresponded to each thirty- 
seconds intervals of time. Dancers’ initials were scattered on the chart so that each 
dancer knew what to do when. Carrie Lambert-Beatty writes that this meant that 
“multiple actions could be performed simultaneously; since marks might be made in 
several boxes in the same row, the same activity could be repeated many times.”270 The 	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dematerialised aspect and nominative function of language in event-score and task-
dance practices enabled artists to deal with matters of everyday empirical reality and to 
frame these realities into experiences of art.  
 For Dewey, the process of reflection that language makes possible is also what 
creates meaning in so far as when feelings–in Dewey’s formulation–are had, they also 
gain meaning and sense. Language enables the body-mind-creature to interact in highly 
complex ways with its environment because of the way it is deeply connected to 
actions, habits and meaning. Language is “always a form of action.”271 Spoken words, 
gestures or written marks only gain their meaning in action. Meaning appears when 
there is agreement–an equilibrium or coherence–between words, action and behaviours. 
It depends on contexts, situations and the way in which organisms interact between 
other organisms and the environment. Habits take a particularly central role in how 
Dewey understands more complex organisms’ communicative skills. Habits embody the 
feelings that language articulates, and the more habits an organism has, the more 
complex the interaction between itself and its environment becomes. “Human learning 
and habit formation present thereby an integration of organic-environmental 
connections so vastly superior to those of animals without language that its experience 
appears to be super-organic.”272 H’Doubler, Halprin, Forti and Rainer were all 
concerned with habits. By taking habitual movements, such as standing and walking, as 
the main material for their work, they exhibited and put habits into view. But whilst 
habits for Dewey are a positive thing, habits from these dancers’ perspective was 
questioned and put into view. The idea of tasking or scoring habits was to make the 
dancer aware of them and to perform them, not in a habitual way, but rather in a present 
manner so that differences could be traced within these movements.  
 
Instead of seeing objects as ontologically separated from subjects, which Dewey 
accuses the history of Western philosophy from Descartes onwards to have done, 
Dewey understands objects as “objects of physics”, and as such, structurally related 
through matter and energy. Although objects of knowledge can be distinguished in 
thought, they “are never separate existences. They are always of, from, toward, 
situations and things”273, and are distinguishable through four different criterias. They 	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are temporal and spatial events that come and go and have a certain uniqueness or 
singularity to them, and they also exist in different situations and contexts that embody 
or give them different qualities and meanings.274 The similarity with the account of flux 
in Macuinas’ Fluxus manifesto is striking. A cut-out from a dictionary included in the 
Fluxus manifesto tells the reader that Flux is “a continuous moving on or passing by, as 
of a flowing stream; continuing succession of changes.”275 Secondly, for Dewey, objects 
are comparable and substitutable: “The technique of equations and other functions 
characteristic of modern science is, taken generically, a method of thoroughgoing 
substitutions.” Fluxus works, such as Brecht’s book-box Water Yam (1963), consist of 
around a hundred event-scores. Each of these, presented in the same font and similar 
length, is serial in composition and substitutable with one another. Within separate 
event-scores, words are also posed in such a way that one word or one sentence might 
be replaced with another. The two event-scores of Chair Event are examples of this. In 
the first Chair Event: “on a white chair, a grater, a tape measure, alphabet, flag, black 
and spectral colours.” In the next Chair Event event-score: “on a white chair, a 
Christmas-tree ball, flag, can-opener, black and spectral colours.” Like Dewey’s 
objects, the two event-scores are interchangeable and so are the words of which they are 
made of. In addition, for Dewey scientific objects are elements of discrete units; never 
metaphysical finalities, they are integral and continuous. If they were completely 
separate unities, they “would have no efficacy, [they] could not act or be acted upon.”276 
Finally, objects of science are the relational models upon which everything else 
depends: “the formulations of the regularities upon which intellectual and other 
regulation of things as immediate apparitions depends.”277  
 
Art and the artist as a problem and the dancer as explorer 
At its core, experience for Dewey is an interaction between an organism and its 
environment, and this interaction always appears as a ‘problem’ which is being solved, 
in a perfect state of equilibrium, to then immediately become transformed into another 
problem. Experience is a form of a problem solving activity that operates in-between an 
organism and its environment, and this problem solving takes on different forms 
depending on need, complexity of the organism and its degree of capacity to feelings 	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and language. Furthermore, this activity–experience–aims for a perfect state of 
equilibrium between needs and satisfactions, and the experience of art is best attuned to 
create such a state of equilibrium. A similar approach to making as a form of problem 
can be found in various artistic practices related to task-dance and the event-score, such 
as Cage’s notion of ‘experimentation’. The latter, Cage writes in the mid 1950s, must be 
“understood not as descriptive of an act to be later judged in terms of success and 
failure, but simply as of an act the outcome of which is unknown.”278 Commenting on 
this, Joseph argues that “[c]omposition thus entered the realm of ‘experimentation’ and 
became an activity without foreseen or predetermined result.”279 In relation to Cage, it is 
also possible to see the score, as it was developed in Cage’s work, as a problem in its 
form. The chart-system used for Music of Changes (1951) allowed for an infinite non-
predetermination at the level of sound-construction and ordering.280 Divided into 
twenty-six charts: “eight for sounds, half of each chart reserved for silence), eight for 
amplitudes or dynamics, eight for durations and of for superposition […] Music of 
Changes was both time-consuming and labo[u]r-intensive, every sound being the 
product of consulting multiple charts.”281  
Event-score and task-dance practices after Cage also used the idea of the 
problem as a strategy to make works. It could be that the viewer, performer and/or 
reader of the works was demanded to engage actively with some form of tension or 
problem in the works in order to be able to experience them. Such an example is the 
task of holding a comb and moving one’s nail up down its prongs, as in Brecht’s Comb 
Music (Comb Event) (1959-1962). The problem could be posed in a more ‘implausible’ 
and imaginative manner, as in Ono’s Instruction Paintings, which asks the reader to 
imagine something that might appear impossible. The reader of Painting for the Wind 
(Summer 1961) is instructed to “Cut a whole in a bag filled with seeds of any kind and 
place the bag where there is wind.” Similarly the reader of Painting to be Constructed 
in Your Head is asked the difficult or impossible task to: “Hammer a nail in the center 
of a piece of glass” (1962, Spring), and the reader of Painting to be Watered (Summer 
1962) is confronted with the problem of watering a painting every day.  
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Within task-dance practices, there is an explicit use of the term problem that 
goes back to H’Doubler and her understanding of dance and movement. Her workshops 
for non-trained dancers took a distinctively different approach to the heavily technical 
classes by Graham. Through the use of articulated skeletons and specific tasks, “[h]er 
classroom exercises focused on specific muscles and joints in aid of solving a particular 
‘problem’ she posed to the class.” An example of such an anatomical problem could be 
mentally and physically understood through sequences where, as described by a student 
of H’Doubler, an “inward rotation of the thigh could initiate a long, beautiful sequential 
roll of the pelvis, shoulder and head.”282 Halprin was interested in the idea of natural 
movement, in the functional, biological and anatomical approach, that H’Doubler had 
introduced. But for Halprin, subjective emotions in addition should be “approach[ed] as 
a ‘technical problem’” by objectifying them to various techniques.283 Forti, who used 
both Halprin’s approach to the natural body, as well as Cage’s scoring-techniques as 
methods in the making of her Dance Constructions, presented these works as explicit 
situations of problems waiting to be acted upon by the performer. As H’Doubler took 
most of her methods and approach to dance from biology, evolutionary science and 
physics, the close relation to science can also be seen in Fluxus and Judson Church 
practices. If task-dance can be traced back to an explicit concern with anatomy and 
evolutionism, following Cage, Brecht, Joseph writes, likened the conception of an 
unlimited totality of possible variations in the event-score “to contemporary scientific 
conceptions of relativity and quantum mechanics.”284 
 
A consequence of this all-inclusive concept of experience is that each problem, and 
each part of the problem, has the same ontological value. For Dewey problems such as 
‘democracy’ or ‘art’ have the same status as the problem of a sessile organism fighting 
for its existence. His account of the various levels of complexity in the organism, 
however, serves particularly well for grasping the new role of the dancer in these 
practices. For Dewey, organisms’ different levels of complexity depend on their organs 
and ability to use them in different ways. Although all living organisms are sentient, 
plants or “lower animals” may only be capable of producing feelings in vague ways. “A 
sessile organism” (an organism that is connected to a substrate and cannot move 	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voluntary, such as a blue mussel) “requires no premonitions of what is to occur, nor 
cumulative embodiments of what has occurred.”285 An organism with so called 
locomotion organs and distant receptors (for example, a bear with ears and eyes), in 
contrast, has capacity to respond to things in its environment through a more complex 
activity: “susceptibility to the useful and harmful in surroundings becomes premonitory, 
and occasion of eventual consequences within life.” In more complex organisms, the 
activity with the environment is therefore differentiated into the “preparatory, or the 
anticipatory, and the fulfilling or consummatory.”286 Complex animals, in contrast to 
sessile and other simple organisms, have feelings “which vary abundantly in quality, 
corresponding to distinctive directions and phases – initiating, mediating, fulfilling or 
frustrating–of activities, bound up in distinctive connections with environmental 
affairs.”287 But lower forms of animals do not know that they have feelings. They can 
only feel them. Only highly complex animals with minds know they have feelings and 
can therefore have them too.   
Similarly to the way in which Dewey argues that the more complex and 
developed the organism the better integrated it is with its environment, H’Doubler and 
Halprin aimeded to develop movement techniques where the dancer was in tune with its 
surroundings. The aim of these movement-techniques was for the dancer to be able to 
refine and retune her or his different muscles and senses into an integrated movement.288 
The more the dancer knew about, and developed complex ways in which to be in the 
world, the more in tune they became with their environment. Ross shows how 
H’Doubler’s view on the dancer was taken over by Halprin. She writes that H’Doubler 
“favoured discovery over drill, teaching dance as a series of movement explorations 
based on anatomical logic and each student’s improvised responses to verbal prompts 
from the teacher.” Halprin’s workshops focused “on turning students into physical 
explorers. By not making formal dance training a pre-requisite to movement invention 
Halprin expanded the definition of the dancer.”289 The tasks given to the dancers taking 
part in Halprin’s workshops were often of the nature that the dancer needed to expand 
her or his notion of skill and the idea of the body. Even if this often meant to break with 
‘rational’ ways of behaving, for example to dance with closed eyes and instead let 	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senses like hearing and touch determine the movements, it meant that the dancer had to 
develop and challenge her- or him-self. The dancer had to, in Dewey’s terminology, 
approach the world as an enquirer always in a constant negotiation with its 
environment, while at the same time, expanding and developing the kinaesthetic and 
sensorial organs and the changing of its environment. In Rainer’s Trio A, the 
choreography consists mostly of everyday movements like walking, sitting and turning. 
The movements, however, are put together in an awkward order with no repetition of 
movements. The non-organic sequencing of the movements challenges the dancer to 
approach each movement as if it was a new one.  Finally, why Dewey’s understanding 
of the organism, and in particular, the more complex species of organisms, can be said 
to model the role of the dancer in task-dance practices is its rejection of the idea of 
‘knowing’ as an ontologically different way of relating to the world. The stark emphasis 
on getting to know the world through senses and feelings of the body, what H’Doubler 
termed “the kinaesthetic sense”290, goes hand in hand with Dewey’s description of how 
knowing that Zöllner’s lines are parallel is one way of relating to them, and that visually 
experiencing them as convergent is another. Task-dance emerged out of a critique of 
modern dance’s emphasis on ‘rational’ and traditional skills and ways of moving. In 
contrast to the disciplined and skilled dancer in the modern dance tradition, Halprin’s, 
Forti’s and Rainer’s practices required dancers that understood themselves in more 
complex somatic and multi-sensorial ways.   
 
2.4. Art as experience: Ono and Forti 
Dewey’s model of integrated interaction between an organism and its environment 
reaches its culmination in his writings on art and aesthetics. Central to his writings on 
experience was the unification of phenomena like stimuli, response, organism and 
environment. In his writings on art, these are substituted with non-separations between 
the roles of the artist and the receiver; between the artistic production and the aesthetic 
consumption; between the doing and the undertaking and between form and matter. 
Dewey criticises the “[m]any theories of art [that] already exist”291 (aesthetics in Kant 
and bourgeois art theory) as they separate art from everyday experience. His critique of 
aesthetics is therefore similar to his criticisms of all major tendencies in the history of 
Western modern philosophy. Similar to how experiences exist in nature and must be 	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excavated and unfolded in all their complexity, art works need to be approached as 
scientific objects.  
 
Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest 
upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations. It 
is the business of those who are concerned with the theory of the 
earth, geographers and geologists, to make this fact evident in its 
various implications. The theorist who would deal philosophically 
with fine art has a like task to accomplish.292 
 
Unsurprisingly, seeing that pragmatism as a whole is rooted in Aristotle’s notion of 
praxis, Dewey draws on the Ancient Greek community in which art was looked upon as  
“enhancements of the processes of everyday life”; dance and theatre were “part of 
religious rites and celebrations” and “had no peculiar connection with theatres, galleries, 
museums.”293 That art in Antiquity was a form of mimesis and reproduction of life only 
highlights, Dewey argues, the integration of art and life for Athenian Greeks: 
 
[W] hen they came to reflect upon art, formed the idea that it is an act 
of reproduction, or imitation. There are many objections to this 
conception. But the vogue of the theory is testimony to the close 
connection of the fine arts with daily life; the idea would not have 
occurred to anyone had art been remote from the interests of life.294 
 
Following the Greek ideal, art for Dewey, constitute experiences in their most complete 
form. The artistic process demonstrates a closeness between the maker and its materials. 
In an “emphatic artistic-[a]esthetic experience” […] “ the relation is so close that it 
controls simultaneously both the doing and the perception.”295 This artistic process is 
also marked by consciousness for Dewey:  
 
A painter must consciously undergo the effect of his every brush 
stroke or he will not be aware of what he is doing and where his work 
is going. Moreover, he has to see each particular connection of doing 
and undergoing in relation to the whole that he desires to produce.296 
 
Forti’s Dance Constructions made between 1960-61 and Yoko Ono’s Instruction 
Paintings made between 1960-63 are both early and emblematic uses of task-dance and 
the event-score. Forti’s Dance Constructions consists of six individual works termed 	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dance constructions and were made for two separate occasions. The first two of these, 
See-Saw and Rollers, were presented in an evening of happenings at the Reuben Gallery 
in New York in December 1960. The other four were presented in May 1961 within a 
programme entitled Five Dance Constructions and Some Other Things at Ono’s loft, 
also in New York, in an evening of performances put together by Young. The latter 
included the constructions Slant-Board, Huddle, Hangers, Platforms and a re-staging of 
See-Saw from the year before. In all of these–except for Huddle–a physical, 
architectural, environmental and game-like object, such as a sew-saw or a slant-board, 
scored the dancer or performer to move in a particular way for about ten minutes.297 
“The structure of each piece”, as Banes writes, “showed the operations of the adult body 
in a situation that is ordinary for children, but rare for adults. Skills of balancing and 
adapting to momentum were tested in a systematic examination of the processes of 
equilibrium.”298 Ono’s Instruction Paintings were exhibited for the first time in July in 
1961 at George Macunias’ AG Gallery in New York299 and published in 1963 in the 
small artist publication Grapefruit.  
 Apart from contextual similarities, such as being part of a New York 
experimental art scene in the early 1960s, Forti’s Dance Constructions and Ono’s 
Instruction Paintings also share a set of conceptual similarities. At the most general 
level, these works explicitly situate the viewer/reader/dancer and/or performer as central 
to the meaning of the work. By reading, moving or imagining specific instructions, 
tasks or problems, the viewer comes to have an experience that can be embodied and 
physical as well as imaginative and intellectual. In Dewey’s terms, the viewer reading 
or the performer moving interact with their environment, and by doing so, achieve an 
experience, which simultaneously presents itself as an intensified moment of art. The 
score or instructions function in these works in at least two ways. Firstly, these 
architectural game-like objects,300 in Forti’s case and the kinaesthetic poems in Ono’s, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Morse, Soft is Fast, especially “Chapter 4: The Dance Constructions, La Monte Young’s Performance, 
and Slow Time”.  
298 See Simone Forti “Dance Reports” in An Anthology of Chance Operations, eds., La Monte Young and 
Jackson Mc Low (New York: Self-published, 1963).  Forti also complimented these environmental- and 
architectural-like objects with hand-drawn pictures and shorter written texts (a type of event-score 
perhaps). Forti, Handbook in Motion (Halifax, Canada: The Press of Novia Scotia College of Art and 
Design, 1980) for the timing of these works. 
299 These instructions were later exhibited “at the Sogetsu Art Center in Tokyo in May 1962, in the form 
of hand-lettered sheets calligraphed in Japanese by Toshi Ichiyanagi, a composer and former student of 
Cage’s.” Kotz, Words to Be Looked At, 61.  
300 Robert Morris’ Box for Standing (1961) and Untitled (Column) (1961) were made around the same 
time and had similar action-like sculptural qualities as Forti’s Dance Constructions. 
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present themselves to the mover/reader of these works as problems, riddles or games, 
waiting to be acted upon, and in that way, to be solved in order to reach a state of 
equilibrium between the organism and its environment. This problem does not seem to 
ask for a specific solution but opens itself for an infinite and undetermined number of 
solutions as long as it stands in relation to the structure or instruction. For example, the 
mover in Forti’s constructions decides with what speed to move and which part of the 
body to put weight on whilst moving. In the score to Hangers, Forti writes: “When the 
piece was first performed it lasted five minutes, but it could last ten or for whatever 
time seems in proportion to the rest of the situation.”301 The performer’s freedom is, 
however, only relative in relation to the construction, presenting itself as a problem set 
out beforehand. Similarly, Ono’s Instruction Paintings demands a participator or a 
reader free to interpret or actualise the instructions in any way they like. But this 
freedom is only actualised if performed in relation to the problem materialised as a type 
of score. Secondly, The linguistic or choreographic notification of these scores can also 
be seen as a kind of framing device or method–to refer back to Dewey’s description of 
immediate empiricism understood as experience–of empirical reality and enable an 
experience to take place. The sensations achieved when thinking about watering a 
painting, or when letting one’s body hang in a rope attached to the ceiling, are made 
into heightened art experiences through these linguistic and choreographic scores. As 
such, they provide a structure that intensifies and frames reality–‘flux’–into a coherent 
experience. That both the event-score and task-dance are based on an idea of instruction 
language (written or spoken) enables what we might call their “approach of 
equivalence” to everything inside the experience, a quality that serves to frame and 
render explicitly an experience into an intensified moment of art.   
Dewey’s concept of the human subject as a highly complex organism, can also, 
on a more detailed level, be said to model the performer or reader in Forti’s and Ono’s 
work. Like Dewey’s body-mind-creatures, they are confronted with a problem, in the 
form of a score, and who, through their embodied activity, are able to establish “super-
organic connections” with their environments. This is explicit in Forti’s written 
instruction to Huddle:  
 
’Huddle’ requires six or seven people standing very close together, 
facing each other. They form a huddle by bending forwards, knees a 	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little bent, arms around each others’ shoulders and waists, meshing as 
a strong structure. One person detaches and begins to climb up the 
outside of the huddle […] It is not necessary to know who is to climb 
next. Everyone knows when anyone has decided to be next. 302  
 
The reader or mover of these works uses their minds to read and understand the 
instructions. But the realisations of the same instructions require an active–either 
explicitly physical or more embodied and sensual–engagement with the body. In Forti’s 
Dance Constructions the mover needs to engage with and act upon its environment in 
an explicitly physical, yet intellectual or mindful, way. “The actualized work”, Morse 
writes about Slant Board, “would become an activity of immediate attention moment to 
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Simone Forti. First performance of See-Saw, Reuben Gallery, New York. 1960. 
Photographs by Robert R McElroy. (Performed by Yvonne Rainer and Robert Morris.) 	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Although mostly performed by trained dancers, the constructions in Forti’s 
work, as they score the dancers into elemental and child-like movements such as 
climbing and balancing, require the dancers to undo their dancing skills and approach 
their bodies, as well as the act of moving, in new and embodied ways. Similarly to how 
Piekut describes the way in which a composition by Cage forced one of its performers, 
Charlotte Moorman, to undo her specialised and classically trained cellist skills,304 the 
dancer in Forti’s constructions was asked to undo or unlearn the specific qualities and 
skills of modern dance, and through this, engage their bodies, through a technique, in 
non-predetermined ways of moving. In describing these dance constructions, Banes 
writes that they “rather than framing special movements requiring the technical skill of 
trained dancers, these pieces simply required ordinary movements that permitted the 
performers to meet the demands of the equipment.”305 To meet the “demands of the 
equipment”, precisely because they are not ‘natural’ for adults, requires the dancers to 
approach their bodies and the situation in non-usual and complex ways. When the 
dancer has no technique or set of skills to lean on, it needs to develop new ones on its 
own.  
 
2.5. Critical limits of Dewey’s experience: Kant versus Dewey  
By using the forms of the event-score and task-dance, Ono’s and Forti’s work 
demonstrate a complete embrace of everyday experience and the aim of wanting to 
frame and make visible this experience. They are, in Dewey’s terms, fully and 
completely immersed into the experiential realm. But these forms and particular 
artworks–despite their immersion into the everyday–are also recognised as art and as 
something other than everyday experience. Articulated differently, these works take as 
their content and material heterogeneous everyday reality, and yet something, in their 
function as art, enables them to also separate themselves from that everyday reality. 
This is what makes them into epistemological problems. From this viewpoint, they are, 
in Dewey’s terms, examples or models of integrated experiences presented as art. But 
they also stand in absolute negation to that same reality. They are perhaps what Boris 
Groys, following Adorno, has termed “paradox-objects”: “A contemporary artwork is as 
good as it is paradoxical–as it is capable of embodying the most radical self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Benjamin Piekut. Experimentalism Otherwise, 148. Piekut writes: “Little in a cellist’s training would 
have prepared her for such physically awkward musical gestures. Indeed, it is precisely a cellist’s training 
that renders such movements awkward.”  
305 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 124.  
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contradiction, as it is capable of contributing to establishing and maintaining the perfect 
balance of power between thesis and antithesis.” Groys exemplifies the paradoxical 
aspect of art by referring to Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) and Malevich’s Black Square 
(1914). The former, he writes, is a functional object and a sculpture, and the latter a 
geometrical figure as much as a painting. This doubleness, of being functional everyday 
objects and of being paintings and sculptures, makes them into art.306 Following this 
figure of the paradox-object, task-dance and the event-score should be added to the list 
of forms which constitutes this paradox in art from the historical avant-garde 
movements and onwards.  
 Dewey’s metaphysical philosophy of science provides a useful model for 
articulating much of the contextual, thematic and historical aspects for how these genres 
developed. This is because Dewey’s philosophy, and these art practices, share a 
positivist approach to methods and approaches found in the natural sciences. But since 
art for Dewey is fundamentally integral to everyday experience, it is hard to see how 
works of art in his account are distinguished as art. It becomes equally clear that 
Dewey’s notion of experience, and in particular, the consequences it has for a notion of 
art, cannot provide a model to why these artistic practices, despite their complete 
integration with experience and the empirical realm, can present themselves as ‘art’. 
There are at least three interrelated reasons to why Dewey’s understanding of 
experience and art fails in giving an account of the post-WWII art practices of task-
dance and event-score practices: 1) It does not distinguish objects ontologically from 
one another, 2) it collapses art and aesthetics in such a way so that the latter is reduced 
to sensible experience and, 3) it is based on a concept of art which explicitly contradicts 
a generic and post-medial category of art developed from the end of the Second World 
War and onwards. These three interrelated reasons are a logical consequence of the 
most basic condition of Dewey’s philosophy, that is, that a radically empiricist 
metaphysics of nature only allows for experience to be immanent. I will begin by 
exploring the latter to then move into the three consequences of this which makes 
Dewey’s philosophy ill-suited to use for post-medial practices of art.  
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Kant versus Dewey 
The overall aim of Dewey’s empiricist notion of experience, as he formulated in several 
articles and books, is to function as a critique of Kant’s transcendental critique and the 
subject-object relation it implies. To understand Kant’s conception of the subject-object 
relation we need to first begin with the basic contradictory statement about the human 
subject that he sets of from in the Critique of Pure Reason307 as well as the 
consequences of this for a renewed understanding of metaphysics.  
 
Human reason has the peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions 
that it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they 
are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it 
also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human 
reason. (A  vii)  
 
For Kant, the cognitive structure of the human subject makes it act in experience from 
principles that have been set by itself. At the same time, these principles “surpass the 
bounds of experience,” (A viii) There are, in other words cognitions which exceed all 
possible experience and go beyond all possible senses “through concepts to which no 
corresponding object at all can be given in experience.” (B6-B9) Experience is “itself a 
kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in 
myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which is expressed in concepts a 
priori to which all objects of experience therefore necessarily conform, and with which 
they must agree.” (B xviii) The constant problem or productive contradiction for Kant 
lies in that reason never stops to ask questions about the principles, which surpasses 
human experience.  Yet it “cannot discover them, for the principles on which it is 
proceeding, since they surpass the bounds of all experience, no longer recognize any 
touchstone of experience.” (A viii) The only way in which human reason can be 
investigated, according to Kant, is by uncovering the principles it rests on. It is only the 
limits and restrictions of human reason and experience that can say anything about 
reason itself. It is impossible, Kant writes, to step outside of experience, and this is why 
it can only be dealt with negatively through its limits. The main task for Kant becomes 
to critically examine the conditions of human experience through a critique of reason: “I 
have to do merely with reason itself and its pure thinking.” (Axiv) Such a critique, does 
not deal with objects of reason, but “merely with itself, with problems that spring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
	  	  92 
entirely from its own womb, and that are not set before it by the nature of things that are 
distinct from it.” (B23) Such a critique of reason, what Kant calls ‘transcendental 
critique’, is a critique of its principles and concepts and transcendental philosophy is a 
system of these concepts. (B25)  
Furthermore, and in relation to the disciplinary status of metaphysics and 
philosophy, this transcendental critique, which also for Kant is necessarily a form of 
self-critique, has to take place on the “battlefield” (A viii) of metaphysics since the 
latter is “the only one of all the sciences that may promise that little but unified effort, 
and that indeed in a short time.” (A xx) Such an enquiry will prove whether 
metaphysics, “the queen of all the sciences” (A viii), as a science, is even possible. The 
problem so far, Kant writes, is that metaphysics has only been dealt with by Dogmatists 
and Sceptics308, and no one has managed to understand metaphysics as the science of 
conditions of possibility. Instead, they have been searching blindly, turning it into an 
insecure science. Kant contrasts the insecurity that metaphysics has taken with the 
sciences of logics, mathematics and physics, which have succeeded because they have 
known their own limitations. Its “understanding has to do with nothing further than 
itself and its own form.” (Bix) Kant’s distinction between metaphysics and the 
conventional sciences is conflated in Dewey’s work, where the latter’s findings and 
methods are applied onto Aristotelian metaphysical categories. Only when Galileo, and 
later Newton, “comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself produces 
according to its own design” could physics become a secure science able to answer the 
questions posed by reason. (Bxiii) Seen in relation to Kant’s viewpoint on metaphysics, 
it is even easier to understand why Dewey insists on using the concept of experience 
and the metaphysics of experience interchangeably. Whereas experience in physics 
connotes facts and empirical data, the metaphysics of such experience turn them into 
ontologies of being.  
  Kant ties metaphysics’ failure to become a secure science with a specific 
conception of the object. “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must 
conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori 
through concepts that would extend our cognition have on this presupposition, come to 
nothing.” (Bxvi) In contrast, the possibility of metaphysics requires a new subject-
object relation since reason poses a priori cognitions, or rather, in itself has the capacity 	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of knowledge outside of experience. Termed the Copernican revolution, it holds the 
idea that objects conform to the subject’s (the transcendental subject) structures and 
have the ability to cognise: “that the objects must conform to our cognition, which 
would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which 
is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.” (Bvvi) This implies 
that the “objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be 
cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts” (Bxvii) This would then be 
similar to the “first thoughts of Copernicus” in that it would turn the perspective around 
completely. Kant’s Copernican revolution in metaphysics is a revolution of method “not 
a system of the science itself; but it catalogues the entire outline of the science of 
metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal 
structure.” (Bxxiii) Again, we might want to recall, with Kant in mind, how Dewey 
wrote that his philosophy should be seen as a completely new method: the denotative or 
the radically empiricist method which opposes Kant’s.  
Kant touches on how it is that objects can be represented to the human 
subject and to the human subject’s relation to metaphysics already in 1772 in a letter to 
the German physician Markus Herz. In the letter, Kant writes that the obscurity of 
metaphysics hinges on the question: “What is the ground of the relation of that in us 
which we call ‘representation’ to the object?” As a reply to his own query, Kant writes 
that a representation of an object is dependent on the “way in which the subject is 
affected by the object.” In the same letter, he also distinguishes between “intellectus 
archetypi (on whose intuitions the things in themselves would be grounded)” and 
“intellectus ectype (which would derive the data for its logical procedure from the 
sensuous intuitions of things.)”309 This idea is developed in the Critique of Pure Reason 
towards the end of the second Introduction and in ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’. 
Objects, Kant writes in ‘The Transcendental Aesthetic’, appear to subjects through a 
synthesising activity between the two faculties or capacities, sensibility and 
understanding. “[T]here are two stems of human cognition which may perhaps arise 
from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through 
the first which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are 
thought.” (B29) Through the faculty of sensibility the empirical is passively given to the 
subject in the form of intuitions, whilst through the faculty of understanding, these 	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intuitions are being given concepts and are therefore able to be thought. Through the 
faculty of sensibility, we come in immediate contact with objects, and through the 
faculty of the understanding we relate to objects mediately. Intuitions are particular 
since they relate to singular manifold senses, whilst concepts are general since they are 
what generalises intuitions into a graspable concept. This activity which brings together 
the particular and the general–concepts and intuitions–is an act of synthesisation. “By 
synthesis in the most general sense, however, I understand the act of putting together 
different representations together with each other and comprehending their 
manifoldness in one cognition.” (B103) This activity is “cast as a fundamental activity 
of the human mind” and “perhaps the most fundamental thoughts of Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy.”310  
The epistemological consequence of Kant’s Copernican revolution is that objects, 
which appear to us, are always known and are always in experience. That which can be 
known or cognised is represented to us as an object in experience. If it does not appear 
in experience, it is non-representable. In contrast to Dewey, Kant’s interest lies in the 
conditions of experience, rather than what exists inside of experience. For Kant, as 
discussed above, the most fundamental condition for experience to take place is the 
synthesising activity between understanding and sensibility or imagination. Dewey, on 
the other hand, is not interested in the conditions of experience, but in the different 
objects, things, links and connections that exist inside it. The task of the inquirer, the 
engaged citizen and the artist, for Dewey, is to go deep into the things and objects in 
experience–posed as problems–and to investigate and explore them in order to come up 
with temporary solutions and ends that will eventually turn into new problems and 
objects. For Dewey, in contrast to Kant, there is only experience. From a Kantian 
perspective, Dewey’s concept of experience, and its relation to the “metaphysics of 
nature”, is necessarily non-critical in that it only deals with that which is inside of 
experience and never addresses the limits of it. The concept of experience in Dewey’s 
work becomes a form of an empty signifier that is supposed to fill in a critique of such a 
position.  
 
After having outlined the basic problems of Dewey’s immanent position with regards to 
his concept of experience and from the standpoint of Kant, we can now turn to the 	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consequences of such a standpoint for Dewey’s understanding of art and aesthetics. The 
first consequence of Dewey’s understanding of experience and metaphysics as non-
critical, and instead, as fully immanent, is the impossibility to think ontologically about 
different kinds of objects. Dewey’s temporal objects of physics exist in experience, and 
the only difference between one object and another is their distinct qualities and 
properties that are constantly changing depending on the contexts and situations they 
are in. The experience of them is also dependent on the level of complexity through 
which the body-mind-creature makes connections to them. Art is only a more 
intensified experience, with different qualities and properties, rather than an entirely 
different experience.  
Instead of an ontologically different kind of object, and this is the second 
consequence of Dewey’s empiricist notion of experience, art is conflated with or 
thought of as aesthetics (and aesthetics, in a specific sense, I will discuss in a moment). 
As Dewey’s example of Zöllner’s lines showed, there are only different types of 
experiences, in which knowing exemplifies one type of experience, and the experience 
of, for example a painting, another one. This distinction between essentially two types 
of experiences in which things either can be known or felt can be traced back to the 
Greeks’ distinction between aisthêta (sensible things, the sensible element of 
knowledge) and noêta (intelligible things). This is also the distinction which Gottlieb 
Baumgarten used when he coined the term aesthetics, by Latinising the Greek adjective 
aisthêtikos as aesthetics: “Aesthetics […] is the science of sensible knowledge.”311 
Although amended in the second edition this is also the definition Kant gave of 
aesthetics in the Critique of Pure Reason “as the exposition of space and time as pure 
forms of intuition, conditioning the possibility of objects in general.”312  
Dewey’s conflation of art with a Baumgartian notion of aesthetics reduced 
to the sensible is problematic from the perspective of a Kantian critique of Dewey’s 
immanent notion of experience as well as from Kant’s redefinition of aesthetics as it 
plays out in his Critique of the Power of Judgment. It is problematic in so far as Kant’s 
transcendental project redefined metaphysics and philosophy “as a critical standpoint 
beyond positive ‘criteria, or positive knowledge”313 in a similar way in which aesthetics, 	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in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, is conceptualised as critique. Rather than 
empirical sensible criteria, Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement poses the 
question whether there are “representations which determine a priori a state of the 
subject like pleasure or pain? […], and whether  “the object’s representation is a 
priori.”314 Kant’s answer to these questions is yes, aesthetic judgments are concerned 
with such objects. The cause of these a priori sensations in the subject–like pleasure or 
pain–can happen because of the way in which the subject reflects on the form of the 
object. It is, as Gilles Deleuze puts it in his book on Kant’s Critiques, “not the existence 
of the represented object which counts, but the simple effect of a representation on me.” 
This, makes aesthetic judgments indifferent to the “material existence of the object.” It 
is “the reflected representation of the form [that] causes the higher pleasure of the 
beautiful.”315 This reflective judgment is a result of the faculties that cause aesthetic 
judgements–understanding and the imagination–as they interact with each other in a 
free play rather than in a synthesising unity. And in contrast to such a synthesising 
activity, in aesthetic judgments, Deleuze writes, citing Kant, the imagination and 
understanding act in a free play and “cannot be known intellectually, but only [be] felt.” 
(§39-40).316 By introducing the aesthetic judgment in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement, Osborne argues that Kant “transformed the meaning of ‘aesthetic’ by 
extending it beyond the sensible (spatial and temporal) apprehension of the objects of 
‘outer’ and ‘inner’ intuition to include reference to the feelings accompanying the 
relations of reflection constitutive of the internal cognitive structure of subjectivity 
itself.”317 This is also why the Critique of the Power of Judgement, according to 
Deleuze, should be seen as the transcendental genesis of the three critiques.318  
Dewey’s understanding of art as aesthetics is also problematic from the 
standpoint of an Aristotelian concept of practice. It is to do with the former’s distinction 
between practice and poiesis. As has been pointed out319, Aristotle was not only the first 
to conceptually distinguish between practice and theory, but within practice, he also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1985), 46.  
315 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, 47.  
316 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. and eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
317 Osborne, “Art Beyond Aesthetics”, 659.  
318 This argument is made by Deleuze in the essay “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”, in Desert 
Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974 (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2002), 56-71.  
319 See for example Lobkowicz Theory and Practice and Bernstein Praxis and Action. See also Chapter 1 
of this thesis.  
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made a separation between practice and poiesis. If the distinction between practice and 
the epistême broadly was connected to a separation between politics and contemplation, 
the separation between practice and poiesis, if looked upon through the triangulation 
where practice is opposed to poiesis, is to do with the distinction between two types of 
productivity. Giorgio Agamben clarifies the difference between practice and poiesis: 
“the genus of action is different from that of pro-duction, for while pro-duction has an 
end other than itself, action cannot, for good action is itself its end.”320 So whilst 
practice (Agamben uses the term action instead) has no other end than itself and is 
related to politics, poiesis has an end outside of itself, and is therefore, in Aristotle’s 
thinking, related to truth. Importantly for our discussion here, art for Aristotle (as well 
as for Agamben) occupies the latter of these categories in that art is that which brings 
out truth. This is confirmed by Agamben when he writes that: “The essence of pro-
duction, conceived in the Greek way, is to bring something into presence (this is why 
Aristotle says […] ‘every art is concerned with giving birth’). Consequently, it 
necessarily has both its end and its limit outside itself.”321  
Viewed against the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis and practice, 
experience can in Dewey’s account, firstly, be understood as practice since experience, 
similarly to Aristotle’s understanding of it, has its base in biological existence and is 
characterised by actions in which ends and means are inseparable: “it is itself 
movement.”322 Furthermore, and as pointed out by Agamben, the English word 
experience corresponds etymologically to the Greek word practice in that both “contains 
the same idea of a going through of action and in the action” and therefore 
“etymologically speaking it is the same word.”323 Secondly, Dewey’s notion of 
experience can also be understood as a form of poiesis since art in his account is 
understood as the most integrated or unified experience. Occupying both of these 
spectrums of Aristotle’s broader notion of practice, Dewey’s concept of experience 
collapses the two. If art for Aristotle was confined to the realm of poiesis, and as such 
constituted a form of truth, Dewey instead situates art at the centre of empirical 
experience. For Aristotle, Agamben writes, “experience seems in no respect inferior to 
art …since experience is knowledge of individuals, while art is knowledge of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Giorgio Agamben, “Poiesis and Praxis” in The Man Without Content (Chicago: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 73. Note that Agamben uses Aristotle’s term ‘action’ instead of ‘practice’. 
321 Agamben, “Poiesis and Praxis,” 73.  
322 Agamben, “Poiesis and Praxis,” 75.  
323 Agamben, “Poiesis and Praxis,” 74. 
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universals, and action […]…is concerned with the individual.”324 Dewey, by operating 
within an Aristotelian framework of experience and metaphysics, still displaces art 
within this, and turns the latter into another metaphysics of experience.  
The third and final consequence of Dewey’s immanent concept of 
experience has to do with its relation to a generic category of art. Art is not an 
ontologically separate object in Dewey’s thought, but instead is thought of as aesthetics 
reduced to the meaning of sensible intuitions. The art object for Dewey is a form of 
poiesis concerned with its being or non-being and with its qualities or properties. From 
the standpoint of a generic and autonomous concept of art, not defined through 
mediums, style or specific forms, such a concept becomes problematic. As event-score 
and task-dance practices demonstrate, this conception of art implies mediations of art 
that surpasses the material qualities of the art object, and instead, privileges relational 
and social forms of mediation. If there is any question of the ‘being’ or ‘non-being’ of 
art–to put it in an Aristotelian/pragmatist manner–it is to a large extent conditioned by 
institutional and specifically historical frameworks separable from the qualities of the 
empirical art object. The next chapter departs from the problem of objectification in 
task-dance and the event-score as a way to further explore the ontological status as art 
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3. Object: Acts of negations of the medium-specific art object 
 
 
We chose objects for their texture and form; they were all everyday 
objects: automobile tires, gunnysacks filled with things – at one point 
we had a big hassock filled with tennis balls – bundles of rags, 
parachutes that were stuck into containers, newspapers rolled up that 
were stuck into things, that come out and explode. […] The costumes 
were designed as extensions of our props. Each person was really 
designed as an object.325  
 
 
Fluxus performances often center around the manipulation and use of 
objects in the enunciation of auditory and visual experience. […] 
Indeed, objects in Fluxus performances assume a distinctly 
performative character, and the body, in addition to its role as subject, 
is itself presented as an object.326  
 
If meaning, after the break with medium-specificity, could no longer be found in the 
material objectivity of the artwork, how did art become an object or be objective in 
other ways? This is the central question that this chapter sets out to explore within the 
context of some task-dance and event-score practices. I focus in particular on how the 
medium-specific art object was negated in task-dance and event-score practices, and 
what consequences it had for the construction of a new concept of the art object. The 
overall aim is to take seriously the negation of a medium-specific notion of the art 
object at stake in these art practices. By being about the conditions of objects and the 
process of objectification, these art practices show how event-score and task-dance, 
despite their ephemeral, literal, de-materialised and event-like character, could sustain 
themselves as objects of art. How did event-score and task-dance practices negate the 
medium-specific material art object as an objective site of meaning? How were event-
score and task-dance practices concerned with objects and ways of objectifying? How 
might we understand the strategies and methods used in these practices as acts of 
reduction and abstraction? Furthermore, in what sense can they be understood to be 
working with objects on at least two different levels: Objects “inside” of the work (on a 
phenomenological level) and their own status as specific ontologically different kinds of 
objects within the institution of art (transcendental and ontological level)? Finally, how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Ann Halprin describes her work Esposizione (1963) to Yvonne Rainer in an interview. Yvonne Rainer 
and Ann Halprin, “Yvonne Rainer Interviews Ann Halprin,” The Tulane Drama Review 10 No. 2 (1965): 
151-154.  
326 Kristine Stiles, “Between Water and Stone; Fluxus Performance, A Metaphysics of  
Acts,” 65.  
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might the negation of the object be seen as an act of separation, and what does this 
mean for these practices’ constitution as ‘art’? 
The overall argument of this chapter is that event-score and task-dance 
practices, by negating medium-specificity, constructed a new conception of the art 
object where the very process of objectifying constituted the art object formally and 
institutionally. The argument is also that this act of objectification took place, in these 
practices, on two distinct yet inseparable levels. These art practices constituted 
themselves through acts of negation, abstraction and reduction, and by so doing, 
produced new types of objects where the act of objectifying was made into an object.  
The chapter begins with an introductory discussion of the minimalist 
object, as theorised by the artists Donald Judd, Robert Morris and art critic Michael 
Fried, and the de-materialised object as put forward by critic and curator Lucy Lippard. 
The main contention here is that, despite in-depth discussions of the critique of the art 
object and its “objecthood” in 1960s art practices, these critiques have failed to 
conceptualise more specifically what concept of objectivity is challenged and at stake in 
these practises. By limiting their field of search to institutional separations between 
plastic art and other practices, they failed to take into account art practices of this 
period, which operated within a context of dance and experimental music, and that 
arguably dealt with the de-materialisation and objectification of the art object more 
radically. The chapter proceeds into a section where I, in a first step, begin with a brief 
genealogy of the concept of the object. I demonstrate how this concept has been 
transformed from its Greek origins in medieval philosophy, and ended up in, on the one 
hand, a Kantian formal and transcendental concept of the object, and on the other, a 
Husserlian phenomenological notion of it. The brief exposition of the Platonic and 
Aristotelian understanding of the term relates to a discourse in close proximity to the 
event-score, and much of the literature on performance more generally.327 This critical 
exposition of the concept of the object points at the distinctively pre-modern character 
of Aristotle’s understanding of the term and problematises this with regards to the art 
practices at stake here. I then proceed into the transformation of this pre-modern 
understanding of the object to a Kantian as well as a Husserlian one. The section on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 See Introduction and Chapter 2 for an outline of how the concept of art at work within much of the 
literature on performance is related to Aristotelian notions of practice and the object. More recent 
examples can be found where an Aristotelian-grounded concept of the object is tied to the use of objects 
in recent literature on performance and dance. Performance scholar André Lepecki ties a Heideggerian 
concept of the thing to some recent performance practices. André Lepecki, “Moving as a Thing: 
Choreographic Critiques of the Object,” October 140 (2012): 75-90.  
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Kant and Husserl explores how, for both, acts of reduction or abstraction are 
constitutive of what they consider to be an object. It also explores how objectivity is 
constructed. Kant’s “degrees of phenomenal objectivity”328 and Husserl’s “multiplicities 
of types of object”329 are produced through “acts of objectivation”330 or spontaneous acts 
on the part of the subject. The final part of the chapter moves into a discussion of the 
way in which the two levels of object construction can be used to discuss the use of 
objects and processes of objectification in some emblematic task-dance and event-score 
practices.   
 
3.1. The minimalist and the de-materialised object  
There are at least two, by now familiar, art theoretical discourses that have focused on 
the negation of the medium-specific art object in the post-war period in North America. 
Firstly, the discourse around minimalist art practices from the mid to late 1960s, in 
which the artists Donald Judd, Robert Morris, Frank Stella, Dan Flavin, Carl Andre and 
Sol LeWitt are central, attempts do so. As James Meyer argues, the heterogeneity 
amongst these artists, often classified as minimal, is too broad to easily put them under 
one label.331 However, common concerns amongst many of them was the rejection of 
medium-specificity and the questioning of how an object of art might turn out after such 
a critique. The exhibition, Primary Structures, at the Jewish Museum in New York in 
1966 represented such a critique. The title emerged from a conversation with the curator 
of the exhibition, Kynaston McShine and Lippard, who recalls that “structures seemed 
an appropriate label for the kind of pared-down objects being produced in artists like 
Judd, Flavin, Morris and LeWitt.” Lippard most likely got the term from LeWitt, for 
whom “a Structure implied a three-dimensional art form unfettered by associations with 
such traditional media as sculpture or painting. It suggested as well a clear tectonic 
organisation, a work built in a factory rather than the subjective product of the artist’s 
hand.”332  
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Emblematic examples of what LeWitt considered a structure were his own 
architectonic metal structures as well as Judd’s ‘specific objects.’333 The latter, also the 
title of an essay by Judd drafted in 1964 and published in Arts Yearbook in 1965, 
proposed a different genealogy for modernism in opposition to Greenberg’s medium-
specificity. Painting and sculpture, Judd argued, were pictorial in nature, and produced 
illusionistic spaces. Specific objects, in contrast, were “neither painting nor 
sculpture.”334 These three-dimensional works, Judd contended, existed in real space for 
themselves, and rendered painting and sculpture obsolete.335 Morris’s early works were 
made within the context of the Judson Church, and although excluded from the 
conventional canon of minimalism, were also explicit rejections of medium-specificity. 
They became suggestions for a new type of art object. Column was made as a prop for a 
performance at Young’s Living Theatre in New York in 1962, and Passageway was the 
artist’s contribution to Young’s evening of performances at Ono’s loft in 1961. The 
former looked like a wooden coffin without a lid in which Morris, during the 
performance, stood inside and after three and a half minutes he toppled down. 
Passageway, as the title indicates, took the form of a wooden corridor through which 
visitors to the evening’s events were urged to pass through. If these early works by 
Morris can be defined as something in-between action and object, similar to Forti’s 
Dance Constructions, his mid 1960s work resembled more autonomous sculptures. 
Morris also confirmed this transition in his work through his writings “Notes on 
Sculpture.” Published in Artforum in 1966, Morris in these articles, confronts Judd’s 
specific objects and argues for a return to sculpture as a medium-specific practice.  
The debate about whether these artistic practices made a critique of the art 
object and proposed a new conception of it, or whether they failed in their “literalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Morris’, LeWitt’s and Judd’s practices were different, as were their conceptions of the object. For a 
discussion of the differences and similarities between them see David Batchhelor, Minimalism: 
Movements in Modern Art (London: Tate Gallery Publishing, 1997).  Furthermore, and about the 
necessary differences between them Meyer writes: “I suggest that Morris orchestrated his discussion of 
sculpture in opposition to Judd’s theory of the object as ‘neither painting nor sculpture.’ […] Similarly, 
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334 Donald Judd, “Specific Objects,” Berkley Edu. Accessed Dec 1, 2016, 
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335 For a discussion of Judd’s essay see ‘Chapter Five: Specific Objects’ in Meyer, Minimalism, 134-141.  
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attitude”336 has mainly been popularised by Michael Fried’s essay “Art and Objecthood” 
published in Artforum in 1967. In the essay, Fried dismisses minimalist art for being too 
factual. Like Greenberg, one of the problems with this, for Fried, was “that minimal art 
exists for us, like the commodities we use everyday.”337 Philosophically and 
conceptually, the problem with the minimalist artwork, for Fried, whether it was Judd’s 
industrial and abstract objects or Morris’ large-scale geometrical figures, was that they–
because of their size and reduction of the art object to its literal support–created a 
feeling of “presence” and gave the impression of meeting another person. Minimalist 
art, he concluded, is theatrical or has a kind of theatrical effect, similar to that of being 
on a stage. “This phenomenological effect”, Meyer argues, was at the core of Fried’s 
critique.”338 Although Fried’s essay has been dismissed by artists and critics ever since, 
it put its finger on the main tendencies in the art of the time (although dismissing them), 
and as Meyer argues, the essay “transformed a hitherto contentious field into a coherent 
entity” and might be argued to have “invented ‘minimalism’ for later critics.”339 
 
Lippard, who worked with McShine, saw minimalism as the precursor to what she 
identified as conceptual art. Whereas the art object was considered in terms of a 
‘structure’ within a minimalist context, Lippard used the term “dematerialization” to 
give an account of the transformation of the art object.340 This term appeared as early as 
1926 in a text by El Lissitzky, but was popularised by Lippard’s and John Chandler’s 
article “The dematerialization of art” published in Art International in 1968.341 In it they 	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London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 149-172.  
337 Meyer, Minimalism, 232.  
338 Meyer, Minimalism, 233.  
339 Meyer, Minimalism, 229.  
340 Lucy Lippard, Six Years: The dematerialization of the art object from 1966-1972 (Berkley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997).  The discussion around dematerialization gained 
a revival in art in 2010 when it converged with a philosophical discourse around the so-called 
immaterialization of labour as coined (and later dismissed) by Maurizio Lazzarato. See my critique of the 
symposium ‘Untitled (Labour): Contemporary Art and Immaterial Production’ at Tate Britain in London 
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the changes that Lippard detected in 1960s art, and later also in Lazzarato within new forms of work. He 
writes: “The idea moving the masses today is called materialism, but dematerialization is the 
characteristic of the epoch. For example, correspondence grows, so the number of letters, the quantity of 
writing paper, the mass of material consumed expand, until relieved by the telephone. Again, the network 
and material of supply grow until they are relieved by the radio.  Matter diminishes, we dematerialize, 
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argued that since 1958, with the break of traditional media, and in particular, with the 
introduction of “performance attitudes in painting and sculpture”342, artists have lost 
interest in the “physical evolution of the work of art.” This, they write, “appears to be 
provoking a profound dematerialization of art, especially of art as object’ [which] 
result[s] in the object’s becoming wholly obsolete.”343 Furthermore, the dematerialised 
artwork, they write, requires more time and experience from the viewer or participator 
and dissolves or integrates art criticism with artistic practice. “If [the] object becomes 
obsolete, objective distance becomes obsolete.”344 This final quote is contested in event-
score and task-dance practices, where objectivity is created through other means rather 
than through tangible objects. There, neither the art object nor the critical objectification 
of the art object disappears with the dissolution of tangible art objects. In the 
introduction to Six Years: The dematerialization of the art object from 1966-1972, 
Lippard, similarly in her and Chandler’s article written six years earlier, describes 
conceptual art as work “in which the idea is paramount and the material form is 
secondary […] ‘dematerialized’.”345 In the chronological time line of conceptual art that 
makes up most of the book, Lippard includes works by Brecht and Ono from the early 
1960s. Lippard describes these artists’ event-scores, as anticipating “a stricter 
conceptual art”346 and as “proto-conceptual.” Ono, quoted by Lippard in the book, 
describes an event as “extrication from the various sensory perceptions”347, and 
demonstrates how the materiality of the object has moved to the materiality of sense 
perceptions and to the experience of these. Rather than dematerialised, as Lippard 
suggested, Ono’s work might best be described as re-materialised through other forms 
of objectification.   
 
Absent from the main minimalist accounts of this period, and from the discussion 
around the dematerialisation of the art object, are artists such as Rainer and Brown 
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342 Lucy Lippard and John Chandler, “The dematerialization of art”, in Conceptual Art: A Critical 
Anthology, eds. Alexander Alberro and Blake Stimson (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), 48.  
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whose early to mid-1960s work developed in a similar geographical and artistic context 
and explicitly worked with critiques of and new conceptions of the art object.  
 
Objects in minimalist dance and sculpture  
Rainer’s article “A Quasi Survey of some Minimalist Tendencies in The Quantitatively 
Minimal Dance Activity Midst the Plethora or An Analysis of Trio A”348 compares 
tendencies in minimalist sculpture to dance, and highlights this gap in the criticism. The 
text contains a diagram that states tendencies within sculpture–named ‘Object’–placed 
on the left hand side of the page and tendencies within dance–named ‘Dance’–placed on 
the right hand side of the same page.  
 
 
Diagram from Rainer’s article “A Quasi Survey…”, (1966).  
 
The first thing to notice about the chart is the equalisation that Rainer makes between 
‘Object’ and ‘Dance’, indicating that they should be considered as ontologically similar 
kinds of object or phenomena. The ‘Object’ in minimalist sculpture is understood as art 
in a general sense, and by placing ‘Dance’ next to it, the latter can be also read as such. 
Secondly, the rest of the chart and the following text, in which Rainer analyses these 
tendencies in relation to her own work Trio A (1966), describes the movements in the 
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Dance Activity Midst the Plethora or An Analysis of Trio A”, In Minimal Art: A Critical Anthology, 
Gregory Battock, ed. (New York: Dutton, 1968): 263-273.  
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piece as “movement-as-task or movement-as object.”349 These transformations of 
movements into objects and task is primarily the result of what Rainer describes as a 
rejection of specialised skill, dramatic accentuation and distribution of energy, and a 
refusal of tying movements together in a continuum. Rainer’s diagram shows how 
‘minimalist dance’ (to stick with the categories of the diagram) was concerned with 
objectification on two levels. Firstly, in that ‘minimalist dance’ is generalised into ‘art’ 
(simply by being placed next to ‘minimalist sculpture’) and turned into an ‘art object.’ 
Secondly, in that this was a consequence of choreographic strategies such as the use of 
found movements, for example walking, as ready-made objects in the work, and at the 
same time, in the reducing or objectifying movements into the most task-like actions 
that appear as self-sufficient objects.  
Judd’s “Specific Objects” and Meyer’s otherwise thorough account of 
minimalist practices, overlook Rainer’s Trio A and works by Brown such as Trillium 
(1963), which “articulated a concept-of-choreography-as-structure.”350 By excluding 
these practices, critical accounts, such as Meyer’s, dismiss works that dealt with a 
critique of the art object and with the idea of objectivation in explicit ways. Lippard’s 
tendency to overlook the often fierce critiques of the art object that took place in Fluxus 
and in related dance practices, can also be ascribed to Judd’s, Fried’s and Morris’ 
accounts of this period. This is particularly strange since Morris, considered one of the 
main protagonists of Minimalism, was explicitly influenced by, and also shared 
strategies with, artists such as Forti and Rainer.351 Not much has been written on how 
the critique of the medium-specific art object took place in event-score practices. 
Brecht’s event-score Two Exercises (1961) demonstrates an explicit concern with 
tangible objects and with ways of making other aspects of life into objects. Quoted in 
Lippard’s Six Years…, the score reads:  
 
Consider an object. Call what is not the object ‘other’. Add to the 
object, from the ‘other’, another object, to form a new object and a 
new ‘other’. Repeat until there is no more ‘other’. Take a part from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 Rainer, “A Quasi Survey…, 269.  
350 Susan Rosenberg, “Trisha Brown: Choreography as Visual Art,” October 140 (2012): 25.  
351 Morse, Soft is Fast and the exhibition Objects and Bodies at Rest and in Motion, Moderna Museet 
Malmö: 26.9.2015-7.2.2016. Moderna Museet, Stockholm: 12.3-12.6.2016. In the exhibition brochure, 
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the object and add it to the ‘other’, to form a new object and a new 
‘other’. Repeat until there is no more object.352  
 
The object under consideration might be a tangible or an imaginary object. But since the 
score asks the reader to include “the other”, defined as something other/else than the 
object, the score makes the reader objectivise more and more the previously un-
objectified phenomena around itself. The “other” is not specified. It is anything that “is 
not the object.” It can be the air or the floor or feelings experienced by the reader, or 
indeed something not yet thought of. Brecht’s score shows how, similarly to Rainer’s 
analysis of Trio A, it is occupied with itself as an object on more than one level. 
Presented as one of many pieces of work in his book Water Yam, the score-event is an 
art object in itself. But the instructions in the score also produce other levels of 
objectivity that are similar to how movements in Rainer’s work are turned into 
“movement-objects.”  
 
3.2. From independent things to acts of the subject  
The Standard English dictionary definition of an object resonates with Lippard’s 
concept of the object. An object is “a material thing that can be seen and touched” (“he 
was dragging a large object”). An object, the same entry states, is also, “a person or 
thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed”, (“disease became the object of 
attention”) and might denote the type of object that Brecht had in mind in many of his 
event-scores. These everyday meanings of the term object are also, to a certain extent, 
what Husserl understood as different types of objectivitites [Gegenständlichkeit]. The 
philosophical history of the term is more nuanced and complex. This is partly to do with 
the history of the translation of the term from its Greek origins into Latin and German 
as well as with the epistemological concerns it raises.  
As Olivier Boulnois points out, one of the difficulties in producing a 
genealogy of the concept of the object has to do with the fact that, although the term 
was never used by Plato or Aristotle, modern translations of their texts have often 
included it, and thus “project onto the ancient authors the Latin vocabulary we have 
inherited from medieval philosophy.”353 To speak about objects in Greek philosophy 
meant instead to speak about their essence and ways of being. Objects exist in 	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353 Olivier Boulnois, “Vocabulary of European Philosophies, Part 2: Object: objective being”, Radical 
Philosophy 139 (2006), 32.  
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themselves, and the only way to get to know them is to get to know their essences and 
being. In Plato, thirst, for example, “will never be for anything other than what it is in 
its nature to be for, namely drink itself.” (Republic IV 437e)” Similarly, for Plato 
knowledge is “’what can be learned itself’.” (IV, 438c) Nor is there in Aristotle’s 
writings a word for object, instead, when he discusses what human beings’ powers or 
faculties refer, to he uses the Greek word antikemenon. The latter means opposite or the 
opposite of thoughts and is the closest term in Greek philosophy that corresponds to the 
Latin term object, derived from objici, which means “the act of standing opposite.” As 
discussed by Boulnois, although Aristotle conceptualised the relation between thought 
and its outside through antikemenon, there are still crucial developments to be made 
before it arrives at its modern meaning. For Aristotle, in contrast to Kant, as we will see, 
a faculty knows a thing-in-itself only via the manifestations of its properties. And 
instead of, as in Kant, subject and object being reciprocally constituted, for Aristotle the 
faculty is governed by being and not by the object.354  
The first usage of the Latin word ‘object’ appeared in the anonymous author 
pseudo-Grosseteste’s (1265-1275) comment on Augustine’s use of objectum when the 
latter described a new theory of perception. 355 Following Plato, vision, for Augustine, 
requires the faculties of the soul and makes objectus into that which stands between the 
seeing and what is being seen. The concept of the object is thus introduced in the 
pseudo-Grosseteste text as the condition for that which enables the very act of seeing by 
the seeing subject, rather than something that exists on its own. As such, it is one of the 
first attempts to construct an epistemologically grounded object. It is, however, not until 
Philippe le Chancelier’s (1165-1236) Quaestiones de anima that antikemenon is 
translated directly into the Latin term ‘object’ and posed as something opposite to a 
subject and related to knowledge. “The object is no longer just an interposed obstacle, 
and is clearly recognized as being the theme specific to the act of knowing.”356 From 
having been an obstacle and something standing in the way, the object becomes 
constitutive of universal knowledge. The latter is also emphasised by Duns Scotus 
(1256-1308) who “stresses that the being of the thing remains the same regardless of 
whether its object exists” and that “objective being is universal, abstract and immanent 	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to the mind.” 357 From having been understood as that which stands opposite to the 
faculties or thought–antikemenon–and that which manifests its being through its 
properties, with the medieval objectum, the object becomes universal and a guarantor 
for objective knowledge and reality.  
 
3.3. Degrees of phenomenality in Kant  
The conceptual development of the object from that of being in antikemenon to the 
universality of objectum was the beginning of the “etymological reawakening”358 of the 
concept of the object that took place within critical idealism, as the latter was translated 
into the two German terms Gegenstand and Objekt. This implied that two new 
meanings (in addition to “that which stands opposite”) were added to the term: 
sensation and substance. This nuanced distinction between Objekt and Gegenstand is 
crucial for what Howard Caygill has described as Kant’s “extremely subtle”359 
conception of the object. This nicety has, however, often been overlooked in the 
translation of Kant’s work: “Existing French and English translations collapse the terms 
Gegenstand and Objekt by translating them both as ‘object’.”360  
Kant’s transformation of the meaning of an object, and the levels of 
objectivity it implies (lexicalised in the terms Gegenstand, Objekt and Ding), are crucial 
in Kant’s philosophy due to the fact that his critique of metaphysics, and his 
reconceptualisation of terms such as critique, knowledge and objectivity, hinged on 
these distinctions. Kant’s critique of philosophy is a critique of the limits or the 
conditions of philosophy of which at the centre is the Copernican Revolution. Rather 
than understanding objects as existing on their own, there for the human subject to 
grasp and explore, Kant redefined both the concept of the subject and the object by 
postulating that objects were formed through a synthesis of concepts and intuitions 
inside the structures of the human subject. Commenting on Kant’s critical turn, 
Dominique Pradelle writes that Kant, in the pre-critical period, followed the classical 
tradition of thinking, and made “the register of op-position (phenomenality) overlap 
with that of substance (reality in itself).” In contrast, and with the turn to transcendental 	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idealism, Kant in his critical period recognises these two aspects in a systematic unity. 
An object of knowledge [Objekt] begun to be understood by Kant as “the opposite […] 
constituted by acts of objectivation on the part of the faculties (sensibility, imagination, 
understanding) and their functions.”361 Put differently, universal knowledge is in Kant 
constituted through acts of objectivisation on the part of the transcendental subject and 
its faculties. The latter becomes a subject through the acts of subjectivation it performs. 
The object comes to exist as an object through these acts, and as Lucien Goldmann 
points out, Kant’s invention of the transcendental subject was already latent in his 
inaugural Dissertation (1770). What’s new, Goldmann writes, quoting Kant, is the idea 
“that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them.”362  
Two things are important here. First, the systematic relational unity that 
Kant constructs between the subject and the object [Gegenstande and Objekt]; and 
second, the acts of objectivation on behalf of the subject that this implies. What goes 
missing, Pradelle argues, when Kant’s distinction between Gegenstand and Objekt is 
dismissed in translations, are what he calls the different “degrees of phenomenal 
objectivity”363 and their distinct differences. The former are objects given by a 
sensibility to consciousness, and are therefore, Caygill writes, “objects of experiences or 
appearances which conform to the limits of the understanding and intuition.”364 The 
latter is constituted as a universal and necessary object of knowledge through a 
synthesis between intuition and understanding. A Gegenstand is more like a 
phenomenon, whereas an Objekt is like a phenomenon that is made into an object of 
knowledge. An Objekt is objective in a different way than a Gegenstand, and by 
splitting Objectum into phenomenal degrees of objectivity, the conditions of experience 
and of knowledge in general are, in Kant, conceptualised through a new understanding 
of objectivity, which is phrased by Pradelle as “acts of objectivation” or “degrees of 
phenomenal objectivity.”  
In her writings on performance in the post-war period, Jones simplifies the 
relation between subject and object in Kant by characterising it as an absolute 
separation resulting in the often alluded to “Cartesian dichotomy between body and 
mind.” Jones also blames the Kantian aesthetic, from which, she argues, modernism 	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was derived, for the exclusion of bodies in art before World War II, as it is “predicated 
upon the suppression of the particular, embodied, desiring subject; the artist and the 
critic must remain transcendent rather than immanent (embodied).”365 Jones’ caricaturist 
distinction between modernism and art from the Second World War (“post-modernism” 
in her terms) is based on the idea that the former relies on the Kantian aesthetic and the 
idea of the transcendental subject, and the latter on a poststructuralist critique of that 
same transcendental subject. Pradelle’s reading of Kant, in contrast to Jones’s, suggests 
that we are confronted with levels of objectivity constituted through actions on the side 
of an active transcendental subject. Although Kant does not problematise the body of 
the transcendental subject (it is a non-question for him), this does not mean that he 
argues for its non-existence, as Jones puts it. The transcendental subject, actively 
through acts of abstraction, objectifies itself, and this objectification becomes the 
condition of possibility for its embodied and experiential aspects.  
 
How should, what Pradelle calls, “acts of objectivation”366 be understood in more 
detail? In the article “The Reproach of Abstraction”, Osborne gives an account of how 
the concept of abstraction (most sophisticatedly articulated by Marx) can be traced all 
the way back to Kant’s transformation of the understanding of objectivity accounted for 
above. In making the connection between the transcendental subject’s acts of 
objectivation and the central role of abstraction in this, Osborne writes: “For Kant, 
‘objectivity’ is not about things; it is about the conditions under which the given yields 
‘objects’–that is, becomes conceptually apprehendable and hence ‘knowable’.” This 
transformation, Osborne argues, is dependent on the role of abstraction in Kant’s work, 
and specifically, the way it is played out in his Logic (1800). “The conceptual aspect of 
this process of object-formation […] is presented in Kant’s Logic as the product of a 
sequence of three ‘logical acts’, of which abstraction is the third.” This third logical act–
abstraction–accounted for by Kant, as Osborne cites Kant, is “‘the segregation of 
everything else by which presentations differ’”. This third act, in comparison to the 
other two which are positive,  is a “negative act”. But the function, of this negative act–
and this is crucial–is positive in that it is constitutive of the object.  
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In its formative role in the generation of concepts, abstraction thus has 
a positive epistemological significance, not merely despite, but 
precisely by virtue of its ‘negative’ role in distancing certain 
presentations from others, within the manifold of intuition through 
which the given appears.367  
 
Caygill also points out that Kant distinguishes between two concepts of 
abstraction in the Logic. Firstly, “abstracting something from” [abstrahere aliquid] and 
secondly, “abstracting from something” [abstrahere ab aliquot]. The second conception 
of abstraction, Caygill contends, citing Kant, is the act that takes place in the 
construction of an object of knowledge: “while formal logic abstracts all content of 
knowledge it is not itself abstracted from it.” (A131/B170)  
Caygill and Osborne demonstrate that the act of objectivication in Kant is 
a negative act with a positive–or perhaps, rather, a constructive–function. Abstraction 
appears as the necessary condition for experience and for the construction of objects to 
take place. Caygill also emphasises that Marx is the only one who has taken Kant’s 
ambiguity of the concept of abstraction seriously in that the former, in Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy, “rigorously distinguishes the two senses of 
abstraction.” There, Caygill writes, Marx “restricts the use of abstractions to revealing 
specific differences through comparison with common specific qualities.”368 
 
3.4. Phenomenal objectivities in Husserl 
In her article on tendencies in minimalist sculpture and dance, followed by an analysis 
of Trio A, Rainer emphasises how movement is a “a complete and self-contained 
event.” Trio A broke with the idea that movements need to be put together into a 
continuous flow, as was seen as the case in modern dance.369 In Rainer’s work, 
movements and phrases were simply placed next to one another without any natural 
transition. This made two movements, for example the rotation of a shoulder and a 
handstand, when put after one another, look like separate movement-objects.  
Despite crucial differences–Husserl’s work was partly an attempt to 
criticise or renew Kant’s philosophical project–similarities exist between Kant’s 	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understanding of the transcendental subject’s acts of objectivation as well as its 
construction of objects on different levels and Husserl’s conception of objectivity as a 
product of the phenomenological reduction. A Gegenständlichkeit or objectivity for 
Husserl, is something towards which consciousness is directed, “refers to a relationship 
with an object”. It is completely cut off from the thing and “reduces ‘object’ to 
‘phenomenon.’” However, and although an objectivity always refers to a phenomenon 
in Husserl, it can be constructed at different levels of intention or meaning in the sense 
that different modes of intention produce different types of objectivities. For Husserl, 
objectivities are always objects that are situated and grounded in the materiality of 
everyday nature, and yet have “supersstructural layers of meaning.”370 Dependent on the 
level of intention and direction of consciousness these can, according to Pradelle, be 
divided into categories such as animate beings, objects of value, use-objects and cultural 
formations. A dog, a book and a judgement are in Husserl’s work all objectivities 
operating on different levels of intentionality.  
  Objectivities are constructed through what Husserl calls a “phenomenological 
reduction”. It is derived from epoché as it was used within Greek scepticism as a way to 
refrain from making epistemic judgments too quickly based on inadequate evidence. 
Following the Greek sceptics’ ambition to consider phenomena around them with care, 
a phenomenological reduction for Husserl means to bracket or reduce phenomena so 
that they appear to us consciously. The phenomenological reduction forms the basis for 
Husserl’s phenomenological method and his attempt to construct a transcendental 
phenomenology. The world, according to Husserl, can be approached through a natural 
or a conscious attitude, and this is why “the meaning of the concept of ‘reality’ is 
split.”371 This distinction between the natural and the conscious attitude is also, for 
Husserl, distinguished through the two types of phenomena they are characterised by 
noesis and noema. The natural world is the world as it is immediately presented to us 
and in which things are in time and space: “This fact-world I found to be ‘out there’, 
and I take it exactly as it gives itself to me as something existing out there.”372 But for 
the human subject to become conscious and experience the world consciously, a 
“phenomenological reduction” needs to take place. The subject undertakes 
phenomenological reductions spontaneously. They make the world conscious to it; it 	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turns noesis to noema. The phenomenological reduction in Husserl can also be 
described as a form of “bracketing” or closing off of the world. This bracketing 
disconnects phenomena through the conscious, spontaneous acts of the subject so that 
phenomena can be perceived in their direct sense without judgement as well as as 
separate from their use. In his earlier works, Husserl calls the phenomenological 
reduction a method of “ideating abstraction.”373 Understood as a form of abstraction, 
this makes us go “back to things themselves [Rückgang auf die Sache selbst]” 374 as they 
are, and makes the natural world present to us on its own. Put differently, objectivities 
appear only by first being bracketed, separated and abstracted from the natural world.  
A similar conscious level of intentionality and method of reducing and 
abstracting was at work in Halprin’s workshops in the late 1950s. Forti recalls: “Our 
basic way of working was improvisation following the stream of consciousness.”375 
Whilst meditatively focusing on thoughts passing, the dancers were given tasks. As one 
of the participants, Forti describes how they were asked to first “individually select 
something in the environment and observe its movements for half an hour”, and then 
“abstract an element from the observed movement that we could take on in our own 
bodies.”376 With Husserl we might say that Forti, Brown, Rainer and the others, in 
partaking in Halprin’s workshops, were given choreographic tools to direct intention 
and consciousness in such a way that certain phenomena in nature appeared as 
separated, bracketed or abstracted. We might in a similar way say that the separation of 
everyday movements, such as standing, walking and sitting, as can be found in all of 
these artists’ work, was a bracketing and abstraction of these movements from everyday 
life in order for these movements to appear, or with Husserl become, noema.  
With these different conceptions and levels of the object and objectivity in 
mind, how can we further understand the concerns with objects in performance 
practices as in, for example, Brecht’s event-scores and Rainer’s task-dances? What 
kinds of objects are being constructed in these works and what kind of acts are taking 
place? How can the Kantian “degrees of phenomenal objectivity”, or Husserl’s 
“multiplicity of objectities” be of help here? And what does the relation between the 
reduction of objectivities, or abstraction from their use–and this pointing towards acts of 
objectification, abstraction and separation–have to do with these works’ placement 	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within the institution of art? And what does this consequently have to do with their 




3.5. Objectivities and Objekts in task-dance and event-score practices 
In her diagram, Rainer places ‘dance’ on the same ontological level as ‘art’, and through 
this, negates dance as a medium-specific category. This negation, as Rainer’s diagram 
demonstrates, was done in the particular artwork through different choreographic 
strategies. Task-dance was not generalised under the category of ‘art’ until it became an 
object in this sense. Although these two levels can be distinguished as separate, as they 
are represented in Rainer’s diagram, they are merely two moments of the same art 
practice.  
Whereas Husserl’s phenomenological objectivities better describe the 
perceivable (tangible or intangible) objects “inside”–so to speak–these works, the 
Kantian construction of an Objekt better accounts for how these practices are 
constructed as specific and ontologically different kinds of objects of experiences. What 
kind of phenomena are in turned into heightened objects – objectivities for Husserl–of 
experience then? Firstly, and central to these practices, is the employment and display 
of what Husserl perhaps would call use objects. In Fluxus-related event-score practices–
and specifically if we expand the notion of event-score beyond the idea of written 
instructions to also consider objects which function as instructions or are imperative to 
their character–domestic and functional objects such as different kinds of wood and 
plastic boxes, chairs, piggy banks, water bottles, perfume bottles, mouse catchers, 
books, newspapers, alarm clocks and telephone books, are used. In George Brecht’s 
event-score Three Chair Events (1961), the reader is instructed, through three separate 
bullet points, to sit on a black chair, on a yellow chair and near a white chair. His 
sculpture-installation Chair Event (1960) contains a white chair with a white and black 
walking stick and an orange laying on it. All the objects in the work are made for use, 
and yet, as an art work, they are either not allowed to be used or are used but for no 
reason, and through this, they are separated from their function as useful objects. In 
Halprin’s Esposizione (1963), the tasks in the piece are centred around objects, as 
described by Halprin in an interview two years later: “We had a hassock filled with two 
hundred tennis balls and one dancer’s task was to take that hassock up there and when 
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she got it up there to overturn it, so that the tennis balls came flying down.”377 Forti’s 
See-Saw (1960), on which two people are instructed to shift the balance between them 
whilst sitting on the see-saw, and Rainer’s Room Service (1963) in which mattresses 
and furniture is lugged around “as if they were as weighty and unwieldy as bodies”378, 
are also examples of works where everyday tangible objects are made explicitly useless. 
So is Morris’ Box for Standing (1961) in which the box, a type of standing coffin, 
functions as an object to generate movement and as a sculpture with no specific use. In 
all of these works, functional everyday objects were displayed, used, dis-used and 
separated from their function and everyday context.  
Another level of objectivity construction, or way of objectifying less 
tangible things such as movements, dreams, fantasies and desires, operates in these art 
practices. In task-dance practices, in particular, as Rainer’s and Morris’ writings on 
their work indicate, movements appear as self-contained objects, rather than as, in 
modern dance, as the expression or mediation of feelings. Performance scholar Bojana 
Cvejić contrasts the understanding of movement in modern dance, as “the bodily 
expression of the subject of dance” to the work of Rainer and other Judson Church 
dancers, in whose work movement instead was “created as an object in itself, that 
engages bones, muscles, ligaments, nerves…”379 Describing Rainer’s above mentioned 
work Room Service (1963), Banes concludes something similar about the relation 
between the tasking of movements and objectivity: “Movement itself became like an 
object, something to be examined coolly without psychological, social or even formal 
motives. […] Rainer proposed a new dance that would recognize the objective presence 
of things, including movements and the human body.”380 Banes also describes Rainer’s 
written No Manifesto (1965) as an attempt at demystifying dance “and making it 
objective.”381 The objectification of actions and movements is also present amongst art 
practices using the event-score. Young’s Composition 1960# 10, with the instruction 
“Draw a straight line and follow it”, takes a poetic and imperative character. With 
Husserl we might say that the reader of the score has to direct its intention towards 
lines, and by so doing, brackets them. The subtlety of these pieces becomes explicit in 
Young’s account of them. Fluxus-fellow Jackson McLow picked up the composition 	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and asked if he could write on it. Young said he could not as it was a piece of work to 
which McLow replied: “Whadaya mean a piece? That’s just a line.”382 Whilst some of 
the accounts of these works are overtly simple, they point at the subtleness with which 
these works articulate the viewer’s or reader’s ability to objectify. In this way, they also 
direct attention to art’s ability to make this process visible. They put into view the 
process of objectifying as articulated in Kant’s and Husserl’s thoughts.   
  There is also an explicit objectification of language–written and spoken–at stake 
in these practices.383 Words and sentences, whilst being instructions for actions and a 
means for something, also appear as autonomous entities: autonomous poems. Although 
some of them were less “poetic” than others, the form or structure of the event-score 
implicated this double meaning of language as both a means to an end and an end in 
itself. At least two more central acts of objectification can be articulated in task-dance 
and the event-score: the objectification of the performer and the viewer. With Husserl’s 
distinctions this would perhaps be put into his category of ‘animate beings’. In a dance 
context, there was an explicit concern of moving from a view of the dancer as 
expressive of subjectivity to a conception of the dancer considered as non-expressive, 
something in-between an object and a subject. The dancer in task-dance is free to take 
on the scores or tasks in the way they like, which resulted in the dancer gaining more 
agency as a subject. But the tasks and the choreographic methods used in task-dance 
also made the dancer appear object-like. The dancer in task-dance, as described by 
Halprin, “didn’t want anything to look as if it had meaning or continuity.”384 The event-
score turned performers and viewers explicitly into parts or objects of the work. An 
event-score like Brecht’s or Ono’s explicitly requires a reader for the work to be 
activated. The event-score was also, as Joseph notes, the first genre of art to make this 
explicit, and he refers to Brecht’s notebooks as examples. The latter, Joseph argues, 
highlights the “tripartite situation of composer, performance and perception”385 and 
demonstrates Cage’s understanding that “the score comes into existence as a result of 
the performer’s “actualization.”386  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Young, “Lecture 1960,” 73.  
383 This was also mentioned in Chapter 2 in the discussion of Ono’s and Forti’s works in relation to 
Dewey’s understanding of the objectification through language as one of the necessary aspects of human 
creatures. 
384 Rainer and Halprin, “Yvonne Rainer Interviews Ann Halprin”, 149.  
385 Joseph, “Chance, Indeterminacy, Multiplicity,” 232.  
386 Joseph, “Chance, Indeterminacy, Multiplicity,” 227.  Although the idea is developed in various places, 
the clearest articulation of this tripartite situation in Cage is in For the Birds where he writes, “to affirm 
that writing is one thing, performing another, and listening a third; and that there is no reason for these 
	  	  118 
 
Domestic, tangible everyday objects, movements and actions as well as people and 
words can, with Husserl, be understood as different types of objectivities appearing at 
different levels of intention and meaning in task-dance and event-score practices. The 
central concern of these art practices is the construction and the presentation of such a 
process at different levels of phenomenological intention. But how, more specifically, 
are these objectivities being constructed in these works? What strategies, and ways of 
making, make a movement into something of an autonomous movement-object, a walk 
into a ready-made, an instruction into a poem and a sofa into a useless bulky thing? 
These genres imply a reduction or abstraction already at the level of their form. The 
experience of an event-score requires that the reader consciously chooses and abstracts 
from the instructions or tasks given. Whereas the viewer of a dance performance, like 
Rainer’s Parts of Some Sextets (1966), does not necessarily need to do so in the same 
way, the performers of the piece must constantly make choices and reduce specific parts 
from the choreographic score. Morris described how the use of tasks in dance implied a 
sense of a reduction of performance and movements to simple actions. “A fair degree of 
complexity of these rules and cues effectively blocked the dancers’ performing ‘set’ and 
reduced him to frantically attempting to respond to cues–reduced him from performance 
to action.”387 By eliminating specialised skill, virtuosity and movement phrases with 
accentuation or dramatic distribution of energy from their works, movement was 
abstracted into its simplest elements. Halprin describes that the aim of the tasks she 
gave the dancers in her workshops was for the dancers to consciously explore the 
function of their bodies rather than imitate someone else’s movement pattern.388  
In event-score and task-dance practices, movements are reduced into simple 
actions, music into sound and poetic sentences into instructions. This reduction of 
material is also emphasised through choreographic and other strategies. Within the 
context of dance, when movements are reduced, they are also being repeated, 
accumulated on top of one another and put into random, and seemingly, ad-hoc 
juxtapositions as a way to serialise them into structures of substitutable elements: “no 
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part of the series is made any more important than the other”389, as Rainer wrote in Trio 
A. Many instructions in Young’s Compositions are contradictory and difficult to think, 
let alone, do. The serial aspect is also central to Fluxus event-score practices. Brecht’s 
publication of event-score after event-score in Water Yam and Ono’s tiny variations of 
difference in Grapefruit are emblematic. The serialisation of these event-scores turns 
them into whole structural objects, sometimes collated into one publication and 
sometimes–through the actualisation of them into performances or acts–dispersed and 
distributed.  
 
Art as an objekt 
The objectivities in these works (a newspaper, a hand-stand, walking, running and a 
poem for example) are constructed through acts of reduction emphasised through 
strategies of repetition, substitution, serialisation, accumulation, de-contextualisation 
and serialisation. The essential product or consequence of these acts of reduction is that 
the objects lose their function. The action of presenting and constructing them displaces 
them their context, use and function,  and from the “fact-world that is always there.”390 
A double movement takes place: Things, movements and words are constructed through 
acts of reduction, and thus become different types of objectivities. Objectivities are 
constructed. At the same time, these acts also negate these objectivities as functional 
useful objects by turning them into art, and making them into a type of bracketed and 
elevated object outside of their real world. Put differently, these objectivities are 
negated as the objectivities they are, and through such a negation, another type of object 
is constructed: a non-functional, serial, structural and useless object. But what is this 
other object that is being constructed through these acts of reduction? On what level is 
such an object constructed? And what is the relation here between the negative act of 
reduction and the positive epistemological construction in Kant? An Objekt in Kant is 
not about things (at the level of phenomenological experience), but about how an object 
of experience is constructed through a synthesis of intuition and understanding. Art, 
however, in Kant is not such an object since art cannot be known intellectually through 
a systematic synthesis of imagination and understanding. In contrast, in aesthetic 
judgments, the faculties of imagination and understanding act in a free play which 
means that the viewer of art can reflect only on the form of the artwork.  But despite the 	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fact that the a priori construction of an experience, an Objekt, is different from what 
Kant considers an aesthetic reflection, Kant’s distinction between phenomena 
[Gegenstände] and objects of experience [Objekt] resonates with art practices discussed 
in this chapter. Through strategies of objectification these art practices were 
transformed from medium-specific disciplines such as ‘dance’ and ‘music’ into generic 
objects of art. Further the objectivities created in task-dance and event-score practices 
are abstracted and removed from everyday function and use. This objectification and 
“bracketing” of certain movements and objects separates them from other types of 
























These practices might be described as objectifying at two distinct, yet simultaneous, levels 
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objects and movements turns things, movements and entire bodies of performers and 
viewers, into objectivities. These acts of objectification separate and abstract these objects 
from their everyday contexts. This latter aspect makes these art practices construct another 
level of objectification: that of the ontology of art understood as a different kind of 
experience. By being ‘about’ objectification and abstraction as an epistemologically 
positive act, they are also about their existence or condition of possibility as ontologically 
different kinds of objects, art objects. This second level of objectivity–the construction of 
itself as an object of art–is indistinguishable from the first level. Importantly, and 
specifically with regards to these practices presenting themselves as art, is the act of 
objectification is understood as a separation. It is the separation of these objects and 
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4. Abstraction: Task-dance’s abstract ontology  
 
 
Strategies of abstraction and reduction are at the centre of event-score and task-dance 
practices. This chapter approaches the problem of abstraction and separation of task-
dance practices, in particular, by considering them in relation to the historically distinct 
social form of production to which a generic concept of art belongs. The concept of 
abstraction can be traced all the way back to Kant. It is, however, most philosophically 
and socially elaborated in Marx’s work. For Marx capitalism, and as Alberto Toscano 
has put it, is seen as “the culture of abstraction par excellence” and “is really driven, in 
many respects, by abstract entities, traversed by powers of abstraction.”391 For Marx, 
abstraction–or rather abstract labour–is the social form through which all relations are 
mediated in fully developed capitalist societies. To explore early 1960s performance 
practices’ relation to the abstract character of the society in which they were produced 
and presented, also means to consider them in relation to the autonomous concept of art 
that was developed within that societal formation. Such a concept of art goes back to 
German idealism and Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), but one of the 
first formulations of such a concept was in Charles Baudelaire’s essay “The Painter of 
Modern Life” (1863).392 It was not however until Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970) that 
the autonomy of art was articulated philosophically and socially.393 Whilst Adorno, as 
pointed out by Bernstein, considered Kant’s transcendental subject as “philosophically 
false”, it was “socially and historically true.” The transcendental subject’s autonomy 
and freedom, as constituted through reason’s lawgiving nature, reverts in capitalism, for 
Adorno, “to its opposite” and becomes “a source of domination and separation.” Citing 
Adorno, Bernstein writes that Kant’s transcendental subject precedes the abstract 
relations through which individuals are constituted under capitalism “and for which 
exchange is the model.”394 Art for Adorno, because it is commodified, makes it 
inseparable from the abstract relations of capitalist society. But in contrast to other 	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commodities, artworks, Adorno argues, mediate abstract labour through their individual 
form, and through this process formally negate abstract labour. In Bernstein’s 
formulation, this makes art “the voice of sensuous particularity against abstract 
rationality.”395  
Following this problematisation between the role of abstraction in task-
dance and event-score practices and the relation between abstraction, labour and art, this 
chapter is concerned with the following: To investigate the way in which task-dance, 
seen as an artistic practice in which artistic strategies of reduction and abstraction are 
central, can be thought of as a form that reflects its constitution as autonomous art and 
as separated from capitalist abstract labour relations. What is the relation here between 
the abstraction in art and abstract labour that is understood as the main mediation form 
of modern society? In what sense is task-dance abstract? These questions will be 
explored by investigating how artistic strategies of abstraction, separation and negation 
in task-dance stand in relation to, a) what Marx considers the main mediating social 
form of Western capitalist modernity (abstract labour), and to b) the function of such 
strategies within the category of what Adorno calls “autonomous” or “nominalist” art. It 
will look at, on the one hand, what Moishe Postone describes as the “historically unique 
form of social mediation that, though socially constituted, has an abstract, impersonal, 
quasi-objective character”396 which characterises modern capitalist society; and on the 
other hand, the idea that, as Bürger has described as “the autonomy of art is defined as 
art’s independence from society.”397 The overall aim of this chapter is to show the way 
in which early 1960s task-dance practices are abstract in a fundamental way, and how 
this places them within a category of art in general.  
The chapter begins with a brief discussion of Yvonne Rainer’s “No-
Manifesto”, published in 1966. Here Rainer negates specific and established 
conventions prevalent in modern dance, enabling dance to function as a point of 
departure from the discussions that the claim that art negates abstract labour through the 
negations of previous norms in art. The chapter proceeds into an exposition of the 	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Marxian category of abstract labour, and its relation to an understanding of modern 
capitalist society as one in which “its basic relations are constituted by [abstract] 
labo[u]r.”398 Dialectical and new critical readings of Marx’s notion of abstract labour are 
contrasted with traditional understandings of the same. The former emphasises the 
systematic and scientific methodology through which Marx introduces the categories 
‘value’, ‘labour’ and ‘commodity’ and argues that they need to be understood within the 
logic of capitalist production itself. Whilst traditional readings of Marx emphasise the 
capitalist system of production as one of struggles between classes and one that 
criticises capitalism from the standpoint of a transhistorical concept of labour, new 
critical Marxism questions capitalism by questioning labour as its main mediation 
form.399 New Systems Dialectic, or a categorical critique of capitalism, also sets off 
from an understanding of what Marx formulates as the fundamental contradictory 
character of capitalism–“its moving contradiction”400–immanent to labour, which is 
understood as the main mediating form of capitalist production. Overcoming capitalism 
from this standpoint means to overcome abstract labour as the main mediating social 
form. The chapter moves onto the conception of art specific to Western modern 
society–primarily via Adorno–as conceptualised through the categories of ‘autonomy’, 
‘separation’ and ‘negation.’ Here art is understood as an institution, which actualises 
itself by negating the fundamental contradiction of capitalist production, and through 
this, reflects a moment of truth about the society in which it exists. A main focus in the 
section on the categories of abstraction, separation and autonomy is the forms through 
which art mediate itself. The final section discusses the way in which task-dance 
practices were constructed and rendered into art through their negation of previous 
forms and methods of working within dance.   
 
4.1. Rainer’s No-Manifesto and other negations  
In 1965 The Tulane Drama Review published an article by Rainer with the title “Some 
Retrospective Notes on a Dance for 10 People and 12 Mattresses Called ‘Parts of Some 
Sextets,’ Performed at the Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, Connecticut, and Judson 
Church, New York, in March, 1965.” Divided into three parts (The origin of the piece, 	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The work and Postscript), the main section of the article focuses on how Rainer made 
the piece by using charts and objects as well as on what this meant for the trained and 
the non-trained dancers in it. In the final section Rainer writes: “All I am inclined to 
indicate here are various feelings about “Parts of Some Sextets” and its effort in a 
certain direction – an area of concern as not yet fully clarified for me in relation to 
dance, but existing as a very large NO to many facts in the theatre today.” What 
followed in the article, is what has become known as Rainer’s No-Manifesto:  
 
NO to spectacle no to virtuosity no to transformations and magic and 
make-believe no to the glamour and transcendency of the star image 
no to the heroic no to the anti-heroic no to trash imagery no to 
involvement of performer or spectator no to style no to camp no to 
seduction of spectator by the wiles of the performer no to eccentricity 
no to moving or being moved.401 
 
 
What does Rainer say no to here? I think the manifesto should be read as a 
rejection on at least two levels. Most importantly Rainer, in it, says no to the idea of the 
dancer as someone who needs to be virtuosic, have specific dancer skills, and whom, 
because of these skills, is able to seduce, involve the spectator, feel moved, be 
glamorous and pretend to be someone or something else. Secondly, such a rejection of 
the dancer also reads as a rejection of a specific idea about dance: dance as being able to 
engage, express, involve, look virtuosic, move and seduce. In short, these “no’s” are 
no’s to a conception of the dancer and the dance in terms of what is known as modern 
dance. Wigman, Graham and also, to a certain extent, Cunningham reproduced a 
concept of the dancer that is viewed as a specialised trained worker whose foremost 
skill was to perform movements that express human subjectivity directly through the 
expressive body and its movements. Modern dance “historically sought natural 
movement or the natural body in order to access and directly communicate a primal 
terrain of human ‘truths’ that have been buried or obscured.”402 Cunningham’s work 
rejected most characteristics common to Graham and other expressionist modern 
choreographers: continuity of movement, continuity between phrases and the 
inseparability between the dance and the dancer. But like Graham’s dancers, 
Cunningham’s dancers were highly skilled and trained. The distinctness of the 
company, Roger Copeland writes, was the dancers’ high level of dexterity. Using 	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structures of juxtaposition as a way of putting movements, phrases and sound together, 
Cunningham’s technique, he argues, required the dancer to, for example, be able to raise 
the right leg high up, whilst the upper body simultaneously tilts in another direction. 
“Cunningham’s dancers could move from whiplash fouette to penchee arabesque 
without apparent transition.” In addition, the “of beat relation” between sound and 
movement that Cunningham, in collaboration with Cage, worked with in his pieces, 
made the movements even more difficult to perform as the dancers could not rest or use 
the music as support. “Indeed, the Cunningham body often looked as it had been 
assembled by a practitioner of a cubist collage.”403 Despite the fact that he introduced 
central ideas into dance, such as removing expression from the body and movement, 
and used sound and dance non-synchronically, Rainer and Halprin criticised 
Cunningham for still holding on to the role of the specialised dancer, a specifically 
trained body, and therefore, a specific division of labour in the production of dance. By 
saying no to the virtuosity of the modern dancer, Rainer also negated the modern 
conception of dance, which relied on such an idea of the dancer.  
In the diagram that was shown in Chapter 2, and in which she compares 
minimalist sculpture to minimalist dance, Rainer articulates strategies and forms of 
working in dance, partly through a set of negations that resonates with the No-
Manifesto. The diagram begins with two columns arranged into numbers that state what 
minimalist sculpture and minimalist dance respectively “eliminate or minimize.” Whilst 
minimalist objects eliminate or minimise the “role of the artist’s hand” and the 
“hierarchical relationship of parts”, minimalist dance eliminates “phrasing”, 
“development and climax” and “character”. Similarly to the No-Manifesto, minimalist 
dance eliminates “virtuosic movement.” In contrast to the No-Manifesto, in which 
Rainer says no to “spectacle” in the text on minimalist dance and sculpture, minimalist 
dance eliminates “performance”. The corresponding term from the realm of minimalist 
sculpture is “illusionism”, which signals that in the category of performance, Rainer 
refers to theatre where illusions in the form of characters and stories take place. In 
comparison to the No-Manifesto, each negation in the diagram also produces a new 
mediation. The negation of “performance” is for example substituted with “task or task-
like activity” and the negation of “virtuosic movement” by “singular action, event or 
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tone”.404 Similar negations of the specialised dancer in modern dance and the notion of 
dance (self-expressive) it created can be found amongst other dancers’ and 
choreographers’ written and spoken statements. Interviewed by Rainer, Halprin, 
describes why she went from taking modern dance classes with Graham and 
Cunningham, to the setting up of her own dance-deck in the woods. The prime reason 
was that she wanted to develop a way of dancing which negated the technicality and 
labour intensity of Graham’s classes. Her rejection of Graham was also a negation of 
the latter’s idea that the dancer’s foremost capacity was to express “the heart’s 
experience” and “the great truths of life”, as Graham put it in an interview in 1950.405 In 
contrast to Graham’s ideas about dance and the skilled dancer, Halprin wrote: “I wanted 
to explore a particular way of breaking down any preconceived notions I had about 
what dance was, or what movement was, or what composition was.”406 She describes 
the liberation from the role of dancer that this produced: “We began to deal with 
ourselves as people, not dancers.”407 In both of Rainer’s texts and in Halprin’s brief 
statement, the two main negations, referred to above, can be detected. Task-dance 
developed as a negation of a dancer as a wage-labourer with specialised skills as well as 
of the notion of dance that such a dance worker created. Dance itself, we might say, was 
negated through the specific work or labour of the dancer through the mediation of task-
dance and its new role of the dancer. 
But how might we understand the negation of the dancer as a specialised 
skilled worker here? Does it, like Wood puts it, immediately mean that Rainer’s work 
negates “alienated” and “productive labour”, and instead represents a form of “non-
productive” type of labour because of the sheer simplicity of the movements? In her 
essay on The Mind is a Muscle (in which Trio A was included), Wood discusses how 
Rainer’s work touches on questions of labour. She emphasises how the work “presented 
groups of people dancing images of ‘labour’: carrying bulky objects, picking them up, 
putting them down…”408 She also underlines the way in which Rainer’s “representation 
of tasks created images that depict ‘labourers’ who […] are certainly empowered and 
thinking” and so represented “unalienated” work.409 Whilst the dialectic between 
productive and non-productive work, that Wood sets up to be at stake in Rainer’s work, 	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is not entirely far-fetched, the level at which she places this dialect is. Wood sees a 
relationship between labour and dance and/or performance at the level of the 
representation of movements.410 The terms used by Wood to describe the ways in which 
Rainer’s work engages with questions of labour, such as labour and non-alienated 
labour, are used as descriptive and representational categories, rather than as social 
forms. In contrast to analyses such as Wood’s, the negation of a specific type of activity 
and labour needs to be approached in a way that accounts for the negation of abstract 
labour in art through the form of the artwork, rather than at the level of the 
representation. This is what Rainer’s No-Manifesto as well as her diagram tells us to do.  
 
4.2. The social form of abstract labour  
At least two separate discourses of abstraction are distinguishable in Marx’s mature 
work. The first one is to be found in the Introduction to the Grundrisse: Foundations of 
a Critique of Political Economy where the terms abstract and concrete are contrasted in 
order to make an epistemological claim about the capacity of abstractions to grasp the 
real (reality) by reproducing the concrete in thought as the totality of (abstract) 
determinations.411 The second discourse of abstraction appears in Marx’s mature work 
and is related to the social ontology of capitalist societies, in which the abstraction of 
social relations becomes real. This mediating form, which constitutes the social 
ontology of modern Western capitalist societies, is expressed in Marx’s category 
‘abstract labour’, introduced in Capital Volume 1. These two discourses of abstraction 
in Marx are inseparable to the extent that labour is only thinkable as a general category 
at the historical stage when the main mediating form of sociality on a global scale 
consists of abstract quasi-objective relations of production: when abstract labour has 
become the dominating and mediating social form. The coming section looks into the 
second of these two senses of abstraction, whereas the final chapter focuses on the first.  
The term ‘abstract labour’ has, at least since the re-discovery in the 1970s 
of Isaak Rubin’s work on value, caused disputes in the secondary literature on Marx. 	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These have revolved around whether abstract labour is physiological or instead is a 
concept of social form, a dispute, which might also be understood as a conflict between 
mainstream technical and analytical readings against Hegelian inflected and dialectical 
readings of Marx. One of the most recent critical overviews of the term is made by 
Werner Bonefeld in his article “Abstract labour: Against its nature and on its time” 
(2010). In it, he departs from this tension (physiological versus social concept of 
abstract labour) by stating that Marx’s concept of abstract labour is “ambivalent”. Yet, 
he argues that abstract labour must be understood as a social form specific to capitalism, 
and he takes a similar position to thinkers like Arthur and Postone. The ambivalence 
pointed out by Bonefeld functions as a useful tension of departure rather than like an 
actual ambivalence in Marx’s own work since Bonefeld convincingly demonstrates that 
Marx’s category of abstract labour is social. Nevertheless, it is useful to set of from this 
friction within the debate, as it resonates with one of the overall problems around which 
this thesis centres: To question a concept of performance primarily looked at 
empirically (and therefore also in some sense physiologically) with a concept of 
performance understood as art (and therefore considered in its social form).  
Divisible into three main strands, the last two decades, Bonefeld argues, 
have seen an “emerging consensus” in the literature that abstract labour must be 
understood as a social form specific to the historical conditions of capitalist production. 
Firstly, a conception of abstract labour that lies somewhere in-between a physiological 
and a social understanding of it is exemplified in the economists Axel Kicillof and 
Guido Starosta’s work. Abstract labour is, in their viewpoint, transhistorical and 
common to all societies, but when performed in capitalism, it is expressed in the social 
form of value. The value-form and abstract labour as a social form are separated in their 
account with the consequence that they conflate the meaning of ‘abstract labour’ with 
the category ‘labour in general’. “They see abstract labour as a transhistorical category 
that in capitalism is represented by the value-form.” Bonefeld argues that there is 
textual evidence for this ambiguous character of labour in Marx, illustrating that Marx 
in Capital refers to labour as both physiological and social. “On the one hand, Marx 
conceives of abstract labour as a ‘purely social reality’ that can only appear in the social 
relations of ‘commodity to commodity’ (Marx, 1983: 54); and on the other, he defines it 
physiologically as ‘productive expenditure of human brains, nerves, and muscles’ 
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(Marx, 1983: 51)412.” But this apparent ambivalence is based on a misreading of the 
term labour in Marx’s work, something that Arthur has pointed out.413  
The second lineage pointed out by Bonefeld is represented mainly by the 
political economist Massimo de Angelis who understands abstract labour as something 
imposed on the workers in production, and which therefore must be related to in forms 
of class struggle. By arguing for abstract labour as a form of domination over workers, 
de Angelis, Bonefeld argues, falls into the same trap as Harry Braverman and confuses 
concrete with abstract labour. Paraphrasing Arthur’s critique of Braverman, Bonefeld 
writes: “Abstract labour is not concrete labour, however homogenised, monotonous, 
repetitive, senseless and boring it might be.”414  
The third approach to abstract labour is represented primarily via Arthur’s 
conceptions of ‘abstract labour’as he has developed it within “the context of debates on 
the ‘New’ or ‘Systematic Dialectic’” in which abstract labour is accounted for as a 
social form of mediation specific to capitalist production. Arthur follows Rubin’s value-
theory, in which both value and abstract labour are thought of as social phenomena. But 
Arthur differs from Rubin in that the latter sees abstract labour as a result of the 
exchange-relation of commodities. For Arthur, abstract labour is a form of production 
which includes exchange. Arthur explains this by pointing towards an apparent 
“contradiction” in Marx’s writings. Quoting the latter from Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy published in 1959, Arthur writes that, on the one hand 
“‘commodities must enter the exchange process as objectified universal labour time’”; 
and on the other hand, that “‘the labour time of individuals becomes objectified 
universal labour time only as a result of the exchange process.’”415 What this 
contradiction points at, Arthur argues, is that “if production is value formed, that is, 
undertaken by self-positing capital, the living labour is treated as abstract prior to the 
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exchange precisely because it is treated as abstract in exchange.”416 For Arthur, abstract 
labour as a social form collapses the realm of exchange and production, and instead, 
posits abstract labour as a totalising social form. Living labour is in this sense already 
conceived of as abstract before it enters exchange in order for it to be thought of as 
exchangeable. In his conception of abstract labour as a specific social form of 
production, Arthur, Bonefeld concludes, “opens up a novel, temporally conceived 
conception of abstract labour that overcomes [the] false dichotomy between production 
and exchange.”417  
But how should we understand this claim by Arthur? How, in other words, 
is concrete labour posited–prior to, as well as after the exchange–as abstract activity? 
And what are the consequences for a conception of art understood as being critically 
separated from such abstract activity? The activity of living labour, Arthur argues, is 
posited as an abstract activity through the measurement of this activity into measureable 
time-units “via relations of equivalence”. In Marx’s work, Bonefeld reminds us, citing 
Marx from Capital Vol I, that this is expressed through what Marx calls socially 
necessary labour time: “labour-time required to produce any use-value under the 
prevailing socially normal conditions of production and with the prevalent socially 
average degree of skill and intensity of labour.”418 Human activity is measured in 
temporal units, and through this, it is made into homogenous equalised and general 
time-units. Bonefeld shows how “Arthur’s argument points towards abstract labour as a 
specific historical form of social time–a time made abstract.”419 Seen as both the 
measurement and the substance of abstract labour, Arthur’s account “posits the 
materiality of abstract labour as a specifically capitalist materiality, a materiality of 
social labour time.”420 Bonefeld also points out that Marx made the connection between 
abstract labour and motion in time in his Critique of 1859, and that this conception is 
presupposed when he writes Capital. Quoting Marx, Bonefeld writes: “‘As values, all 
commodities, are only definite masses of congealed labour-time’.” Marx argues, “On 
the one hand, [that] commodities must enter the exchange process as objectified 
universal labour time, [and] on the other hand, [that] the labour time of individuals 
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becomes objectified universal labour-time only as a result of the exchange process.”421 
For Arthur, this social form (abstract labour) appears in the commodity, and its double 
character is expressed as its use- and exchange-value: The commodity is of use for the 
person buying it and has an exchange-value for the person selling it. The use-value 
expresses the concrete labour, and the exchange-value expresses abstract labour; they 
cannot be viewed separately. The substance of value for Arthur is abstract labour. But 
this substance of value, and of the commodity, needs to be considered from different 
standpoints: 
 
In effect, abstract labour as a form determination, of the living labour 
of the wage-worker, and abstract labour as the dead labour objectified 
in a commodity, are the same thing, in the one case looked at as 
activity, in the other as its result.422  
 
The implication of Arthur’s conceptualisation of abstract labour as a social 
form is that living labour can–and indeed only does–appear as abstract in current 
historical conditions. It also emphasises how it produces a specific conception of time. 
The social reality of abstract labour is expressed in the supra-sensible form of value. 
Abstract labour is therefore both real and social. Postone articulates the relation 
between the activity of labour and the commodity-form by emphasising that abstract 
labour is both the essence and content of commodities as well as the main mediating 
social form. “As an object, the commodity has a material form; as a social mediation, it 
is a social form.”423 The double character of the commodity, Postone continues, that is, 
that “it is simultaneously a use-value for the other, and a means of exchange for the 
producer”424, implies that the substance of a commodity is abstract labour expressed as 
value (via price). It also means that the mediating activity is labour: “Labour and its 
products mediate themselves in capitalism; they are self-mediating socially. This form 
of social mediation is unique: within the framework of Marx’s approach, it sufficiently 
differentiates capitalist society from all other existent forms of social life.’”425 Postone 
also emphasises how this gives an objective character to labour, the commodities and 
the social relations through which they are produced.   
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 Bonefeld, Arthur and Postone demonstrate how abstract labour, when 
understood as a social form, must be seen as both the substance of commodities, and 
therefore of value, as well as the mediating form through which that substance is 
mediated. The consequence of this, as Postone argues, is that “the social relations 
specific to, and characteristic of, capitalism exist only in the medium of labour.”426 The 
social relations also show how abstract labour does not look in a particular way, but 
rather constitutes the social form through which other forms and representations are 
mediated. Because abstract labour is a social form of relation, the representation of such 
relations might look very different in different historical periods. In this way, the 
relations also demonstrate that abstract labour cannot simply be negated by 
representations of labour that appear un-alienated or unproductive, but that abstract 
labour also needs to be negated at the level of social form. How might abstract labour 
be negated, without representation of movements, as Wood has it, for example? If, as 
Adorno puts it, modern art is distinct to capitalist societies, what is the relation here 
between abstract labour as the main mediating social form of capitalist societies and the 
abstract character of modern and post-WWII art practices in which performance 
practices are central? In what sense might art be understood as a privileged space for the 
presentation of abstractions? What is the relation between the autonomy of art 
constituted through acts of separation from abstract labour and its distinctively abstract 
representation? How might task-dance practices be seen as abstract in this sense?  
 
4.3. The autonomous artwork in Adorno   
Adorno conceptualises the relation between the real abstraction of social relations in 
capitalist societies and art in its distinct modern sense. The latter, often referred to by 
Adorno as “autonomous art”, is for him, characterised by its distinctness or separation 
from life. Art’s separation from empirical reality conditions its ontology and function. 
“It is defined by its relation to what it is not.”427 But what is art separated from, 
according to Adorno, and how should this separation be understood as its ontological 
condition? The separation constitutive of the ontology of art operates at different levels. 
Art is, first of all, separated from empirical reality and can only come into being by 
claiming that it is different from the empirical reality in which it is presented. 
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“Artworks detach themselves from the empirical world….”428 Art, for Adorno, is also 
separated from society. In its separation from empirical reality and society, bourgeois 
art for Adorno, is, as a consequence, separated from industrial production, the division 
of labour implied in industrial capitalist societies, the technology used in such 
production and the reproduction of capital more generally. This separation from reality, 
society, industrial production (the division of labour and technological reproduction) 
and ultimately the value-form in modern works of art, is for Adorno always a dialectical 
movement of negation and affirmation. Reality, society and the production of value can 
only be negated by being fully incorporated. “Art is modern when, by its mode of 
experience and as the expression of the crisis of experience, it absorbs what 
industrialization has developed under the given relations of production.”429 Negation in 
art, for Adorno, is represented through the form or construction of the work through 
which it expresses itself as different from bourgeois society. “If art opposes the 
empirical through the element of form–and the mediation of form and content is not to 
be grasped without their differentiation–the mediation is to be sought in the recognition 
of aesthetic form as sedimented content.”430 
 
This inherent dialectical separation that autonomous art carries with it constitutes what 
Adorno calls “the ontology of art”431 and makes autonomy “an irrevocable aspect of 
art.”432 This ontology of art is also for Adorno what makes up art’s function. Its 
separation–through incorporation and negation through form and construction–makes 
art functionless. This “dialectic of functionalism” constitutive of modern art implies that 
the autonomous work of art is functional only “in reference to itself.”433 So if the 
autonomous artwork for Adorno is constructed through its epistemologically positive 
separation from reality and capitalist mediations, it might also be said to be able to 
express something about the “moving contradiction” inherent to capitalist society. The 
autonomous artwork contains a moment of truth of the real abstraction of capitalist 
production, and as such, “contains the potential for the abolition of the alien.”434 	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Important for Adorno’s concept of art’s autonomy is its distinctively 
historical aspect. If abstract labour is the mediating social form historically specific to 
capitalist society,435 autonomous art is the historically specific social practice that 
constitutes itself in negation to such labour. Bürger develops the historical conditions 
for autonomous art by drawing on Adorno, Kant and Schiller, and on sociological 
research into the institutional conditions of art. Bürger constructs a concept of 
autonomy distinguished from the concept of autonomy in the French version of “l’art 
pour l’art” and the concept of autonomy in various German positivist sociological 
discourses. In the former, art’s separation from society is made ahistorical and turned 
into its nature, and in the latter, the autonomy of art is reduced to a product of the artist. 
Both, according to Bürger, miss the two-sidedness of art’s autonomy.  
 
Both approaches miss the complexity of autonomy, a category whose 
characteristic is that it describes something real (the detachment of art 
as a special sphere of human activity from the nexus of the praxis of 
life) but simultaneously expresses this real phenomenon in concepts 
that block recognition of the social determinacy of the process.436  
 
Following Adorno’s account of autonomous art, an idea of art’s relation to abstraction is 
established. Firstly, art, for Adorno separates itself from society–and through this 
becomes visible as art–through forms of negation. This negation and separation is the 
ontological condition of autonomous art for Adorno. Autonomous art, in his account 
then, must always be thought of as abstract. But this abstract aspect does not have the 
least to do with that it looks abstract since what looks abstract changes with time. 
Abstract painting from the turn of the 20th century “looks” abstract because it uses forms 
such as the monochrome and the collage. These ways of making negated previous forms 
of mediation in painting. Minimalist artworks might look abstract because of their 
reduction and negation of certain characteristics of older forms of sculpture. Adorno 
demonstrates that art’s abstractness lies in its ontology: it is a social practice whose 
ontology is based on separation and abstraction. Furthermore, this ontology mediated–
formally–differently in different historical moments and in different technological and 
social contexts. It relates negatively to abstract labour. Kant makes us aware of this idea 	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of separation as a form of abstraction when he, as Caygill points out, “illustrates 
philosophical abstraction with the example of colour: ‘With a scarlet cloth, for example, 
if I think only of the red colour, then I abstract from the cloth’ (L p. 592); he does not 
abstract a quality ‘red’ from the cloth, but considers it in abstraction from the cloth.”437 
The act of separating the colour red from the cloth is an act of abstraction in so far as it 
can only be understood in a positive epistemological relation to the cloth. Art is not 
abstract in the sense that it ‘reflects’ or ‘imitates’ the abstract conditions of capitalism. 
Art is abstract because of its ontological condition, which is constituted as an act of 
separation and abstraction that is mediated through its form which merely “looks” 
abstract.  
 
Mediation of abstraction 
If all autonomous art, in its ontological condition, to a certain extent, is abstract, how is 
this abstraction mediated? And more specifically, how does task-dance mediate this 
abstraction? For Adorno, the autonomous or nominalistic artwork must, in order to be 
art, negate universals. In a section in Aesthetic Theory entitled Universal and Particular, 
Adorno writes that the nominalistic artwork is based on what he calls “aesthetic 
nominalism”438, which developed alongside modernity and the formation of the 
bourgeois subject and constituted a break with traditional genre aesthetics’ so called 
academic aestheticism. The latter originated in the division of the arts from antiquity, 
and was characterised by the fact that particular artworks gained their meaning and were 
considered art if they managed to fit into specific universals articulated as norms or 
conventions, as for example, perspectival painting. Adorno argues that this relation 
between the universal and the particular, as it was configured in traditional genre 
aesthetics, was broken in modernity through the development of aesthetic nominalism. 
Particular artworks–instead of being subsumed under universals (posed as norms and 
conventions)–began to negate these, and through this, mediate new forms. In aesthetic 
nominalism, the universal, Adorno argues, is dealt with through negation. Expressed 
differently, the nominalistic artwork must–in order to be ‘art’–negate universals in 
singular and new ways. Importantly, for Adorno, this dialectic between the particular 
and the universal is not only present at the level of a general category of art, but can  
also necessarily be seen as present in that of form. The nominalistic artwork, Adorno 	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states, is negative in relation to its form since it defines itself in relation to what it is not: 
the heterogeneous. The artwork, Adorno writes, “absorbs industrial technique” and 
“rational empirical reality”, but does so without turning them into its laws. It treats 
these–the heterogenous–as its other through mastery over materials (technique) which 
appear as the form of the artwork. Following Adorno’s understanding of the 
nominalistic artwork, art in modernity–in order to be art–must negate its outside posed 
as universals. Historical avant-garde art did so at the turn of the 20th century when it 
negated the universal of art through forms such as the monochrome. With the 
ontological transformation of art after WWII, and the development of a generic concept 
of art, negation of universals became even more important as art practices started to 
open up to empirical reality–or to the social–in even more radical and new ways. 439  
 
4.5. In what way is task-dance abstract? 
So how might we read specific artworks in the light of art’s ontological condition that is 
understood as separation and as inherently abstract? How might we understand early 
1960s task-dance practices from this standpoint? In what way are they abstract, and how 
is this abstraction mediated? Rainer’s No-Manifesto and her diagram on Minimalist 
Dance demonstrate that negation was central in the development of her’s and others’ 
practices. These different rejections can be boiled down to two main ones: the negation 
of the specialised dancer, and the medium-specific idea of dance dependent on such a 
skilled dancer. The critique of the first produces a critique of the second in the sense 
that a dance cannot be spectacular if the dancer cannot seduce. Similarly, the dance 
cannot be expressive if the dancer does not have the technical skills to express. In the 
previous chapter, the rejection of ‘dance’ was discussed in relation to the category of 
the object, and in particular, to the use and construction of objects in task-dance and 
event-score practices.  Tangible as well as less tangible objects were presented and used 
in works by Rainer and others, and these objects’ negated usefulness. By being 
presented as useless objects, the discussed performance practices negated an idea of the 
art object as the material site holder for an objective meaning of the work. What other 
negations can be found in task-dance practices? 
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For Adorno, “the prime fact” about “new music,” in which he included 
Cage, was that it negated the tonal system as a key component of meaning. New 
music’s qualities, he writes, “become manifest in what it prohibits.”440 Similarly, task-
dance prohibits specific characteristics of the dancer (specialised skill for example), and 
through this, prohibits a certain idea about dance. I will now focus on the critique of the 
disciplined and skilled dancer in task-dance to then come back to the question of 
abstraction. In particular, I will focus on what other universals that task-dance can be 
said to have that are negated through the critique of the specialised dancer: the division 
of labour in production of dance, and as a consequence, the use of time and the notion 
of a disciplined body necessary for such division of labour to take place. The negation 
functions in a similar way here, as in the account given above that explores the negation 
of a specific conception of the art object. Similar to how task-dance and event-score 
practices negated a certain conception of the art object, and by so doing also produced 
another one, task-dance practices both critiqued and affirmed a specific division of 
labour, negated and produced a specific notion of time, and rejected and constructed a 
disciplined and undisciplined body, simultaneously.  
 
Division of labour, abstract time and the disciplined body 
Rainer’s No-manifesto and Halprin’s statements on why she left modern dance shows 
that task-dance partly emerged as a rejection to the idea that dance requires specialised 
and labour intensive skills. Connected to this, task-dance was also the result of a 
negation of the traditional division of labour present in the practices of modern dance 
company that implied a division between the choreographer (understood as 
producer/author of the work as well as employer) and the dancers (understood as 
employees and as executioners of the dance).441 However, the method used to depart 
from such a division of labour, or the idea of skilled dancers, and ultimately the idea of 
dance, was–as the term for this sort of dance indicates–to employ techniques strongly 
associated with the division, mechanisation and de-skilling of labour in capitalism. 
Firstly, because the tasks were simple, they reduced the skills needed for someone to 
make them. Secondly, because the scoring of tasks implied a minimal amount of 	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individual choice involved, a type of indifference to specific movements, and the way 
they are put together, was developed. The idea that the movement, as was the case in 
modern dance, mediated or expressed the inner subjectivity of the dancer was done 
away with through the task. By using tasks, scores and charts, movements were divided 
into equal sections of time-units, which meant that they could not produce qualities like 
rhythm, momentum or climaxes, as was the case in modern dance. The reduction of 
individual choice, the indifferent approach to the activity performed and the abstraction 
of human movement in time through tasking were also some of the key characteristics 
for the development of the division of labour in capitalist societies. The introduction of 
the division of labour meant an increased productivity. It was an important step towards 
the disciplinarisation of the worker and of the measuring of work in socially necessary 
labour-time. As Adam Smith put it in The Wealth of Nations (1776) in the section on 
the pin-factory: “The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the 
greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or 
applied, seem to have been the division of labour.”442  
The tasks given in Forti’s Dance Constructions (1961), Brown’s Trillium 
(1961) and Rainer’s Parts of Some Sextets (1965) and Trio A (1966) are simple: make a 
huddle, walk across the stage, do a handstand, run sit or lie down. They are simple in 
the sense that they are “found”– a form of ready-made–and do not need to be invented 
by a choreographer or a dancer, nor do they require specialised skills specific to a 
dancer or a dancer’s body. These movement tasks are also simple in the sense in which 
Smith, in the same section, describes how a key element of the division of labour is to 
reduce each worker’s activity into a specialised and simple one: “the division of labour, 
by reducing every man’s business, to some one simple operation, and by making this 
operation, the sole employment of his life, necessarily very much increases the dexterity 
of the workman.”443 Similar to in Smith’s pin-factory, tasks and instructions are used in 
task-dance as a way to reduce and simplify movements. But in contrast to the de-
skilling of the worker in the pin-factory that follows as a result of the capitalist division 
of labour, the consequences are different in task-dance practices.  
Whereas Smith’s account of the way in which the introduction of the 
division of labour into specific tasks for each specific workman increases productivity 	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(and leads to a de-skilling of labour444), the tasks in task-dance–despite their simplicity 
and division–liberate the dancer from specialisation and thus introduce new skills. “The 
non-trained people, Morris and Rauschenberg, learned everything except ‘Quartet.’”445 
In Smith’s case, non-specialised labour implies that the worker becomes de-skilled. The 
worker makes monotonous and repetitive movements which reduces his or her 
capacities. In Rainer’s case, the simplification of movements, in contrast, frees the 
dancer from the strained disciplined division of labour in modern dance and introduces 
new skills, such as being present whilst performing movements. Put differently, a strict 
division of labour was used in task-dance in order to get rid of a certain division of 
labour. In Rainer’s and Brown’s work, the deskilling also resulted in a process of re-
skilling. The movements in Trio A and Trillium are simple, but put together, they are 
difficult to perform. With no rhythm or transitions between each movement, the dancer 
needed skills to be able to do each movement with precision and without emphasis.  
As a consequence of a strict division of labour, which is formalised 
through the tasks noted down as scores or instructions, task-dance practices, in addition, 
negated a certain conception of time and of a disciplined body. As Smith–but also 
Foucault–has described, the disciplining of the time in which each task is performed is 
fundamental to the increase in the productivity of labour. In a section on the 
introduction of clock-time as the control of people’s activities in schools, hospitals and 
workplaces, Foucault writes about the latter:  
 
The gradual extension of the wage-earning class brought with it a 
more detailed partioning of time. […] an attempt is also made to 
assure the quality of the time used: constant supervision, the pressure 
of supervisors, the elimination of anything that might disturb or 
distract.446  
 
And Smith distinguishes three key features that the division of labour 
brings with it, and that within them, time is central. The features are also fundamental 
for an increase in productivity. Firstly, the division of labour increases the quantity of 
work that the worker can perform. When each worker’s activity has been simplified into 
one simple operation, it increases her or his capacity to do one specific task. Secondly, 
for Smith, the division of labour saves time since the worker does not need any longer 	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to move from one task to another or to change their tools or place in which to perform 
their work. Different workers can perform different tasks simultaneously. Smith even 
argues that a worker who constantly changes tasks and tools runs the risk of becoming 
“slothful and lazy.”447 This can be contrasted with Marx’s famous dictum that the less 
specialised the worker the better, and that one ideally should “fish in the afternoon” and 
“criticise after dinner.” It can also be contrasted with the tasks in Rainer’s Trio A, where 
each movement is different from the other and is put together awkwardly, challenging 
the dancer as it needs to change movement constantly. The third and final consequence 
of the division of labour, Smith states, is the increase in work made possible through 
advanced machinery that enables the worker to focus on the activity of one “very simple 
object.”448  
As both Foucault’s and Smith’s accounts of the division of labour 
demonstrate, as well as Arthur’s and Postone’s conceptualisation of abstract labour as 
social form, the introduction of such an organisation of labour also brought a new form 
of time into place. Postone makes a distinction between a conception of time before 
capitalism and the conception of time operating within the capitalist mode of 
production: “concrete time” and “abstract time”. The former refers to an idea of time 
“before the rise and development of modern, capitalist society in Western Europe” and 
is a more useful category than cyclical time, according to Postone, since “there are 
linear conceptions of time which are essentially concrete such as the Jewish notion of 
history.”449 Concrete time for Postone is a time in which a “relationship exists between 
the measure of time and the sort of time involved.” This means that there are no 
determined or constant time units that measure an undetermined activity. In concrete 
time, the time units vary, which, “indicates that this form of time is a dependent 
variable, a function of events, occurrences or actions.” Abstract time, instead, Postone 
argues, is historically specific to capitalism. Bonefeld and Arthur gave an account of 
how living labour, within current historical conditions, can only be thought of as 
abstract, and how this implies a conception of living labour understood as a 
materialisation of abstract time. For Postone, abstract time, is a time of indifference in 
which the measurement and the time-units are constant and separated from the human 
activities to which it relates. Abstract time is “uniform, continuous, homogenous, 	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‘empty’ time” independent of events.”450 Postone also argues that abstract time is a time 
of the clock. This is also emphasised by Foucault in his detailed accounts of the 
disciplining of the worker and the centrality of the clock in this process. With the 
introduction of the clock, the measuring of heterogeneous activities could be measured 
into constant, homogenous and divisible time units. The division of labour is dependent 
on the modern invention of the clock as it abstracts all activities into homogenised units.  
“From the tick to the tock, clock time measures human activity regardless of specific 
contents. In clock time, the expenditure of labour does not occur in its own good time. It 
occurs within time—a time made abstract, and imposing.”451 If abstract labour is the 
materialisation of abstract time, the clock is the index or sign of such abstract time.  
Forti, Rainer and Brown followed Cage and Cunningham in their use of clocking tasks 
and instructions as an artistic strategy of producing and choreographing movements. 
One of the first performances in which a clock was used explicitly was in Untitled 
Event (1952) at Black Mountain College initiated by Cage, and in which Cunningham, 
Rauschenberg and David Tudor, among others, participated. It was later explored in 
Dunn’s composition workshops for dancers in which the dancers were asked to perform 
a specific task within a specific time frame.452 These were partly based on Cage’s so 
called “‘point-drawing’ technique”, in which dots were made on a sheet of paper within 
a given amount of time and then “translated into sounds by establishing different means 
of mapping bywhich their frequency, amplitude, timbre, duration, and ‘morphology’ 
(attack and decay characteristics) could be determined independently of the composer’s 
preconceptions.”453 In Dunn’s class, and as recalled by Forti, this was transformed into a 
performance context where the dots implied at what time the performance was to take 
place, while the nature of the events was left up to the performer.454 But time was also 
formalised in the tasks. Rainer describes the relation between the task given and the 
time-frame of the task in the chart –a technique probably introduced to her via Halprin’s 
workshops455– used in her work Parts of Some Sextets: “The chart is divided into 	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squares, each indicating the juncture of a given piece of material with a given interval in 
time.” Rainer had also recorded her own voice, saying ‘change’, and which indicated 
each time 30 seconds had passed in the performance.456 This was also used as a form of 
index for the passing of time.   
Although Rainer’s dances were built around strictly clocked intervals, the 
“clocking” or the “measuring” of time had a different effect to the measuring and 
disciplining of work time than accounted for by Smith and Foucault. Clock-time in 
Smith’s pin-factory was used to measure the tasks performed by the workers whose 
labour materialises the abstract time of which it is made of. Rainer, in contrast, used 
charts and homogenised time-units of this task as a way to liberate the dancer and their 
dance from measurements and discipline. Although Rainer used charts and clocks to 
time the movements, and although the representation of movements appeared as if fully 
determined by a clock, the time-units to perform a specific task functioned as a limit 
rather than a rule. Following Postone’s account of concrete time, the measurement of 
time, and the activity to be measured in Rainer’s work, were variable instead of 
constant. For example, one of the tasks in Parts of Some Sextets was to “‘do the rope 
movements wherever you happen to be,’”457 in 30 seconds which was the determined 
time-frame for each of the movements in the charts. But as Rainer writes, if one of the 
dancers happened to be pregnant then the rope movement would take the time it takes 
for a pregnant woman to perform such a movement. This meant that the time frame put 
explicitly in the task, in the score or indicated by a clock or voice, as in Rainer’s work, 
only functioned as a moving time-border against which the dancer’s movement would 
pose itself. The time-unit varied according to the activity. The task would ‘take’ its 
time, so to speak, and could–in thought–stretch out infinitely into an expanded and 
perhaps infinite time. If abstract labour materialises abstract time, the labour performed 
in Rainer’s work did two things at once: It made visible the procedure through which 
labour is made abstract, and it pointed to a more concrete conception of time. The dance 
materialised abstract labour, and through its form, pointed to the truth of such abstract 
labour.  
 
Rainer’s Trio A and Parts of Some Sextets negated the conventions or universals that 
operated in previous froms of dance. These included, a division of labour based on the 	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abstraction of labour through time-units, the division between workers (dancers) and 
managers (choreographers and company directors) and the idea that the dancer needed 
to have specialised skills as well as a disciplined and trained body. Task-dance 
practices, such as Rainer’s, negated these conventions through the forms of tasking, 
scoring and using time-units and charts. These forms resonate with the main mediating 
social form in capitalist society in which these practices are produced. But they are not 
abstract because they “look like” or “imitate” the forms of abstract labour made in 
factories, for example. They are abstract because they negate–and through this mediate–
norms through their form, and thus–formally–separate themselves from the society in 
which they are inseparable from. These activities are only abstract labour in so far as 
they cannot be anything else than abstract labour. Through their form, however, they 
negate abstract labour, and so give the illusion–although a real illusion–of being 
separated from abstract labour. ‘Dance’ was used as a way to negate ‘dance’ as a 
medium-specific discipline separable from painting, sculpture and music, and through 
this process of negation, constructed a new conception of dance. With task-dance, dance 
for the first time, becomes abstract in its ontological condition and becomes what 
Adorno calls autonomous.  By turning dance into art, dance also became subsumed 
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5. Structure: The performative structure-object 
 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that event-score and task-dance practices 
proposed a new conception of the artwork conceived of as a “performative-structure-
object” in a Structuralist sense, and which included a critique and a development of the 
Kantian subject-object-relation. The argument is also that this new conception of the 
artwork, a form of mediation, conditioned the possibility for thinking and 
institutionalising the categories ‘performance in general’ and the ‘performativity of the 
artwork’, which are central categories for a generic concept of art. Implicated in this 
argument is a complex set of relations between the concepts of ‘structure’, ‘art in 
general’, ‘performance in general’, ‘subject/object’, ‘abstraction’, ‘labour in general’ 
and ‘performativity’. Internal to this argument is also a confrontation between 
structuralist and poststructuralist thought as well as an encounter with Marxist and 
critical theory.  
Although the term structure goes all the way back to a 19th century 
architectural context, where functional structure was opposed to exterior form or 
style458,  philosophically, the concept of structure is primarily tied to what is known as 
structuralism: “the decisive moment in French thought during the second half of the 
twentieth century.”459 Structuralism did not have a founder460, but Claude Lévi-Strauss 
popularised the concept through Russian structural linguist Nikolai Trubetzkoy’s 
phonology. Although Lévi-Strauss, in Structural Anthropology (1958), identified four 
“basic operations”461 of structural linguistics, structuralist thought’s inherent “points of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 This original meaning is present in the Latin version of the word–structura–which, as Jean-Loup 
Bourget puts it, “designates the armature, the skeleton, what makes (a building, the human body) hold up 
as opposed to appearance, the outer ‘form.’” Bourget also writes that the French 19th century architect 
Viollet-le-Duc defined “Gothic architecture not by its style, but by an interplay of weights and trusts, that 
is, by its functional structure”. The term structure was then primarily conceptualised within the field of 
linguistics and anthropology (Ferdinand de Saussure, Nikolai Trbetzkoy and Roman Jakobson), for whom 
it primarily came to mean “an abstract and invariant model, ‘the relational system latent within the 
object.’” This concept of structure differs from the concepts ‘gestalt’ and ‘form’ which designate a 
totality, as for example in a perceivable geometrical form as used in psychology as well as from the 
concept of ‘pattern’ as used in biology, psychology and computer studies. Jean-Loup Bourget, 
“Structure,” in Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed, Barbara Cassin. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014), 1066. 
459 Étienne Balibar, “Structuralism: A Destitution of the Subject?” differences: A Journal of Feminist 
Cultural Studies 14 (2003): 3. 
460 Balibar writes that Structuralism was not a movement and “ had no founder–not even Claude Lévi-
Strauss–and consequently, neither scission nor dissidence.” Balibar, “Structuralism”, 3.  
461 The four basic operations given by Strauss, quoting Trbetzkoy, are: It studies the unconscious 
structures of linguistic phenomena rather than the phenomena themselves; it studies the relations between 
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heresy”462, and the fact that “no unitary position was ever constituted under this 
name”463, have made it so the term remains “notoriously vague and contested.”464 
Attempts have, however, been made to articulate the general concept of structure at 
stake within structuralist thought, albeit without trying to make any unificatory or 
totalising claims on it. One such endeavour is Deleuze’s essay “How Do We Recognize 
Structuralism?”(1967) in which he refuses to ask what structuralism is. Instead of 
ontologising the problem, Deleuze poses the question from within the structuralist–at its 
base linguistic–method by posing the question “How do the structuralists go about 
recognizing a language in something, the language proper to a domain?”465 Setting off 
from a primarily Lacanian concept of the structure, Deleuze identifies seven formal and 
recognisable criterias in stucturalists’ thought “whatever the diversity of their works and 
projects”466, and through this defines the “structuralist object”. Such an object, as my 
reading of Deleuze’s article will show, shares significant characteristics with how the 
art object was conceived of in task-dance and event-score practices, including, its 
seriality, an emphasis on practice, substitution, relationality and a concept of the subject 
that works with and against a Cartesian I.  
Instead of making a mere analogy between the conception of the artwork, 
seen as a structure-object, with a concept of structure in structuralist thought, this 
chapter investigates the way in which the conception of the artwork as a “performative 
structure-object” can be argued to be the practical condition for the generalisation of the 
category ‘performance’ in art. The claim is that such a conception of the object made 
possible the negation of specific craft-based labour as well as the idea of a medium-
specific art object. I am, in other words, interested in the relation between performance 
as a category, and the conditions that enabled such category to develop. Departing from 
this problematic, this chapter asks, firstly, in what sense might task-dance practices be 
seen as “performative structure-objects”?  Secondly, how might this conception of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the phenomena rather than the actual phenomena seen as autonomous entities; it introduces the concept of 
the system and structural linguistics “aims at discovering general laws”. Peter Hallward, introduction to 
Concept and Form: Volume One, Key Texts from the Cahier pour l’analyse, eds. Peter Hallward and 
Knox Peden (London and New York: Verso, 2012), 2.  
462 Balibar, “Structuralism: A Destitution of the Subject?”, 3.  
463 Étienne Balibar, “Structure: Method or subversion of the social sciences?,” Radical Philosophy 165 
(2011): 17.  
464 Hallward, introduction, 1.  
465 Gilles Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-
1974, ed. David Lapoujade. (Paris: Semiotexte, 2004), 171. (My emphasis.) 
466 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 171.   
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art object be understood to have conditioned the establishment of the category 
performance in general?  
 The chapter opens with an account of Brown’s Accumulation (1971), which 
evolved into the Accumulation Series including, among others, Primary Accumulation 
(1972) and Group Primary Accumulation (1973).  I use these pieces by Brown as case 
studies and emblematic examples of an artist whose works used task-dance as a strategy 
of making, and through this, were able to develop a concept of the dance as structure. 
The use of structure was already central in the early works of Forti, Brown and Rainer, 
such as Dance Constructions (1961), Trillium (1962), and Ordinary Dance (1962). By 
moving into Brown’s work of the early 1970s, my aim is to explore how this 
fundamental relational and structural character of the earlier works was taken further in 
the 1970s. Brown’s 1970s work should be seen as a development of the basic premises 
of task-dance, rather than as a move away from it.  
I then move into an account of the concept of structure as it was conceived 
in structuralist and poststructuralist discourses of thinking. By focusing on Deleuze’s 
article and on Balibar’s elaboration of this, the aim with this section is to show the way 
in which the structuralist object, in these texts, is characterised by seriality, substitution 
and a concept of the subject as a double process of subjecting and becoming a subject. 
The second part of the chapter demonstrates the way in which an understanding of task-
dance as a performative structure-object paved the way practically for the establishment 
of performance as a general category. I do this first by giving an account of Marx’s 
scientific methodology as outlined in the Grundrisse where he illustrates the way in 
which categories become general. This leads me to a discussion of the theorisations 
around ‘art in general’ by Bürger and De Duve, and to a final section where I elaborate 
on how the performative structure-object, as a form of mediation, conditioned 
performance as a general category within art.  
 
5.1. Structural objects in task-dance and in structuralism 
In March of 1962 Brown performed Trillium for the first time at the Maidman 
Playhouse in New York. The piece consisted of three movements, sitting, standing and 
laying, and was accompanied by a tape of Forti. Brown later described the work as a 
“structured improvisation” and a “serial composition where I involved myself in one 
movement after another […] I broke those actions down to their basic mechanical 
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structure.”467 As Brown’s work developed, she became increasingly interested in the 
organisational structures of movements as well as in mathematical procedures. In 
October 1971 she performed the solo, Accumulation, at the New York Gymnasium. The 
performance was around four and a half minutes long and contained a sequence of 
approximately ten movements that were accumulated one after another. As in Trillium, 
Brown’s interest in making Accumulation was primarily the putting together of 
movements into a serial structure, rather than being concerned with the movements 
themselves. When describing the structure of Primary Accumulation–a development of 
Accumulation premiered one year later–Brown wrote that the choreographic method 
was “an additative procedure where movement 1 is presented; start over. Movement 1;2 
is added and start over. 1,2;3 is added and start over etc., until the dance ends.”468 As in 
Rainer’s Trio A and Forti’s Dance Constructions, the movements in Accumulation and 
Primary Accumulation are everyday-like and low-key.469 Describing the movements in 
Accumulation, in which the dancer stands in one spot throughout the piece and faces the 
audience, Banes writes:  
 
It starts with a movement, the rotation of the right fist with the thumb 
extended that is repeated seven or eight times. The next movement, a 
gesture with the left thumb, is added, and the two are repeated in 
sequence several times. As the piece progresses, succinct gestures, a 
twist of the pelvis, a bend of the knee, a turn of the head, a step back, 
a lift of the leg are strung onto the end of the accumulation, and 
sometimes sandwiched into earlier sections of the progression.470  
 
Primary Accumulation also contained low-key, comfortable movements, that were 
easily repeatable into a series of accumulations. But in contrast to Accumulation, Brown 
in Primary Accumulation removed the function that the legs had as the main carrier of 
the dance, “much like the old relationship of the pedestal to the sculpture”471, and 
instead performed the thirty movements laying down on the floor. Also distinguishing 
the two pieces was that the 29th and the 30th movement in Primary Accumulation rotated 
90 degrees, which made the audience able to view the dance as a three dimensional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Trisha Brown, “Trisha Brown an Interview” in Contemporary Dance ed. Anne Livet (New York: 
Abbeville Press), 44-54. I was brought attention to this quote and interview by reading Ramsay Burt, 
“Against Expectations: Trisha Brown and the Avant-Garde”, Dance Research Journal 7 No. 1 (2005): 
11-36. 
468 Trisha Brown, “Three Pieces,” The Drama Review: TDR 19 No. 1 (1975): 29.  
469 For moving image documentation of these works see: Trisha Brown, Babette Mangolte, Jonathan 
Demme and Carlotta Schoolman dir., Trisha Brown Early Works 1966-1979 (ArtPix, 2005).  
470 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 82.  
471 Brown, “Three Pieces,” 29.  
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object, or what Brown described as a “self-contained unit of movement, and which I 
view as a stationary object.”472  
In Accumulation, Primary Accumulation and in Group Primary 
Accumulation (premiered in May 1973 at the Spring Dance Festival in New York), 
something peculiar happens as one watches the performance that seems to cohere with 
what Banes has described as the unfolding of the “deep structures of the dances.”473 In 
the works, each movement is performed with low intensity and casualness. Yet, and in 
distinction to some of the more energetic movements in Rainer’s Parts of Some Sextets, 
such as running, the dancer/dancers in Brown’s accumulation works performs the 
movements with what looks like a laid-back precision. This casualness and precision, 
through which the movements appear, one after another, make the moevments look as if 
they do not have a source or origin; they simply appear. As a consequence, as the 
movements are slowly being accumulated next to one another and repeated, although 
still recognisable as separate movements, the beginning and the end of the entire 
sequence is hard, if not impossible, to detect. The result is that the dancer looks as if it 
is inseparable from the dance object. Put differently, in these works “the dance” (the art 
object) turns into a structure through which the dance unfolds, and as a consequence, 
the performer looks inseparable from this structure. In the group version of Primary 
Accumulation, another dimension is added. As four dancers perform the same series of 
movements simultaneously, each dancer unfolding a part of the structure, together the 
dance-structure envelopes the dance from the dancers’ relations to one another. As in 
Accumulation and in Primary Accumulation, it is equally difficult to detect a beginning 
and an end in the group version of it. Although with slight variations, all of Brown’s 
Accumulation pieces show a fundamental concern with the structuring of movements 
where the “what” of the movements becomes secondary. Compared to Trillium, in 
which the structuring of movement was fairly simple, the Accumulation pieces structure 
movements into a seemingly endless structure of series. Brown’s Accumulation unfolds 
itself as an object of dance through the structure of which it is constituted. The dancer, 
who is inseparable from the setting forth of this object and also inseparable from the 
object itself, produces a relational subject-object relationship in these works in which 
the art object emerges through processes on the part of the dancing subject.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Brown, “Three Pieces,” 29. 
473 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 82. 
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Three years before the premier of Accumulation in which, as Banes has put it, “Brown 
began making dances based on mathematical systems of accumulation”474, Deleuze 
wrote his article in which he set out seven criteria for the structural object. A structural 
object, Deleuze writes, is, first and foremost, always “a third regime: that of the 
symbolic”475 and always contains “a third, at once unreal, and yet not imaginable.” All 
great structuralist thinkers have found such a third object. Foucault’s archaeology of 
thought, Althusser’s “deeper domain as object of science and philosophy” and Lacan’s 
“symbolic father or Name-of-the-Father”476 are all examples of a third symbolic object. 
Secondly, symbolic structures are objects defined “by the nature of certain atomic 
elements which claim to account both for the formations and wholes and for the 
variation of parts” and have “nothing to do with form: for structure is not at all defined 
by an anatomy of the whole.”477 The elements of the structure are, instead, primarily 
defined by how they are placed or positioned within the structure, since place in a 
structure “is primary in relation to whatever occupies it.”478 This is why Althusser’s 
subjects (workers and capitalists for example) are “places in a topological and structural 
space defined by relations of production.”479 Deleuze’s third criterion is that each 
element in the structure is singular and differentiates itself from the others in a 
“reciprocal determination.”480 These differential relations “correspond with the symbolic 
elements, but do not resemble them.”481 The singular elements are structured by the 
Symbolic, and this is why the real subject of, for example Althusser’s relations of 
production, is neither the worker, nor the capitalist, but is the relations of production: 
“the structure itself.”482 It is not only the elements within the structure, which are 
differential; the structure itself is also differentiating in its affect in relation to other 
structures. This is why, for Deleuze, it is also necessarily serial: “every structure is 
serial, multi-serial, and would not function without this condition.”483 The sixth criterion 
given by Deleuze is that the structure, because it is unconscious, always “envelopes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Banes, Terpsichore in Sneakers, 82. 
475 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 171.   
476 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,”172.  
477 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 173.   
478 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 175.  
479 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 174.  
480 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 176.  
481 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 177.  
482 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 178.  
483 Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?,” 182.  
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wholly paradoxical object or element,”484 a so called general object or “object = x”. In 
his seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter” (the first text of the Écrits, 1966), Lacan 
comments on the role of the letter in Edgar Allen Poe’s short story The Purloined 
Letter, and shows how it exists in two series of structures simultaneously, yet is always 
out of place or misplaced. It takes the place of “object = x”, or “the empty square.”485 
Another example of such a general object is “value”, which for Deleuze is “an 
expression of a ‘generalized labo[u]r’ that is beyond a empirically observable quality 
and is a locus of the question that runs through or traverses the economy as structure.”486  
 Whilst the first and the sixth criteria in Deleuze’s account of the structural 
object are difficult to immediately detect in Brown’s Accumulation series, the other 
criteria resonate with the concept of structure at work in these dances. Each work 
unfolds several structures (for example a. 1 + 1, b. 1+2+3 and c. 1+2+3+4 are three 
structures which together form a larger structure) with singular elements in each of 
them. Each of the movements, and each of the structures, are distinct, singular and do 
not collapse into an unmediated whole. Similarly, the way in which Deleuze argues that 
each structure is organised serially, and would not function without such serial 
constitution, Accumulation is nothing but a series of movements. Through its serial 
constitution, Accumulation makes up structures. Deleuze’s final criteria for the 
structuralist object interests me the most in terms of its relation to Brown’s work. After 
having shown how the structure as a problematic “object = x” is governed by Lacan’s 
symbolic phallus, that is, “that which does not coincide with its own identity, always 
found there where it is not […] always displaced in relation to itself”487, Deleuze arrives 
at the concept of the subject. The subject, he argues, is that which takes the place of the 
empty square or problematic object: “The subject is precisely the agency [instance] 
which follows the empty place: as Lacan says, it is less subject than subjected 
[assujetti]–subjected to the empty square, subjected to the phallus and to its 
displacements.”488 Constituted between being subjected and being a subject, this site of 
the subject is, for Deleuze, a site of practice (“Final Criteria: From the Subject to 
Practice”). The structuralist subject for Deleuze then is what he calls, a “structuralist 
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hero” with no identity and is made of non-personal individuations as well as pre-
individual singularities.  
For Balibar, the “question of the subject and subjectivity”489 is also the 
most important contribution of structuralism to philosophy. As with Deleuze–who 
contends that the structuralist subject, despite its subjection, is a hero and a site of 
practice and action–the structuralist subject for Balibar is both a de- and a re-
construction of the Cartesian subject. It is “a reconstruction of subjectivity as an effect, 
or in yet another formulation, a passage from constitutive to constituted subjectivity.”490 
The latter is also what defines the concept of structure for Balibar, since a structure is “a 
mechanism of reversal of the constitutive subject into constituted subjectivity.” This 
means for Balibar that the subject is in language, rather than that which speaks 
language, that which situates itself between the symbolic and the imaginary, and that 
which is constituted in relation to the other.  Therefore the subject is never a whole, but 
instead, is part of “a process of displacement.”491 The structure as a “destituted subject” 
is for Balibar a subject that is constructed as a split from itself and is constituted as a 
difference of differences.   
 Deleuze’s and Balibar’s conception of the structure as subject and practice is 
similar to the account of a conception of a subject at work in Brown’s Accumulation 
Series. Each movement unfolds from and through the performer. But it does not look as 
if the movements originate in or derive from the performer. Instead, the viewer is given 
the impression that each movement and each series derive from the movement or series 
of movement. The practice of performing, and the performer performing, appear 
inseparable. The performer becomes a performer through the unfolding of movements 
organised into series. But these movements are not essential to the performer. They 
appear through the practice of the performer and through the displacement of each of 
the series. A concept of the subject emerges in these dances through a process in which 
movements, and the dancer’s body as a totality, are objectivised. Such a subject cannot 
be found in the moving dancer, but rather is found in the constant displacement of the 
dancer through the dance-structure.  
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5.2. The Performativity of the Cartesian I 
The destituted structuralist subject must, according to Balibar, be problematised in 
relation to a humanist, classical Cartesian Subject that is de- and re- constructed by the 
structuralist project. The latter, Balibar argues, is often caricatured as an opposition to 
classical philosophy’s conception of the “humanity of man”, such as the understanding 
of man as common form [eidos], as Gattungswesen [generic], or as the construction of 
experience (existentialist). Although structuralist projects, for example journals like 
Cahiers pour l’Analyse, as Hallward writes, “privileged the analysis of formal 
structures and concepts in opposition to theories based on the categories of lived 
experience or on the conscious subjects of such experience”,492 these projects do not 
make right the caricature of an opposition between a classical humanist subject, on the 
one hand, and a structuralist conception of the subject, on the other. Such a 
simplification of the relation between these different types of subjects, rather erases, as 
Balibar writes, “[e]verything in ‘classicism’ that makes possible the structuralist 
opening (the performativity of the Cartesian I,’ for example).”493 The thought that the 
structuralist subject is conditioned on a de- and re-construction of the Kantian subject, 
rather than the latter’s complete destruction, also fits with Balibar’s argument that 
poststructuralism is structuralism in its strongest sense. Whereas the latter simply 
understands the subject as an effect of the structure, poststructuralists searches for 
agency, or at least resistance, within the structure now defined as “the operator of the 
production of subjectivity” and “the effect of subjectivity as self-recognition and 
distanciation with respect to the object.”494  
 Balibar’s problematising of the structuralist subject is important here for two 
reasons. Firstly, by seeing the structuralist subject, as a continuation rather than a 
radical deviation from the Cartesian I, Brown’s Accumulation series can be understood 
in a two-fold sense. Without the performer or performers, no dance would appear. In 
modern dance, the movements and the dance look separated from the dancer. The 
movements appear like extensions or expressions of the dancer, and yet clearly derive 
from the dancer. In Brown’s solo Accumulation, the opposite happens. The movements 
do not look as if they originate from Brown, but look as if they are generated through 
the movements and series of movements through which the dancer appears. From this 	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perspective, Brown’s Accumulation series problematises the conception of the subject at 
stake in modern dance, rather than constituting a complete break with it. In 
Accumulation, like in Rainer’s Trio A and Forti’s Dance Constructions, the dancer is 
objectified through the structure of the movements. This objectivation is central in these 
practices and distinguishes them from theatre or other performing arts. It is what makes 
them into art. This, however, does not mean that the dancers are reduced to objects in a 
simple sense. The objectivisation would not be able to take place without the dancer, 
who simultaneously is being subjectivised. The role of the dancer occupies the empty 
position in which it is simultaneously both subjected and becoming of subject in the 
form of a structure.  
Secondly, Balibar’s and Deleuze’s accounts of the structuralist subject is 
important because of the relation they have to the term ‘performativity’, and of the role 
this term has played in the generalisation of the category of performance within art. 
Developing Deleuze’s notion of the “structualist hero”, Balibar asks whether the subject 
as structure is doomed to Althusser’s “primitive scene of interpellation,” or whether 
new “re-commencements” are possible. Referring to Althusser’s interpellated subject in 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1970) where it is argued that “there is no 
‘subject’”, and to Butler’s appropriation and performativisation of this figure, Balibar 
opens the question of what the subjected subject really is. Butler’s articulation of the 
becoming of a subject through subjection, and Althusser’s claim that “there is no 
subject” until it is “being subjected in the moment and gesture of emergence from what 
is not yet a subject”, do not, Balibar contends, demonstrate the destruction of the 
subject. Instead, he argues, this subjectification demonstrates how there is “no structural 
constitution of the subject that is not, if not an image and resemblance of the Creator 
like the metaphysical subject, at least the performance of ironic enactment of a 
linguistic causa sui.”495 Following Balibar, the structuralist subject is a detour from the 
indeterminacy of the transcendental subject, but not from the latter’s anthropological 
dimensions, that is “if one admits that the proper object of anthropology is precisely the 
study of differential modes of subjectivity and forms of individual or collective (in fact, 
more fundamentally, transindividual) experience that correspond to them in the history 
of humanity.”496  
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Following Deleuze and Balibar, the concept of structure in structuralism, 
and its continuation in poststructuralism, is a subject-object relationship defined by the 
relations between its elements rather than their essence. It is a concept of the subject 
constituted through its withdrawal, lack or absence; it is a process in which a double 
movement of being, subjected and becoming a subject, takes place in the same instant. 
This structural subject-object is constituted in relation to an outside, or in Lacanian 
terms, to the Other. Balibar shows how the term performativity enters the discourse 
around the structure in relation to the question of the subjected subject. Butler’s concept 
of gender as performative is inseparable from a concept of the subject seen as a process 
of being subjected and becoming a subject. With this taken into account, performativity 
for Butler, or the “performance of […] a linguistic causa sui” for Balibar, is the name of 
the activity, the practice, constitutive of the structure-object. Put differently, the 
structure becomes the transcendental condition for the performance of the performative 
subject. The structure object is in that sense always performative. As a consequence, the 
poststructuralist subject, as for example Amelia Jones has it, does not get rid of the 
Kantian or Cartesian subject. It develops and complicates it.  
 
This subject-object or subject [sujet] -subjected [assujetti]-movement in the structure , 
and at work in task-dance practices of the early 1960s and early 1970s, resonates with 
Adorno’s subject-object-dialectic in the autonomous artwork. For Adorno, the modern 
artwork’s autonomy is achieved by a negation expressed through its form. The 
autonomous artwork for Adorno is expressed, presented or speaks through this 
negation. For Adorno, and as Stewart Martin puts it, “art is critical in so far as it is 
mute, in so far as what it communicates is its muteness.”497 This muteness constitutes 
what Adorno calls the “enigmatic quality” of the work of art, through which it “cavorts 
clownishly.”498 Any attempt to understand a work of art from either just the inside or 
just the outside will fail since the enigmatic dialectical quality of art makes 
understanding “itself a problematic category.”499 More specifically, what makes 
autonomous artworks, for Adorno, enigmatic is that they reverse the relationship 
between the subject and the object since artworks or art objects for Adorno act like 
Subjects.  	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They are objects that act like subjects – human subjects, individual 
bourgeois subjects – the subjectivity of which remains opaque. As 
such, works of art draw attention to the objecthood, and hence 
opacity, of human subjects themselves and thereby to the illusion 
constitutive of the philosophical concept of the subject itself (the 
illusion that the subject is not an object). That dialectical 
transformation of the object into a subject that is the work of the 
artwork is matched, epistemologically, by a dialectical reversal of the 
human subject into an object, which renders subjectivity, in itself, 
opaque.500 
 
The fact that Adorno’s conception of the autonomous artwork implies, as Osborne here 
suggests, an inversion of the Kantian transcendental subject-object relationship is 
central in relation to the concept of the structure as subject. By using the structure as the 
main form of mediation, the task-dance practices discussed in this chapter constructed a 
conception of the artwork as a performative structure-object. Subjectivity emerges in 
this structure-object through modes of subjection (becoming object). If we now take 
into account that this performative structure-object also is an autonomous art object, in 
Adorno’s sense, we might say that it performs a human Subject, and through this, 
reveals the illusion of both the transcendental subject as well as the autonomy of art. 
The objectivisation of the dancer and its movements, in Brown’s work, models the 
reversal of the subject-object-dialectic in Adorno.  
Another internal relation between Adorno’s understanding of the autonomous 
artwork and the structure concept is the relation between art and “its separation from 
empirical reality” and philosophy’s relation with its outside. If philosophy, for George 
Canguilhem, is only  possible to be achieved by working on material from outside of 
philosophy, in Adorno, the nominalistic artwork gains its radical autonomy through 
negation of that which it is, such that it becomes that what it was not.  
 
5.3. Labour in general and art in general: Marx, Bürger, De Duve and Adorno  
Adorno’s conception of the autonomous artwork complicates the Kantian 
transcendental subject much in the same way that the notion of the subject as structure 
does in Balibar. Brown’s Accumulation pieces resonate with both of these critiques, and 
with developments of the concept of the subject, through the categories of abstraction 
and generality. How might it be that the conception of the artwork as a performative 	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structure-object conditioned practically the thinking of the category art in general, and 
perhaps more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, performance in general? And 
what is the link here between abstract labour, labour in general, and post- or meta-
mediums such as performance?  
In the introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx formulates a general methodology 
for political economy, and in particular, the construction of economic categories. 
Grounded in an idea of how thought works in relation to reality, and the way in which 
knowledge is produced in this process, the main claim made by Marx is that the correct 
scientific method is “of rising from the abstract to the concrete”,501 since this is the only 
“way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in 
mind.”502 Evald Ilyenkov argues that this makes Marx’s method into a dialectical logic 
standing “against all kinds of neo-Kantian logic and epistemology which oppose, in a 
crudely metaphysical way, ‘pure forms of thought’ to forms of objective reality.”503 The 
concrete for Marx does not simply stand for–as it does in formal logic–the immediately 
given, nor does this imply that the abstract is an abstraction, that is, pure thought, of this 
sensually given.  Rather, with the concrete, Marx understands “a totality of thoughts 
[…] a product [...] of the working-up observation and conception into concepts.” All 
concrete categories, population for example, contain within them a range of abstract 
categories without which they would be inconceivable. This is why the concrete, for 
Marx, must be considered “the concentration of many determinations, hence the unity 
of the diverse.”504 With unity and totality, Marx here means “an internally divided 
totality“505, rather than a “similarity of phenomena.” This is why the concrete, for the 
mind, appears “as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, 
even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure 
for observation [Anschauung] and conception.” This however does not mean, as Marx 
criticises Hegel for, that this is “the process whereby the concrete comes into being.”506 
Rather, it is only how the concrete becomes thinkable, that is, being reproducible by the 
mind.  
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With the ‘abstract’, Marx refers to categories such as ‘exchange-value’ 
and ‘capital’, which in their function of being simple and abstract categories, only 
describe a “one-sided relation” of a more developed totality, that is, their one-sidedness 
comes from the fact that they “can express the dominant relations of a less developed 
whole.”507 The abstract for Marx, Ilyenkov writes, is “by no means a synonym of the 
‘purely ideal’, of a product of mental activity.” Rather: “Time and again Marx uses this 
term to characterise real phenomena and relations existing outside of consciousness, 
irrespective of whether they are reflected in consciousness or not.”508 The category 
population, for example, cannot exist without the category class, “of which it 
[population] is composed.”509 In the same way, the category ‘exchange-value’ makes no 
sense without a comprehension of capital. So for Marx, because the mind reaches the 
concrete by way of thought, the method for science in general, and for political 
economy in particular, must begin with the simple and abstract categories, rather than 
with the concrete real ones, since the simple abstract categories determine the larger 
concrete ones.  
Marx’s claim about abstract and concrete categories, and its consequences 
for scientific research, is made more complex by the fact that the abstract categories do 
not necessarily correspond chronologically to the concrete ones. Rather, 
 
the simple categories are the expressions of relations within which the 
less developed concrete may have already realized itself before having 
posited the more many-sided connection or relation which is mentally 
expressed in the more concrete category; while the more developed 
concrete preserves the same category as a subordinate relation.510  
 
‘Money’, for example, existed long before the more concrete category ‘bourgeois 
society’ in which money became central. It is equally possible to find communities with 
highly developed forms of economies and divisions of labour where there is no such 
thing as money. Money, in its most abstract and general form, “can only achieve its full 
(intensive and extensive) development precisely in a combined form of society, while 
the more concrete category was more fully developed in a less developed form of 
society.”511 	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 This leads Marx to make another major claim: “the path of abstract thought, 
rising from the simple to the combined” corresponds “to the real historical process.”512 
The reason for this is that “[a]s a rule, the most general abstractions arise only in the 
midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one thing appears as 
common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone.”513 
According to Marx, the most abstract categories become valid or thinkable as abstract 
categories, only when the historical relations are fully unfolded. ‘Labour’ is 
“immeasurably old.” But “when it is economically conceived in this simplicity, ‘labour’ 
is as modern a category as are the relations which create this simple abstraction.”514 
‘Labour in general,’ “presupposes a very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of 
which no single one is any longer predominant.”515 It also means that it is only in the 
most developed form of capitalist society that “the abstraction of the category labour, 
labour as such, ‘labour pure and simple’, becomes true in practice.”516 Marx here points 
to the fact that it is only when labour has reached a stage in which it is fully abstracted 
from individual producers, and therefore, when exchange has reached its full scope, that 
labour stops being thought of in connection to particular individuals or to particular 
types and crafts of labour and instead is considered ‘labour in general’. The implication, 
as Rubin puts it in more detailed historical terms, is that when exchange is international, 
there is a “full mobility of labour”517 and capital has become “the all-dominating 
economic power of bourgeois society.”518 Only then does labour become thinkable as 
what Marx in Capital describes as “human labour pure and simple, the expenditure of 
human labour in general.”519  
 
Using Marx’s epistemological method for thinking categories, and his claim that labour 
becomes general at a specific historical stage, how might we understand the condition 
for thinking a generic concept of art and its relation to labour? Bürger takes Marx’s 
“fundamental methodological insights”520 about categories and their relation to real 
historical processes into the social subsystem of art.  His argument is that the historical 	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European avant-garde movements were the first ones to make the content of the artwork 
“the disjuncture of the work and the praxis of life”521, and that they, through this artistic 
strategy, made art autonomous. Or, differently expressed, they made ‘art’ conceivable 
as a general category. “Art as institution,” he writes, “only became recognizable after 
the avant-garde movements had criticized the autonomous status of art in developed 
bourgeois society.”522 For the first time art became the critique of the separation of art 
from life, rather than a critique of styles. 
 
When the avant-gardists demand that art become practical once again, 
they do not mean that the contents of works of art should be socially 
significant. The demand is not raised at the level of the contents of 
individual works. Rather, it directs itself to the way art functions in 
society, a process that does as much to determine the effect that works 
have as does the particular content.523  
 
Underlying Bürger’s claim is the conception that the institutionalisation of the concept 
of aesthetics (Kant and Schiller), understood as a realm separated from everyday life, 
broke with previous regimes of art. From this perspective, the concept of art as 
autonomous was to a certain extent established already with the development of 
transcendental aesthetics. Bürger’s point, however, is that it is not until the 
institutionalisation of the concept of aesthetics–to which the avant-garde movements 
responded by wanting to integrate art with life–that ‘art’ and other categories belonging 
to ‘art’ became thinkable as general categories. An example of this is the category 
‘artistic means’, which could be considered the most general category to describe works 
of art, but which did not become recognised as such until the historical avant-garde 
developed. Until then the use of techniques and methods was limited by the medium 
and the period of style.  
In line with Marx, Bürger also argues that art in general was not 
recognised until the historical avant-garde movements had made their “full appearance” 
and had considered the concept of ‘self-criticism’. Presented by Marx in the same pages 
in the Grundrisse, to be ‘self-critical’ means to have a dialectical understanding of the 
past and present. Rather than regarding the present as a mere result of the past, it means 
that it is possible to understand the conditions by which thoughts and knowledge in the 
present are made possible. For Marx, an exemplary case is that of Christianity, which 	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was not able to get an “objective understanding of earlier mythologies” until it had 
developed a ‘self-criticism’ to a certain degree. “Likewise, bourgeois economics arrived 
at an understanding of feudal, ancient, oriental economics only after the self-criticism of 
bourgeois society had begun.”524 For Bürger, in a similar way, it is only with the avant-
garde movements that art begins to question itself as art. Instead of criticising particular 
elements or styles of art, art itself comes under scrutiny. Following Adorno, the self-
criticism of art as institution–expressed in the avant-garde movements’ artworks–
coincides, Bürger argues, with the development of bourgeois society and with 
capitalism as the dominating system of production. The reason why art can criticise 
itself as an institution separated from life is because it is not merely separated from life 
through the aesthetic paradigm, but also because it functions as a commodity on the 
“free” market and is “freed” from the function of representing specific institutions such 
as the church. From this perspective, the commodification of art, through which it 
detached itself from the Church and Royalty, was the transcendental condition for the 
concept of aesthetics to establish itself. 
Bürger’s achievement is that he brings a meta-perspective to Adorno’s 
construction of categories via Marx, and through this, enables a connection to be made 
between the generality of labour in capitalism and a generic concept of art. The problem 
with Bürger’s account of the category of art in general is his claim that art practices 
after the historical avant-garde no longer criticise ‘art’ itself, and therefore, are no 
longer able to render themselves visible as art. Attempts continue, he writes, “[b]ut 
these attempts, such as the happenings, for example can no longer attain the protest 
value of Dadaist manifestations, even though they may be prepared and executed more 
perfectly than the former.”525 Task-dance and event-score practices, preceding 
happenings and other performance practices, termed neo-avantgardist by Bürger, were 
the result of a critique of medium-specificity. Although modern art broke with previous 
regimes of art, mainly through different forms of abstraction, it was still mediated 
through mediums, and therefore, through craft (useful labour) and the specific materials 
belonging to these crafts (use-values). The art practices I have described were instead 
mediated through forms such as the structure, the series, the system, the event, the 
instruction and the task. These forms continued to develop art’s ontological condition as 
one based on separation and abstraction.   	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De Duve has made another attempt to construct an account of the category of art in 
general, or a generic concept of art and the concrete conditions for this. His work on 
Duchamp, set in motion–the by now–established claim that artworks are mediated 
nominally through the nominalist act ‘this is art.’ De Duve’s account of a generic 
concept of art does away with the conception of art’s historical mediation completely, 
and through this, falls into the trap of positivism. De Duve also makes a connection 
between the introduction of structure in early twentieth century painting, and the 
implications of this for a general concept of art. He also mentions the negation of 
specialised art labour skills. Art in general, De Duve writes, implied “a new set of 
aesthetic principles […] whose claim was that they were generalizable, as a form of 
thought about art in general rather than as skill confined to a specific craft.” Abstract 
art, emerging around 1912/13 with cubist and expressionist painting, was a sort of 
paradox in that it reduced painting to colour and form, but through this “would open 
onto the broadest generalization whose name was abstraction in general. Only when this 
generalization was achieved in painting did sculpture turn abstract.”526 De Duve also 
demonstrates the connection between the structure concept in structural linguistics and 
the generalisation of art labour in painting by referring to Wassily Kandinsky’s 
understanding of paint as elements of a form of universal language.  
 
Linguists would say that what Kandinsky does in this passage is 
establish the paradigmatic and syntagmatic conditions of pure colour 
as language. It is as if he had read Roman Jakobson and had posited 
the linguist’s axes of selection and combination as the linguistic 
transcendentals that, in his mind, would soon constitute the objective 
foundation for a universal language deserving to be called Malerei 
[painting], not Esperanto.527  
 
Problematising the emergence of art in general and abstract art, De Duve also notes that 
theories of the purity of colour (such as Michel Eugéne Chevreul’s) had “numerous 
parallels” with structuralist theory, and that Chevreul’s system was “no longer read as 
an application of physics to the realm of perception psychology (a typically positivist 
bias) but the establishment of a linguistic system through which ‘colo[u]r’ could ‘speak’ 
with reference to the representation of nature.”528 By establishing this connection 	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between abstraction and art in general, De Duve points to the importance of the act of 
reduction present in abstract art that also is present in event-score and task-dance 
practices. Most importantly, De Duve demonstrates the way in which the relations 
between abstract art, art in general and the structuralist concept of structure were 
present already in modern art from the early twentieth century and ran parallel to the 
historical avant-garde.  
 
5.4. Performance in general  
If De Duve managed to show the way in which the generalisation of labour partly was a 
result of the introduction of a certain idea of the structure into art, he does not make 
visible how this generality of labour beyond craft was mediated in artistic practices. The 
nominalist act of “this is art” is only one aspect of the institutionalisation of art. It does 
not give an account of art’s mediation. In the same part of Aesthetic Theory where 
Adorno discusses the nominalistic artwork, and even more so in the article “Art and the 
Arts”, Adorno also declares that the nominalistic dialectic between the universal and 
particular is destroyed with the so called “erosion of the arts”,529 which is the “powerful 
trend”530 that Adorno rightly recognised as the dominant tendency within art at the end 
of the 1960s. Describing this post- or transdisciplinary moment in art, he usefully 
summarises, in the article, some of the main tendencies of this period: “Musical 
techniques have evidently been stimulated by painting” and “inclines toward the 
graphic arts in its notation.”531 In the article, Adorno also comments on the fact that 
sculptors have “ceased to respect the boundaries between sculpture and architecture that 
had seemed evident, since they were based on the distinction between functional and 
non-functional art.”532 Adorno’s argument here is that there is a danger that the 
liquidation of the different arts might result in a tendency of artworks that cease to 
mediate themselves with universals, and instead end up, with “facticity” or literalness.533 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno calls this “unchecked aesthetic nominalism”,534 and the 
consequence is that the artwork no longer negatively mediates itself with universals (the 	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Philosophical Reader (Stanford University Press, 2003), 384.  
530 Adorno, “Art and the Arts”, 369.  
531 Adorno, “Art and the Arts”, 368.  
532 Adorno, “Art and the Arts”, 368-369.  
533 The same terms were used by Michael Fried to describe minimalist art in his essay “Art and 
Objecthood” accounted for in Chapter 3.  
534 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 287. 
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condition for the nominalist artwork), but merely gives in to the material–the 
heterogeneous–without principles of construction, technique or form. For example, 
Adorno writes of “[a]ction painting, l’art informel and aleatorical works” that they 
have stopped giving form to the material they engage with “and instead [shifted] the 
responsibility for its organization back to the contingent material itself”535 (that is, a 
kind of readymade).  The heterogeneous element of art, Adorno argues, is not 
undergoing any subjection to artistic technique in these artistic practices. This leaves, he 
claims, the materials as purely arbitrary and literal. Absolute individuation without 
technique, form or construction destroys the potential for art to mean anything at all.   
 Rather than seeing the aleatory and post-disciplinary works of the 1960s as a 
tendency of ‘unchecked nominalism’, as Adorno and following him Bürger do, they 
need to be understood as mediating other universals than the ones Adorno sets out. “For 
if modern art is to be true to its rejection of received universals in the name of 
subjective freedom, it must also reject the auto-destructive universalization of its own 
inherent nominalism and enter into new kinds of relations with universals–both old and 
new.”536 If historical avant-garde art negated the outside through forms such as 
‘structure’, ‘montage’, ‘monochrome’ and ‘collage’, art after the 1960s mediated 
heterogeneous productivity through new social forms. One of the most important of 
these was the “performative structure-object.” It was the practical condition for the 
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This thesis has constructed a critical concept of performance as it operates within a 
generic and autonomous concept of art. It has done so through a two-fold operation. 
Firstly, it has reconstructed a generic concept of performance–distinct from the 
performing arts–within the context of North-American post-WWII art. It has focused on 
two artistic strategies: task-dance and the event-score as they are derived from musical 
modernism and modern dance, primarily via John Cage and Merce Cunningham. 
Specific attention has been paid to George Brecht’s, Yoko Ono’s, Simone Forti’s, 
Yvonne Rainer’s and Trisha Brown’s performance works from the late 1950s to the mid 
1960s. Second, the thesis has considered these performance practices in explicit relation 
to concepts and categories operating within a generic and autonomous concept of art. 
The latter has, in this thesis, referred to Adorno’s understanding: art as derived from, 
yet distinctively and formally separated from, empirical reality. Together with Marx’s 
concept of practice [Praxis]–as it was formulated in his early writings–the term has 
played, a fundamental role in the construction of a critical concept of performance. The 
importance of Marx’s concept of practice, as has been demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, is that it refers to an activity that is both social and sensuously empirical, which 
is conceived as a relational activity. This reformulation radically transformed the 
categories ‘materiality’, ‘mediation’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’ as they had operated within 
German idealism and metaphysical materialism. Embedded within, but formally 
abstracted from the social relations from which it comes, the generic category of 
performance–the thesis has claimed–is a practice of relations in this sense. This has 
been argued by demonstrating the way in which task-dance and event-score practices 
have critiqued a medium-specific concept of the object, a Kantian concept of the subject 
and a traditionally metaphysical idea of materiality. The importance that Marx’s notion 
of practice has had in this thesis has also to do with the function that practice has in 
Marx’s work more broadly, and the way it lays the ground for other central categories in 
his work: ‘labour in general’, ‘abstract’, ‘concrete’ labour and ‘abstraction’. Art, as has 
been shown throughout the thesis, and in Adorno’s sense, is inseparable from the social 
and the empirical in the same way that Marx’s economic categories are equally 
important for such a generic and autonomous concept of art.  
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Other categories that have been fundamental in constructing a critical 
concept of performance are categories which are present within the discourse of a 
generic concept of performance, but which have not been confronted critically in the 
literature. Examples of such categories that have been confronted and critically 
investigated in this thesis are: ‘experience’, ‘performativity’ and ‘structure.’ This has 
been done by tracing these concepts back to their deeper and often undertheorised 
philosophical histories in pragmatism, structuralism and poststructuralism.  
The methodology used in this thesis has been critical in the sense in which Marx 
conceptualises the construction of economic categories within a broader 
epistemological claim in the introduction to the Grundrisse: Foundations of the 
Critique of Political Economy. As was shown in the introduction and in Chapter 5, 
Marx’s claim is an anti-empiricist one. Social reality must be approached through the 
most abstract categories: ‘labour’, ‘value’ and ‘capital’ in Marx’s case. I have used 
Marx’s epistemological historicising claims about scientific method as my overall 
approach and method in this thesis. I have done so by employing categories and terms 
that are central to task-dance and event-score practices, and that, I have argued, are 
internal to the more generic category performance as it operates within the context of a 
generic concept of art. Each chapter has dealt with one concept or category: ‘practice’ 
[Praxis], ‘experience’, ‘object’ [Objekt, Gegenständ], objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit], 
‘abstract labour’ and ‘structure’. Each of the five chapters has also confronted related 
terms and categories such as ‘mediation’, ‘task’, ‘event’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘reduction’. 
Instead of a chronological ordering, the chapters have proceeded through different 
categories inseparable from the more general category of performance. Each has, in this 
way, accounted for one aspect of the general category of performance, and together, 
they have given an account of how, why and in what ways such a general category 
developed within a generic concept of art.  
The main claim that has been argued in this thesis is that a critical concept of 
performance within an art context must take into account the way it operates within a 
generic and autonomous concept of art. Another central claim that has been argued 
throughout the thesis is that performance practices–developed through the artistic 
strategies of task-dance and the event-score–were central in the transformation from a 
medium-specific to a generic and autonomous concept of art. Implied in the main 
argument of this thesis is that art theory (including dance theory, theatre studies and 
performance studies), by adopting a concept of performance from cultural theory, has 
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failed in its attempts to consider performance as a generic category as well as as one 
that operates within a generic concept of art.  
 
The central problem from which this thesis set out was the way in which a cultural 
concept of performance–derived from cultural theory–has been used to engage with 
performance practices within art. Such a concept of performance has its roots in 
structuralism, pragmatism, analytic language philosophy and poststructuralism more 
broadly. It has been established in cultural theory, including Cultural-, Theatre-, 
Gender- and Performance Studies, and Art Theory. Whereas the introduction gave an 
account of three of the main concepts of performance at stake in cultural theory, 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how these have been used explicitly to engage with task-dance 
and event-score practices in art theory. On both occasions, it was shown, that although 
they take different approaches, and operate within different contexts, this concept of 
performance–broadly speaking–refers to what Roland Barthes has termed “the problem 
of meaning” present in structuralism.537 I demonstrated the way in which the terms 
performance and performativity have been used to describe the process of meaning 
production in subjectivity, gender, value and societal impact of artworks, etcetera.  Put 
differently, I showed how, performance–and the connected term of performativity–in 
the above-mentioned discourses, have been used to describe the process through which 
meaning–in its social-linguistic sense–is produced. Furthermore, I have demonstrated 
the way in which phenomena, within these discourses, are considered to produce 
different intensities or levels of meaning, while at the same time, none of these are seen 
as ontologically differentiated from any other. Throughout this thesis, and specifically 
in the Introduction, Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, I have also tried to show how this cultural 
concept of performance erases any critical concept of art. Performance practices, I have 
argued, have instead been interpreted as operating on different levels of meaning. Such 
a concept of performance, my claim has been, cannot account for performance’s central 
role in the establishment of a generic concept of art.  
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in art theory and performance studies, 
where generic performance practices are discussed, in in a two-fold way. First, it 
contributes to the existing literature because it has constructed a critical concept of 	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performance as it operates within a generic concept of art. As demonstrated in Chapter 
2, attempts have been made to investigate task-dance and event-score practices. But this 
has been done without considering these practices within ‘art’. No attention has been 
given to the way in which artistic forms are historically specific mediations of an 
autonomous and generic concept of art. This thesis, in contrast to the majority of the 
literature, has demonstrated how such a generic concept of performance was 
fundamental in the establishment of art as a generic category. Furthermore, it has 
focused on dance’s central role in the production of performance and of art as generic 
categories. Often treated separately in the literature, this thesis has re-inscribed the role 
of dance within art.  
Secondly, the thesis contributes to the existing literature because it has provided 
a critique of a cultural concept of performance, currently used uncritically within art 
theory. The thesis has traced concepts related to a cultural concept of performance, used 
within cultural theory, to their philosophical roots in pragmatism and structuralism. It 
has demonstrated their indebtedness to an Aristotelian notion of practice, and to the 
consequences of this for a non-critical concept of art. Furthermore, it has confronted the 
conception of the subject at work within such a cultural concept of performance and 
illustrated that this subject would be absolutely non-Kantian. In contrast, this thesis has 
demonstrated how a performative poststructuralist subject is dependent on the 
traditional Cartesian I.  
Chapter 1 argued that the transformation in the ontology of art towards a generic 
form of artistic being is best described as a shift towards practice, as understood in 
Marx’s elaboration of the term. This chapter also argued that post-war art practices that 
have retrospectively been labeled performance–in its generic sense–particularly those 
that took place within dance and music contexts, were central to this change. Internal to 
this latter argument, I distinguished between two tendencies in performance practices 
during the post-war period, and made the case for a certain tendency or lineage within 
these that broke with medium-specificity in a more fundamental way. I designated these 
through the distinction ‘performance’ in general and ‘performance art.’ This chapter 
also demonstrated the way in which the latter of these is best understood in terms of a 
“metaphysics of practice” in Aristotle’s sense, a practice which goes beyond the 
physical; whereas the first of these categories, and the art practices related to such a 
category, are more akin to a practice in Marx’s use of the term. Chapter 2 introduced 
task-dance and the event-score as the two most important artistic strategies within post-
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war art by focusing on Simone Forti’s Dance Constructions (1960-61) and on Yoko 
Ono’s Instruction Paintings (1961). It argued that task-dance and the event-score’s 
importance for the transformation from a medium-specific to a generic concept of art 
lay in their posing of epistemological problems. They are social and empirical, and ideal 
and material. This chapter also argued against a conception of these artistic practices, 
present in the dominant literature, as productive of unmediated experiences. It outlined 
the way in which this understanding is dominant in the literature, and traced this back to 
Dewey’s pragmatist notion of experience–at its base an interaction between an 
organism and its environment–to which a major part of the chapter is dedicated. The 
final part of this chapter confronted Dewey’s instrumental concept of experience with 
Kant’s critical epistemology, which sees experience as mediated through faculties. 
These concepts were also confronted with Aristotle’s concept of practice. The chapter 
demonstrated the way in which Dewey’s notions of experience and art fail to critique 
Kant, and instead, should be seen as a conflation of Aristotle’s concepts of practice and 
poiesis. The overall argument of Chapter 3 is that event-score and task-dance practices, 
by negating medium-specificity, constructed a new conception of the art object where 
the process of objectifying constituted the art object formally and institutionally. 
Furthermore, it was argued that this act of objectification took place in these practices 
on two distinct, yet inseparable, levels. These art practices constituted themselves 
through acts of negation, abstraction and reduction, and by so doing, produced new 
types of objects where the act of objectifying was itself made into an object. The 
objects, on the first level, were argued to be objectivitities [Gegenständlichkeiten] in 
Husserl’s sense of the term. This chapter also argued that, through the displacement or 
abstraction of these objectivities from their function and use, another type of object–an 
Objekt in Kant’s use of this term–was constructed. Following from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 
investigated task-dance practices as historically mediated forms that reflect their 
constitution as autonomous art, and as formally separated from capitalist abstract labour 
relations. The overall argument of this chapter was that early 1960s task-dance practices 
are abstract in a fundamental way that includes them within a category of art in general. 
It confronted conceptions of task-dance practices as a medium-specific craft-based 
discipline. By focusing on Rainer’s No-Manifesto, it also confronted arguments that 
Rainer’s work is “about” labour” and demonstrated that they are only so at the level of 
representation. In contrast to such conceptions, the chapter argued for task-dance that is 
ontologically related to abstract labour. Chapter 5 returned to concepts and questions 
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outlined in the introduction, and specifically the question of methodology of 
constructing categories. Focusing on Trisha Brown’s Accumulation Series (1971-73), 
the chapter demonstrated the way in which the conception of the artwork as a 
performative structure-object was the practical condition for the generalisation of the 
category performance in art. The central argument of this chapter was that event-score 
and task-dance practices proposed a new conception of the artwork that is conceived as 
a performative structure-object in a structuralist sense, and which included a critique 
and a development of the Kantian subject-object-relation. It also argued that this new 
conception of the artwork, a form of mediation, conditioned the possibility for thinking 
and institutionalising the categories ‘performance in general’ and the ‘performativity of 
the artwork’, central categories for a generic concept of art. Implicated in this argument 
was a set of relations between the concepts ‘structure’, ‘art in general’, ‘performance in 
general’, ‘subject/object’, ‘abstraction’, ‘labour in general’ and ‘performativity’. 
Furthermore, one of the achievements of Chapter 5 was that it confronted the discourses 
of structuralism and poststructuralism with critical philosophy and theory. In this way, 
this chapter went back to the central problem and question of the thesis that posed a 
confrontation between cultural and critical theory. 
 
One of the difficulties with writing this thesis concerned the problem from which it set 
out: the way in which performance practices have been understood through a cultural 
concept of performance. As I hope to have demonstrated throughout, a cultural concept 
of performance has been the main lens through which event-score and task-dance 
practices have been approached. The thesis relies upon exhibition retrospectives and 
moving-image documentation of works for its materials. To undertake archival work 
would, however, have required a discussion of the archival status of dance and 
performance work, which would have taken the thesis in a direction away from its 
conceptual and methodological concerns. Moreover, these issues have been discussed 
and researched by others within fields more appropriate for such a research, such as art 
history and museum studies.538 With regard to the question of restoring or archiving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
538 Tate Modern has organised several events exploring the issues related with documenting, archiving 
and collecting performance based works. One such example was the two-year research project 
Performance at Tate: Collecting, Archiving and Sharing Performance and the Performative. “It studied 
the museum’s practices of collecting, displaying, documenting and sharing performance and explored 
how performance practices may reframe conventional understanding of an art collection.” “Performance 
at Tate: Collecting, Archiving and Sharing Performance and the Performative,” Tate Modern, last 
accessed Dec 27, 2016, http://www.tate.org.uk/about/projects/performance-tate-collecting-archiving-and-
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performance practices, a number of choreographers that have come out of task-dance 
practices, within the last decade, have worked on strategies to restore and archive their 
work through the use of the retrospective.539 Importantly, this strategy has also been 
used as a way to move dance and choreographic practices away from the theatre into the 
museums and art galleries. Such an angle on the archival question would, in contrast to 
the question of the status of video and score-documentation, be more relevant for the 
arguments of this thesis. The focus here, however, has been on a limited number of 
historical examples; and to move into contemporary dance and performance practices 
would have moved attention away from the conceptual problems of the thesis.  
 Another difficulty with the research has concerned the two-fold operation that 
the thesis has undertaken. It has taken as its problem and framework a concept of 
performance at work in cultural theory with its roots in structuralism and pragmatism. 
Within this framework, this cultural concept of performance has been confronted with a 
critical one. The focus has been on constructing a critical concept of performance 
through new categories internal to a generic and autonomous concept of art. Yet, the 
engagement with literature on task-dance and event-score practices has also led to a 
consideration of the deeper philosophical roots of the cultural concept of performance 
used in that literature. Furthermore, demonstrated in the last chapter, performance in its 
critical sense, and as it operates within a generic and autonomous concept of 
performance, is not separable from performance in its structuralist and poststructuralist 
sense. The difficulty, throughout the thesis has been to weigh when best to move into a 
critique of a cultural concept of performance, and when to move more towards a 
construction of a critical concept of performance. In the end, the focus lies in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sharing-performance-and-performative. See also the special issue “On Archives and Archiving,” of 
Performance Research Vol 7 No. 4 (2002) edited by Richard Gough and Heike Roms.  
539 French choreographer Boris Charmatz’s project Musée de la Danse explores the possibility of using 
the institutional framework of the museum to think choreography and dance in an expanded sense. 
“Musée de la danse,” last accessed Dec 27, 2016, http://www.museedeladanse.org/fr/articles/musee-de-la-
danse. The project was invited to Tate Modern, London, May 15-16, 2015 and to Museo Nacional de Arte 
Reina Sofia, Madrid Dec 17, 2016. French choreographer Xavier Le Roy is one of many contemporary 
choreographers who has expanded the concept of the retrospective by exhibiting his own choreographic 
works as a retrospective within art institutions such as the Tapei Bienale, BAC in Beirut and MOMA in 
New York. Le Roy conceives of “Retrospective” (2012) as one of his works and writes on his website 
that it “is an exhibition conceived as a choreography of actions that will be carried out by performers for 
the duration of the exhibition. […] This exhibition employs retrospective as a mode of production rather 
than aiming to show the development of an artist’s work over a period of time.” Xavier le Roy, last 
accessed Dec 27, 2016, 
http://www.xavierleroy.com/page.php?sp=2d6b21a02b428a09f2ebd3d6cbaf2f6be1e3848d&lg=en.  
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construction of a critical concept of performance that is created through the crossing of 
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